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A
MEMENTO

TREATING,
OF THE
Rise, Progress, and Remedies of
SEDITIONS:

WITH SOME
Historical Reflections
UPON THE
SERIES of Our late Troubles.

By Roger L'Estrange.

THE SECOND EDITION.

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A MEMENTO.

C A P. I.

T H E

Matter and Causes

O F

SEDITIONS.

TH E *Matter of Seditions* (according to Sir Francis Bacon ; whose words and Authority I shall often make use of in this little *Treatise*) is of two kinds ; much *Poverty* and much *Discontentment*. The Matter of Sedition.

The *Causes* and *Motives* of *Seditions* he reckons to be these : *Innovation in Religion ; Taxes ; Alteration of Laws and Customs ; Breaking of Priviledges ; General Oppression ; Advancement of unworthy Persons ; Strangers ; Dearths ; Disbanded Souldiers ; Faëtiens grown desperate.* And whatsoever in offending People, joyneth and knitteth them in a *Common Cause*. The Causes of it,

These *Inconveniences*, either *seasonably discover'd*, colourably pretended, or *secretly promoted*, are sufficient to the foundation of a *Civil War*. In which *Negative* and *dividing Politics*, none better understood themselves than the Contrivers of our late Troubles: not only improving and fomenting *Discontentments* where they found them, and creating violent *Jealousies*, where there was but any place to *imagine* them; but they themselves were the greatest *Gainers*, even by those Grievances against which they complained: Reaping a double Benefit, first, from the *Occasion* of the *Difference*, and then from the *Issue* of it.

The Remedy. When a *seditions Humour* is once mov'd, the best Remedy is to cut off the *Spring* that feeds it: by pleasing all sorts of People, so far as possible, and by *disobliging* none, but upon *Necessity*. Which *publick tenderness* must be so managed, that the *Majesty* of the *Prince* be not lost in the *Goodness* of the *Person*: for nothing can be more Dangerous to a *Monarch*, than so to *over-court* the *Love* of his People, as to *lose* their *Respect*, or to suffer them to impute that to his *Easiness* which ought to be ascrib'd purely to his *Generosity*.

Contempt
more fatal to
Kings than
hated.

Offences of that *daring* and *unthankful* quality, can scarce be pardon'd, without some hazard to the *Authority* that remits them: *Secret Contempts* being much more fatal to Kings, than *publick* and *audacious Malice*; the latter commonly spending it self in a *particular* and *fruitless Malignity* toward the *Person* (and that with *Terrour* too, as being secur'd under a thousand Guards of *Majesty* and *Power*) whereas the *Other* privily taints the whole *Mass* of the People, with a *Mutinous Leaven*, giving *Boldness* to contrive, *Courage* to execute; and, if the Plot miscarries, there's the *Hope of Mercy* to ballance the *peril* of the *Undertaking*. For a Conclusion of this Point, *He that but thinks Irreverently of his Prince, Deposes him*.

Concerning the *Materials of Sedition*; viz. *Poverty* and *Discontentment*: it would be endless to dissolve these *General Heads* into *Particular Rules*: the best Advice in this Case must be General too; that is, to endeavour to remove whatever *Causes* them, referring the Particulars to *Counsel* and *Occasion*.

Poverty
breeds Sedi-
tion.

'Tis very well observ'd by the Lord St. Albans, touching Poverty: [*So many overthrown Estates, so many Votes for* *Trow*

Troubles; and if this Poverty and broken Estate in the better sort, be joyn'd with a Want and Necessity in the mean people, the Danger is Great and Imminent:] Which to prevent, [Above all things (says the same Author) good Policy is to be used, that the Treasure and Moneys in a State be not gathered into few hands.; for otherwise a State may have a great Stock, and yet starve: And Money is like Muck, not good except it be spread.] And again, [A numerous Nobility causeth Poverty and Inconvenience in a State, for it is a Surcharge of Expence.

A numerous Nobility causeth poverty.

As to the Seeds of Discontentments, they are as various as the Humours they encounter; dependent many times upon Opinion, and inconsiderable in themselves, however Notorious in their Effects.

Touching the Discontentments themselves, it is the Advice of the Lord Verulam, [That no Prince measure the Danger of them by this; Whether they be Just or Unjust? for that were to imagine people to be too reasonable. Nor yet by this, whether the Grievs whereupon they rise, be in Fact, great or small; for they are the most dangerous, where the Fear is greater than the Feeling.

Fears and Jealousies.

Such were those furious and implacable Jealousies, that started the late War, which doubtless may more properly be accounted among the Dotages of a Disease, or the Illusions of a dark Melancholy; than the deliberate Operations of a sober Reason.

Proceed we now from the Matter and more remote Causes of Seditions, to the Approaches and Prognosticks of them.

C A P. II.

The Tokens and Prognosticks of Sedition.

IT is in many Cases with Bodies Politick, as it is with Natural Bodies; both perish by delaying till the Distemper be grown too strong for the Medicine: Whereas by watching over, and applying to the first Indispositions of the Patient, how easie is the Remedy of a Disease, which in one day more perhaps becomes Incurable? Some take it for a point of Brui-

very, not to own any *Danger* at a *distance*, lest they should seem to *fear* it. Others are too *short-sighted* to discern it: So that betwixt the *Rash* and the *Stupid*, (a large proportion in the Division of the World) we are past the *help* of *Physick* before we can persuade our selves we need it.

Dangers (says the Incomparable *Bacon*) are no more light, if they once seem light; and more dangers have deceived Men, than forced them. Nay, it were better to meet some *Dangers* half-way, though they come nothing near, than to keep too long a *Watch* upon their Approaches; for if a man watch too long, it is odds he will fall asleep.]

Neither let any man measure the *Quality* of the *Danger*, by that of the *Offender*: For again, ['tis the *Matter*, not the *Person* that is to be consider'd; *Treason* is contagious, and a *Rascal* may bring the *Plague* into the *City*, as well as a great *Man*.] I do the rather press this *Caution*, because *Security* was the Fault of those to whom I direct it.

But what avails it to be wary of *Dangers*, without the skill and providence to fore-see and prevent them? Or what hinders us from the fore-knowledge of those *Effects*, to which we are led by a most evident, and certain train of *Causes*? States have their *Maladies* as well as Persons; and those ill habits have their peculiar *Accidents* and *Affections*; their proper *Issues* and *Prognosticks*: upon the true judgment of which Circumstances depends the Life and Safety of the Publick. Not to play the fool with an *Allegory*; Be it our care to observe the *Gathering* of the *Clouds*, before they are wrought into a *Storm*.

The dangers
of Libels.

Among the *Prefages* of foul *Weather*, the Lord *St. Albans* reckons *Libels* and licentious *Discourses* against the *Government*, when they are frequent and open: and in like sort, false news often running up and down, and hastily imbraced, to the disadvantage of the *State*.

We need not run beyond our *Memories* to agree this Point, it being within the *Ken* of our own Notice, that *Libels* were not only the *Fore-runners*, but in a high Degree, the *Causes* of our late *Troubles*: and what were the frequent, open, and licentious *Discourses* of *Cloak-men* in *Pulpits*, but the ill-boding *Play* of *Porpiscers* before a *Tempest*?

We

We may remember also the *false News* of Plots against the *Religion* and *Liberties* of the Nation, and how the *King* was charg'd as an *Abetter* of the *Design*.

We may remember likewise, how the *Irish Blood* was cast upon the Account of his late Sacred Majesty, even by Those men whose guilty Souls are to Reckon with Divine Justice for every Drop of it.

Neither have we forgotten with what *Care* and *Diligence* these *Falshoods* were dispers'd; with what Greediness they were swallow'd; nor what ensu'd upon it.

If we look well about us, we may find this Kingdom, at this Instant labouring under the same Distempers; the Press as *busy* and as *bold*; Sermons as *factionous*; Pamphlets as *seditionous*; the Government *defam'd*. The Lectures of the *Faction* are throng'd with pretended *Converts*; and scandalous Reports against the *King* and *State*, are as currant now as they were twenty years ago.

These were ill Tokens *then*, and do they signify just nothing *now*? What means all This but the new Christening of the *Old Cause*? the doing over again of the Prologue to the last Tragedy?

Sir Francis Bacon proceeds, [*That Disputing, Excusing, Cavilling upon Mandates and Directions, is a kind of shaking off the Yoke, and Assay of Disobedience; especially if in those Disputings, they which are for the Direction, speak fearfully and tenderly; and those that are against it, audaciously.*]

Herein is judiciously expressed the Motion or Gradation, from Duty to Disobedience. The first step is to *Dispute*; as who should say, *I will if I may*. The very Doubt of Obeying, subjects the Authority to a *Question*, and gives a dangerous Hint to the People, That *Kings* are accountable to their Subjects.

To *Excuse* is a Degree worse, for that's no other than a Refusal of Obedience in a Tacit Regard either of an *unjust Command* or of an *unlawful Power*.

To cavil at the *Mandates* of a Prince, is an express Affront to his *Dignity*, and within one Remove of *Violence*.

Through

Through these *Degrees*, and *slidings* from *Bad* to *Worse*, from *one Wickedness* to *Another*, our late *Reformers* Travel'd the whole *Scale of Treason*; as the *Scene* chang'd, shifting their *Habits*, till at last, quitting the *Disguise* of the *Kings Loyal Subjects*, they became his *Murderers*.

What's more familiar at this *Day*, than *disputing* His *Majesties Orders*; *disobeying* his *Proclamations*, and *vilifying Acts* of *Parliament*? Whereof there are so many, and so *Audacious Instances*, it shall suffice to have made this *General mention* of them.

Another *Observation* is, that, *When Discords and Quarrels, and Factions, are carried openly and audaciously, it is a Sign the Reverence of Government is lost.*

This was the temper of that *Juncture*, when the *Schismatical Part* of the *two Houses*, and the *Tumultuary Rabble* joyn'd their *Interests* against *Bishops*, and the *Earl of Strafford*; which *Insolence* was but a *Prelude* to the succeeding *Rebellion*.

And are not *Factions carried Openly and Audaciously* now? when the *Promoters*, and *Justifiers* of the *Murder* of the late *King*, are still continued *publick Preachers*, without the least pretence to a *Retraction*; Dictating still, by *Gestures, Shrugs, and Signs*, That *Treason* to their *Auditory* which they dare not *Utter*? What are their *Sermons*, but *Declamations* against *Bishops*: *Their Covenant-keeping Exhortations*, but the *contempt* of an *establisht Law*? How it comes to pass, *Heaven* knows; but These *Honest Fellows* can come off for *Printing and publishing* down-right *Treason*, when I have much ado to *scape* for *Telling* of it.

Whither these *Liberties* tend, let any *Man* look over his *shoulder*, and *satisfie* himself.

When any of the Four Pillars of Government, are mainly Shaken, or weakened, (which are Religion, Justice, Counsel, and Treasure,) Men had need to pray for fair weather.

To speak only of the last, The want of *Treasure* was the *Ruine* of the late *King*; Through which defect, his *Officers* were expos'd to be *Corrupted*, his *Counsels* to be *Berray'd*, his *Armies* to be ill pay'd, and consequently not well *Disciplin'd*: Briefly, where a *Prince* is *Poor*, and a *Faction* *Rich*, the *Purse* is in the wrong *Pocket*.

Multris utile Bellum, is an assured and infallible *Sign*, of a *State* disposed to *Seditions* and *Troubles*, and it must needs be,

be, that where War seems the Interest of a People, it should be likewise the Inclination of them.

Touching the *General Matter, Motives, and Prognosticks of Sedition*, enough is said; We'll now enquire into the special cause of the late Rebellion.

C A P. III.

The True Cause of the late War, was AMBITION.

THE True Cause of the late War, was *Ambition*: which being lodg'd in a confederate *Cabale* of *Scotch*, and *English*, drew the corrupted Interests of both Kingdoms into the *Conspiracy*: to wit, the *factious, covetous, Malecontents, Criminals, Debtors*: and finally, all sorts of men, whose *crimes, necessities, or passions*, might be *secur'd, reliev'd, or gratifi'd* by a change of Government. To these, were joyn'd, the *credulous, weak Multitude*; the *clamour* being *Religion, Law, and Liberty*. And here's the summ of the *Design, Pretence, and Party*.

The Rise of
the late War.

This *League* we may presume was perfected in 1637. First from the Kings Charge of *High-Treason* against *Kimbolton*, and the *Five Members*; Secondly from the *correspondent practices* in both Nations, appearing manifestly about that time: Next, 'tis remarkable, that the *English pardon* has a *Retro-spect* to the beginning of the *Scotch Tumults*; (*Jan. 1. 1637. Three Years* before the meeting of the *Long Parliament*) which Provision seems to intimate That *Conspiracy*. And now the *Poyson* begins to work.

Upon the 23 of *July* in the same Year, (according to a publicke Warning given the Sunday before) the *Dean of Edinburgh* began to read the *Service-Book* in the Church of *Saint Giles*: whereupon ensued so horrid a *Tumult*, that the *Bishop* was like to have been Murder'd in the *Pulpit*; and after Sermon scaped narrowly with his Life to his Lodgings.

The first Tumult
against
the Service-
book.

The particular recital of their following Insolencies upon the *Bishop of Galloway*, the *Earls of Traquair and Wigton*; the besieging of the *Council-House*, and contempts of the *Council*, their audacious Petitions against the *Service-Book*, and *Canons*, I shall pass over, as not belonging to my purpose.

B

Upon

The Covenanters Uſurp the Supream Authority.

Upon the 19 of *Febru.* following, a *Proclamation* was publiſh'd againſt their *Seditious Meetings*, which they encounter with an *Antiproteſt*, and preſently erect their publick *Tables of Advice and Counſel for Ordering the Affairs of the Kingdom*: The Method whereof was This. *Four principal Tables* they had. *One of the Nobility*; a *Second of the Gentry*; a *Third of the Burroughs*; a *Fourth of Miniſters*. And theſe *Four* were to prepare Matters for the *General Table*; which conſiſted of *Commissioners* choſen out of the *Reſt*.

The Inſtitution of the *Scottiſh Covenant*.

The promoters of it.

The firſt Act of this *General Table* was their *Solemn Covenant*; a Contrivance principally promoted by perſons formerly engaged in a *Conſpiracy* againſt the *King*, and, among others, by the Lord *Balmerino*, a Pardon'd *Traitor*, and the Son of One. His Father had been a *Favourite*, and principal *Secretary* to King *James*, and rais'd by him out of Nothing, to his Eſtate, and Dignity. Yet was this Thankleſs Wretch *Arraign'd* for, and *Attainted of High-Treaſon*, and after Sentence to be *Drawn, Hang'd, and Quarter'd*, he was by the Kings Mercy pardon'd, and reſtor'd. Another eminent *Covenanter* was the Earl of *Arguile*, of whom *Walker* gives this Accompt.

Hiſt. Indep. Appendix, pag. 14.

He brought his Father to a penſion; outed his Brother of his Eſtate *Kintyre*; ruin'd his *Siſters* by cheating them of their portions, and ſo enforcing them into *Cloyſters*.

It muſt needs be a *Conſcientious Deſign* with ſuch *Saints* as Theſe in the Head of it.

The Covenant a *Rebellious Vow*.

This *Covenant* was effectually no other then a *Rebellious Vow* to oppoſe the *Kings Authority*, and *juſtifie Themſelves* in the exerciſe of the *Sovereign power*, which they aſſum'd, to a degree even beyond the claim of *Majeſty it ſelf*, pleading the *Obligation of the Covenant*, to all their *Uſurpations*.

A Plea for *Treaſon*.

The *Uſurpations of the Covenanters*.

They *Levyed Aſen and Moneys*; *Seiz'd the Kings Magazines and Strong Holds*; *Rais'd Forts*; *Begirt his Caſtles*; *Affronted his Majeſties Proclamations*; *Summon'd Aſſemblies*; *Proclaim'd Faſts*; *Deprived, and Excommunicated Biſhops*; *Aboliſh'd Episcopacy*; *Iſſued out Warrants to chooſe Parliament-Commissioners*; *Renounced the Kings Supream Authority*; *Trampled upon Acts of Parliament*; *preſſing their Covenant upon the Privy-Council*. They gave the laſt *Appeal* to the generality of the People; *diſcharging Counſellors, and Judges, of their Allegiance*, and threatening them with *Excommunication*, in caſe they diſobeyed the *Assembly*.

All this they did, according to the *Covenant*; and whether This was *Religion* or *Ambition*, let the World judge.

These *Affronts* drew the King down with an Army to the *Borders*; and within two Miles of *Barmick*, the two Bodies had an *Enterview*, March 28, 1639. But the *Scots* craving a Treaty, his Majesty most graciously accorded it; Commissioners were appointed, Articles agreed upon, and a *Pacification* concluded, June 17. A Pacification with the Scots.

Not one Article of this *Agreement* was observ'd on the *Covenanters* part; but immediately upon the Discharge of his Majesties Forces, the *Scots* brake forth into fresh *Insolencies*, and the *Incroachments* upon the Prerogative; addressing to the *French King* for *Assistance* against their *Native Sovereign*: And yet the *Quarrel* was, as they pretended for the *Protestant Religion*, and against *Poper*y. Their Insolencies, delity.

In *August* 1640, they entred *England*, and upon a Treaty at *Rippon* soon after, a *Cessation* is agreed upon, referring the Decision of all *Differences* to a more General Treaty at *London*. They enter England.

In *November* began the *Long Parliament*; and now the Scene is *London*: Where with great License and Security, Parties are made, and *Insolencies* against the Government committed and authorized under protection of the *Scotch Army*, and the *City-Tumults*. By degrees, Matters being prepar'd and ripened, they found it opportune soon after, to make something a more direct Attempt upon the *Sovereignty*, but by *Request* first; and resolving if that way fail, to try to force it. The influence of the Scottish Army, and the City-tumults, upon the Long Parliament.

In *January* they Petition for the *Militia*: In *February* they secure the *Tower*; and in *March* Petition again for't: But so, that they Protest, If his Majesty persist to deny it, they are resolv'd to take it: And the next day it is Resolved upon the Question, That the Kingdom be forthwith put into a posture of Defence by Authority of both Houses of Parliament. The two Houses usurp the Militia.

In *April* 1642, the Earl of *Warwick* seizes the *Navy*, and Sir *John Hotham*, *Hull*; Refusing the King Entrance, which was justified by an ensuing *Vote*; and his Majesty proclaiming him *Traitor* for it, was Voted a *Breach of Priviledge*. The Rebellion begins at Hull.

In *May*, they pretended Governour of *Hull* sends out *Warrants* to raise the *Trained Bands*, and the King (then at *York*) forbids them; moving the County for a *Regiment* of the

The Kings defence of himself, Voted a War against his Parliament.

Treasonous Propositions of the two Houses.

Trained Foot, and a Troop of Horse for the Guard of his Royal Person : Whereupon it was Voted, That the King, seduced by wicked Counsel, intended to make a War against his Parliament, and that whosoever shall assist him, were Traytors.

They proceeded then to corrupt and displace divers of his *Servants*, forbidding others to go to him. They stop and seize his Majesties Revenue ; and declare, *That whatsoever they should Vote, is not by Law to be questioned either by the King or Subjects ; No Precedem can limit or bound their Proceedings. A Parliament may dispose of any thing wherein the King or People have any Right. The Sovereign Power resides in Both Houses of Parliament. The King hath no Negative Voice. The levying of War against the Personal commands of the King, though accompanied with his Presence, is not a levying of War against the King : but a levying War against his Laws and Authority, which they have power to declare*) is levying War against the King. Treason cannot be committed against his Person otherwise then as he was Intrusted. They have Power to judge whether he discharge his Trust or not ; that if they should follow the highest Precedents of other Parliaments Patterns, there would be no cause to complain of want of Modesty or Duty in them ; and that it belonged only to them to judge of the Law.

Having stated and extended their Power, by an *absurd, illegal, and impious severing* of the King's Person from his Office, their next work is to put Those Powers in execution ; and to subject the *Sacred Authority* of a lawful Monarch, to the *Ridiculous and Monstrous Pageantry* of a *Headless Parliament* ; And That's the Business of the 19 Propositions demanding.

Deposing Propositions of June 2.

That the great Affairs of the Kingdom and Militia may be managed by Consent and Approbation of Parliament ; all the great Affairs of State, Privy-Council, Ambassadors, and Ministers of State, and Judges, be chosen by Teem ; that the Government, Education, and Marriage of the King's Children, be by Their Consent and Approbation ; and all the Forts and Castles of the Kingdom, put under the Command and Custody of such as They should approve of, and that no Peers to be made hereafter, should Sit and Vote in Parliament.

They desire further, *That his Majesty would discharge his Guards ; Eject the Popish Lords out of the House of Peers, and put the Penal Laws against them strictly in Execution : and finally, That the Nation may be govern'd either by the Major part*
of

of the Two Houses, or in the Intervals of Parliament, by the Major part of the Council ; and that no Act of State may be esteemed of any validity, as proceeding from the Royal Authority without Them.

Upon these Terms they insisted, and Rais'd a War to Ex-
 tort them : So that 'tis clear, they both *design'd* and *fought* to
 Dethrone his Majesty, and exercise the *Sovereign Power* them-
 selves ; which was to Suit their Liberty of *Acting* to that of
Sitting, and to make themselves an *Almighty*, as well as an
 Everlasting Parliament.

The Cause of
 the War, was
 Ambition.

C A P. I V.

*The Instruments and Means which the Conspirators employ'd
 to make a Party.*

THAT their *Design* was to *usurp* the Government, is manifest:
 Now to the *Instruments* and *Sleights* they use to compass it.

The Grand Projectors knew very well that the strength of
 their Cause depended upon the favour of the Ignorant and Li-
 centious Multitude ; which made them court all people of that
 Mixture, to their Party ; (for Men of Brain and Conscience
 would never have agreed to a Conspiracy, against so clear a
 Light, so just an Interest) ; and Those they found their fast
 Friends, whom neither the Horreur of Sin, nor the brightest
 Evidence of Reason was able to work upon.

The Rabble
 were the Pil-
 lars of the
 Cause.

To fit and dispose Both Humors to their purpose; the first
 Scruple they started was Religion : which taken as they used
 it, in the external form and jingle of it, is beyond doubt, the
 best Cloke for a Knave, and the best Rattle for a Fool in Na-
 ture. Under this Countenance, the Murder of the King pass'd
 for a Sacrifice of Expiation : and those Brute Animals, that
 scarce knew the Bible from the Alcoran, were made the Arbi-
 trators of the Difference.

Religion the
 pretence.

The fear of Popery was the Leading Jealousie, which Fear
 was much promoted by Pamphlets, Lectures, and Conventicles :
 Still coupling Popery and Prelacy ; Ceremonies and the Abomi-
 nations of the Whore : by these Resemblances of the Church of
 England, to that of Rome, tacitly instilling and bespeaking the
 same disaffection to the One, which the People had to the Other.
 Their zeal was first imploy'd upon the names of Priests, and Al-

Their Zeal
 against Po-
 pery.

tar,

The Method
of the Reformation.

tar, the *Service-Book*, *Church-habits*, and *Ceremonies* : From *Thence*, they stept to the Demolishing of *Church-Windows*, *Images*, *Crosses* : the Persons of the Bishops went to't *next*, and then the *Office*. Thus far the *Rabble* carry'd it, the *Leaders* at last sharing the *Revenues* ; and here's the *Reformation* of the *Hierarchy* compleat.

Rebellion divides God and the King.

When by these Scandalous *Impositions* , the Duties of a *Christian* and a *Subject* ; *Conscience* and *Loyalty*, seem once to *enterfere*, what can be looked for, but *Rebellion*, from a Loose *Multitude* that think themselves Discharged of their *Alliance* ?

Scandal Improved,

All Governments are lyable to Abuses, and so was Ours, among the Rest ; where Personal *Faylings*, and *Excesses*, were improv'd into the Fame of an *Universal Prophaneness*, or *Apostacy*. Nor did they reckon it enough to *Expose*, and *Aggravate particular miscarriages*, and *Humane Frailties* ; but the most *horrid Crimes* Imaginable, were without either *proof*, or *ground*, or *colour*, laid to the Charge of the *Episcopal* and *Royal party* ; Both which were ruin'd by the same Method of *Calumny*, and *Sedition*.

and Invented.

The late King was betray'd by *presbyterians* in his Counsel.

The main Encouragement to their Attempt, was that, The *Presbyterians* had a strong Party in the *Kings Council* ; (and this His Majesty himself takes notice of, in his Large Declaration of 1639. Pag. 124.) by which means, the *Kings Councils* were both *Distracted* and *Betray'd* : and the *Conspirators* Secure (at Worst) of *Mediators* for a *commodious Peace*, in case they Fail'd of a *Successful War*. Nor did this Confidence deceive them, in the following Interview of the Armies near *Barwick*, where the *Covenanters* had been almost as easily Beaten as look'd upon, had not the Quarrel been taken up by an *Importune*, and *dear-bought Peace*, for that expedition cost more Money, only to *face the Scotch Rebels*, then would afterwards have serv'd His Majesty to have *Reduced the English*.

A Dear peace, the cause of a long War.

Tria pricipia.

Throughout the Menage of their Affairs, it may be Observed that they had these *Three Regards* still in their Eye, and Care. 1. To *Reproach his Majesties Government*. 2. To *Animate*, and *Reward his Enemies* : And 3. To *persecute his Friends* : And still as any thing Stuck, a Tumult ready at a dead lift to help it forward : For they were not Ignorant, that the *King* was to be *Defam'd* before he could be *Disarm'd*; *Disarm'd*, before *Depos'd*; *Deprived* of his *Friends*, before *Despoil'd*

The Method of Treason.

spoild of his Rights and Privileges : and That being their Design, This was Rationally to be their Method.

Their first Uproar about the *Service-book*, was but a wild tryal how far the *Multitude* would *Engage*, and the *Magistrate* *Endure* ; which appeared in This, that the *City-Magistrates* did at first, Earnestly, and Publicly *protest*, not only *against* the *Outrage* ; but for the *Liturgy* : not daring to do Otherwise ; till a while after, Encouraged by the *Boldness* and *Importunity* of the *Offenders*, and the *Patience* of some in *Authority* ; those very Persons did in their Pulpits, and Discourses, magnifie that *Beastly Crew* for the *Worthies* of the Age, whom just before they had decry'd for *Rogues* and *Villains* : The Truth is, they were Then about to play the *Rogues*, *Themselves* ; and when persons of *Quality* turn *Rascals*, Then do *Rascals* become persons of *Quality*.

Rebellion begins in Confusion, and ends in Order.

At the beginning of the Broyl, half a douzen broken heads had saved Three Kingdoms. Who would have own'd That Rabble, had they been *Worsted* ? or, What *Resistance* could they have made to any *Legal Opposition* ? But they were *Flatter'd* to be *Quiet*, and That advanc'd this *Tumult* to a party ; the Faction growing every day more and more formidable.

As their *Strength* encreased, so did their *Pretences*, both in *Number*, and *Weight* ; and nothing less would content them, then to strip the *King* as bare, as they had done the *Bishops*. The particulars of their *Insolencies* are too many for a *Treatise*, and in Truth, too foul for a *Story* ; but in gross, nothing was wanting to the perfection of the *Wickedness*, which either *Hypocrisie*, *Perjury*, *Treason*, *Sacrilege*, *Rapine*, *Oppression*, *Forgery*, *Scandal*, *Breach of Faith*, *Malice*, *Murther*, or *Ingratitude* could contribute. All which, in every Point shall be made good by several *Instances*, if any Man require it.

We'll now look Homeward, where we shall find the *English* *Rebellion* wrought, to a Thridd, according to the Trace of the *Scottish Pattern*.

The English follow the Scottish pattern.

The *Press* and *Pulpit* were already at the Devotion of the *Reforming Party*, the *Covenanters* had an *Army* on Foot, and the *Schismatiques* were prepar'd for a *General Rising* ; at which time, his Majesty Summon'd a *Parliament*, to assemble in *November* following.

In This Contention, those of the *Confederacy*, made it their first work to engage the *People*, by ripping up of *Common Grievances*,

The prologue to the late War.

Loyalty per-
secuted.

Grievances, Breach of Laws and Priviledges; and by contend-
ing to assert their *Rights, Liberties, and Religion*, against the
Encroachments of *Prerogative*, and *Papery*. Being secure of
their Party, they propose next the *Manner* of accomplishing
their Purpose; which must be Effected by *Craft and Terrour*.
In Order whereunto, They first attack'd Two of his Maje-
sties prime *Counsellors* and *Confidants*, the Earl of *Strafford*, and
the *Arch-Bishop* of *Camerbury*; (Two Persons worthy of
the King's Trust and Kindness, however Worried by the
Multitude). To weaken the *Lords House*, they null'd the
Bishops Votes, and Committed Twelve of them for *Treason*;
Five of the *Judges* were Committed likewise: And to dispose
the *Lower-House*, nothing was wanting which either *Force*,
Flattery, *Corruption*, or foul-play in *Elections* could Procure
them.

So far as the King *Granted*, all went well; but if his Ma-
jesty deny'd them any Thing, the Fault was laid upon his
Evil Counsellors: Under which Notion all his *Friends* were
comprehended. So that his Choice was This; either to give
away his *Crown*, or to have it *wrested from him*.

In *May*, the Faction of the *Two Houses* Publish'd a *Prote-
station*, (which was but a Gentle slip into the *Prerogative*
Royal to try their *Interest*, and by degrees to inure the Peo-
ple to their intended and succeeding *Usurpations*. Some four
or five days after, were signed those *Two Fatal Bills*, for the
Death of the *Earl of Strafford*, and the *Perpetuity* of the *Par-
liament*: And having now gain'd leave to sit as long as they
please, they have little futher to ask, but that they may like-
wise do what they list.

Rebellion re-
warded.

Where *Loyalty* was made a *Crime*, 'twas fit *Rebellion* should
pass for a *Virtue*. Upon which suitable equity, the *Scots*
were Justified, and *Voted*, our Dear Brethren, 300000*l.* in *June*
1641, and *Six-score thousand* more in *August* following, and
so we Parted.

The King goes
for Scotland.

In this Perplexity of Affairs, the King takes a Journey in-
to *Scotland*, if possible, to secure an Interest there; but the
Conspiracy was gone too far to be compos'd by Gentleness.
Upon his Majesties Departure, the *Houses Adjourn*, and du-
ring the *Recess*, appoint a *standing Committee*, and They for-
sooth must have a *Guard*, for fear of their own Shadows.
In which *Interval* of the King's *Absence*, the *Usurpers* lost

no time, as appear'd by their readiness to Entertain him at his Return: When the first Present they made his Majesty, ~~was the Perition~~, and ~~Remonstrance~~ of December 15; which I cannot think upon, but that Text comes into my mind, of Mark 15. 18. [*Hail King of the Jews, and they smote him on the head with a Reed, and spate upon him, and bowed the head, and did him reverence.*]

This *Impious Libel* was seconded with an *Audacious Tumult*, even at the *Gates* of the King's *Palace*; and it was now high time for his Majesty to enquire into the *Contrivers* and *Abettors* of these and other the like *Indignities*; and *Proclamation* was accordingly made for the *Apprehending* of them; which very *Proclamation* was declared to be a *Paper False, scandalous, and Illegal*.

The King Affronted by Tumults first; And Then for complaining of them.

After this *Language*, what had they more to do, but by *Armed Violence* to *invade* the *Sovereignty*, and to improve a *loose and popular Sedition*, into a *Regular Rebellion*? Which was a little hastned to, even beside the *Terms of Ordinary Prudence*) to implunge their *Complices* beyond *Retreat*, before they should discern that hideous *Gulf* into which their *Sin* and *Folly* was about to lead them. To keep their *Zeal* and *Fury* waking, the *Faction* had a singular *Faculty* at *Inventing* of *Plots*; *Counterfeiting Letters*; *Intercepting Messages*; *Over-hearing Conspiracies*: Which *Artificial Delusions* especially asserted by the pretended *Authority* of a *Parliament* and a *Pulpit*) could not but work strong *Effects* of *Scruple* and *Jealousie*, upon a *pre-judging* and *distemper'd* *People*.

These were the means and steps by which they gain'd that *Power*, which afterward they *Employed* in *Opposition* to those very ends for which they swore they Rais'd it; leaving us neither *Church*, nor *King*, nor *Law*, nor *Parliaments*, nor *Properties*, nor *Freedoms*. Behold! the *Blessed Reformation*: Wee'l slip the *War*, and see in the next place what *Government* they *Gave* us in *Exchange* for That they had *Subverted*.

C A P. V.

*A short View of the Breaches and Confusions betwixt the Two
Factions, from 1648, to 1654.*

IT cannot be expected that a Power, *acquir'd by Blood and Treason*; maintain'd by *Tyranny*; the Object of a *General Curse and Horror* both of *God and Nature*; only *United against Justice*, and at perpetual *Variance* with it self :---I say, it cannot be expected, that such a Power as this should be *Immortal*. Yet is it not enough barely to argue the *Fatality of Wickedness*, from the *Certainty of Divine Vengeance*; and There to stop :---*Usurpers* are not rais'd by *Miracle*, nor cast down by *Thunder*; but by our *Crimes or Follies* they are *Exalted*, and Then, by the *Fatuity* of their own *Counsels*, down they *Tumble*. Wherefore let us enquire into the *Springs and Reasons* of their *Fortunes and Falls*; as well as Gaze upon the *Issues* of them: A timely search into the *Grounds of one Rebellion*, may prevent another. How the *Religious Opposers* of the late King *advanced themselves against his Sacred Authority*, we have already shew'd; be it our business here, to *Observe their workings, one upon the other*.

The Presbyterians ruin'd by their own Arguments.

To begin with *Them*. that began with *Us*: The *Presbyterians*, having first asserted the *Peoples Cause* against the *Prerogative*, and attempting afterwards to *Establish Themselves*, by using *Pregogative-Arguments* against the *People*; found it a harder matter to *Erect an Aristocracy* upon a *Popular Foundation*, than to *subvert a Monarchy* upon a *Popular Pretence*; or to dispose the *Multi-tude* (whom they themselves had *Declar'd to be the Supreme Power*) to *lay down their Authority at the Feet of their Servants*. In fine, they had great *Difficulties* to straggle with, and more than they could overcome: (I mean, *great Difficulties* in point of *Interest*, and *Conduct*; or those of *Honour and Conscience*, they had subdu'd long since) They strove however, till oppress'd by a *general hatred*, and the *Rebound of their own Reasonings*, they *Quitted to the Independents*.

Thus

Thus departed the *Formal Bauble, Presbytery*; succeeded, for the next Four years, by the *Phanaticism* of a *Free-State*. The better half of which time, being successfully Employ'd in the subjecting of *Scotland*, and *Ireland* to their power, and *Model*, and to compleat their *Tyranny* over the Kings *Best* Subjects, and their *Usurpations* over his *Royal Dominions*; Their next Work was to make themselves Considerable *Abroad*, and 'twas the Fortune of the *Dutch* to feel the First proof of That Resolution.

Betwixt these *Rival States* pass'd Six *Encounters* in 1652. most of them Fierce and Bloody, the Last especially, a *Tearing* one. Upon the whole, the *Dutch* lost more, but the *English* got little, beside the *Honour* of the *Victory*: in which particular, the *Kingdom* pay'd dear for the *Reputation* of the *Common-Wealth*. Quarrels with the Dutch.

This *success* rais'd the *pride* and *vanity* of the *English*, so that at next *Bout*, nothing less would serve them than an *absolute Conquest*. But while they are providing for it, and in the *huff* of all their *Glory*; behold the *Dissolution* of the *Long-Parliament*; which whether it *began* or *ended*, more to the satisfaction of the *People*, is a point not yet decided. The Long Parliament dissolved.

Dissolved however it is; and *Rebuk'd* for *Corruptions*, and *Delays*, by *Cromwell*; who with his *Officers*, a while after, Summon a *new Representative*; and *Constitute* a *new Counsel* of *State*, compos'd of *Persons* entirely disaffected to the *Common-wealth*. This Little, Ridiculous *Convention*, thought to have done mighty *Matters*, but the *Plot Vented*, and *Vanish'd*.

Some of their *Memorable Fopperies* are These: The Famous *Act* concerning *Marriages*, was *Theirs*; they pass'd likewise an *Act* for an *Assessment* of 120000 *l. per Annum*; they Voted down the *Chancery* and *Tythes*; they Voted also a *total Alteration* of the *Laws*. Barebones Parliament: Their Acts.

All of a mind they were not, and for *Distinction* sake, the company was divided into the *Honest party*, and the *Godly party*. Of the former, were *Cromwell's* *Creatures*, and of the Other, *Barebones*; or rather, *Harrisons*; (the *Person* they had design'd for *General*, if they could persuade *Cromwell* to quit his *Secretary* for some additional *Title* of *Dignity*.) These Zealous *Patriots* Commonly brought their *Bibles* into the *House* with them; and as I am Enform'd, divers of them were seeking Their Zeal.

ing the Lord with Vavasor Powell, when This following Trick was put upon them.

Their Dissolu-
tion.

The corrupti-
on of a Con-
venticle, is the
Generation of
a Protector.

Cromwell In-
stalled, and
Sworn Pro-
tector.

A Councell of
one and Twen-
ty.

An Hour or two sooner in the morning then usual, Decemb. 12. he that they call'd their *Speaker* took the *Chayr*; and it was presently *Mov'd* and *Carry'd*, (for several Reasons) to re-assign their power to him from whom they had it; which was immediately persu'd, and so they made *Cromwell* a Prince, for making *Them* a Parliament.

This gracious *Resignation* produc'd that blessed *Instrument* of Government, by which the *Hypocrite* was made *Protector*; and now forsooth the style is chang'd from *The Keepers of the Liberty of England* by Authority of Parliament, into *Oliver Lord Protector of the Common-wealth of England, Scotland, and Ireland, &c.* who was Installed and Sworn, Decemb. 16. 1653.

To his Assistance was appointed a Councell of 21. the *Quorum*, 13. By whom immediately upon the Death of the present Protector, should be chosen one to succeed him, (always excepted the *Right Line* from the choice) 'Tis suppos'd, that *Lambert* had an eye upon himself in the reach of That Article, and a particular influence upon the drawing of it, being at That time Popular enough with the Army to hope for any thing. A while after the Establishment of this Traytour, comes forth an *Ordinance, Declaring Treasons*; and now his Highness thinks himself in the saddle; especially having beaten the Dutch into One Peace, and Treated the Swede into Another, which were proclaim'd soon after.

Having run through the Narrative of those Considerable Changes, and Confusions, of Power, which interviened betwixt the Murder of a most Gracious Prince, and the appearing Settlement of an Usurping Tyrant, we'll make a little stand here; and look behind us.

Cromwells Ma-
sterpiece.

The Two Main Engines that made *Cromwell* Master of the Army, were first, The *Self-denying Ordinance* by which he Worm'd out the *Presbyterians*, and Skrew'd in his own Party: The Second, was The *Vote* of March 19. 1646. for the Disbanding of so many Regiments, and sending Others for Ireland. This Vote was privily procur'd by himself and Ireton: which he foresaw must necessarily enflame the Army; and so it did, never to be reconcil'd.

This Breach was the setting up of *Cromwell*: and the Foundation of his succeeding greatness. It was the Impression of *That Vote* that baffled, and purg'd the House in 47. Forced it, in 48. and Dissolv'd it, in 53. after which he call'd *Another*, that dy'd *Felo de se*, and Bequeathed to his Excellency the Government.

The Foundation of Cromwells Greatness.

Had the Devil himself destroy'd that Faction, the Nation would have Thank't him for't; so 'tis no wonder if his *Advance* was smooth, and Prosperous: but now He's Up, how to maintain his Power, against a General *Odium*, and *Interest*; how to get himself forc'd to exchange *That Temporary Title of Protector*, for the more *Stable, Legal, and desirable Name of King*, without discovering his Insatiate *Longing* for it: This is a Point of *Mastery*, and *Cunning*; and Possibly the Thing that brake his *Heart*, was his *Dispair* to Accomplish it.

The *Faction* has already trod the *Round of Government*; The *Lords and Commons*, outed the *King*; the *Commons*, the *Lords*; the *Multitude*, the *Commons*; (and with the Fate of all *Rebellious Causes*; *seeking Rest, but finding None*) At last, up goes the *Pageantry of a Monarch, Cromwell*; whose *Temper, Straights, and Politicks*, shall be the Subject of the next Chapter.

C A P. VI.

The Temper, Straights, and Politicks, of Cromwel, during his Protectorship.

THE *Character of This Glorious Rebel*, is no further my purpose, then as it leads to a right Judgment of his *Actions*, and the *Confusion* of his *Adorers*.

Of strong *Natural Parts*, I perswade my self he was, though some think otherwise, imputing all his Advantages to *Corruption, or Fortune*, (which will not be deny'd however to have concurr'd powerfully to his Greatness). Nor do I pretend to collect his *Abilities* from his *Words*, any more then the World could his *Meaning*, save that the more entangled his *Discourses* were, I reckon them the more *Judicious*, because the fitter for his *Business*. His *Interest* obliging him to a *Reserve*, for he durst neither clearly Own his Thoughts, nor Totally

Cromwells Character.

tally *Disclaim* them; the *One* way endangering his *Design*, and the *Other*, his *Person*. So that the skill of his Part lay in This; neither to be *mistaken* by his *Friends*, nor *understood* by his *Enemies*. By This middle Course he gain'd *Time*, to *remove Obstacles*, and *ripen Occasions*; which to *emprove* and *fol-*
low, was the peculiar *Talent* of that *Monster*.

To these *enablements* to *Mischief*, he had a *Will* so *prostitute*, and *prone*, that to express him I must say, He was made up of *Craft* and *Wickedness*; and all his *Faculties*, nay all his *Passions*, were *Slaves* to his *Ambition*. In fine, he knew no *Other* measure of *Good* and *Bad*, but as things stood in *This* or *That* Relation to his *Ends*; which I the less admire, when I consider that he was brought up in a *Presbyterian School*: where *Honour*, *Faith*, and *Conscience* weigh nothing, further then as they subserve to *Interest*. But enough of *This*.

In the foregoing Chapter we have Plac'd the *Protector* in the *Chair*, but not the *King* in the *Throne*; the *Power* he has already, but wants the *Title*; and, which is worse, he dares not offer at it, being equally affray'd to *own* his *Longing*, or to *miss* it. In This *Distraction* of *Thought*, his *Jealousie* joyns with his *Ambition*; *Sollicitous* on the *One* hand for his *Family*, and on the *Other* for his *Safety*. For his *Family*, in point of *Grandeur*, and for his *Safety* Thus.

Council! Je-
alous of his
Council.

After his *Death*, according to the *Instrument*, the *Council* is to chuse a *Successor*, and whoever gapes to be the *One*, is sup-
posed to wish for the *Other*; which probably they had rather *hasten*, then *wait* for: So that This *Miserable* creature being peyned, betwixt the *Hazard* either of *enlarging* his *Power*, or having it thus *dependent*; and the *disdain* of seeing it *limited*, enters into a restless *suspicion* of his *Council*, and no way to be quieted but by *depressing* Those that *Rais'd* him. So much for the *first Difficulty*, a *second* follows.

And of his Ar-
my.

His *Design* had These *Three Grand Enemies*. The *Royalists*, The *Presbyterians*, and the *Common-wealths-Men*: the *Last* of which compos'd the *Grois* of his *Army*; whom he had so *inur-*
red to the *Gust* of *Popularity*, and *Freedom*, and so *enslam'd* a-
gainst the *Tyranny* of *King-shp*, that the bare *Change* of the
word *Common-wealth*, to *Kingdom*, had been enough to have
cast all into a *Revolt*.

These were the main *Impediments* of His Majesty that would
be; and now we'll touch upon the *Shifts* and *Tricks* his *High-*
ness us'd to *Remove* them. Crom-

Cromwell having squander'd away his *Money*, and taking occasion from the *Salisbury Rising* in 1654. to Squeeze the *Cavaliers* for more ; *Kills two Birds with one stone*, by Commissioning some of those Persons which he most apprehended in his Counsell, to do his work : whom under the Name of *Major-Generals*, and with a Power at *Liberty*, (doubtless foreseeing how they would abuse it) he places as *Governours* over the *Several Counties*. These he employs to Levy his barbarous *Decimation*, which when they had done, and by a Thousand Insolencies enraged the People, he laies them aside ; being now become, of the most Popular of the Party, the most *Abominated* Creatures of the *Nation*.

Oliver erects Major-Generals, and then fools them.

Touching the *Royallists*, no good for him was to be hop'd for There, but by *Goals*, *Exile*, *Selling* them for *Slaves*, *Famishings*, or *Murther* : all which was abundantly provided for, by *Sequestrations*, *Pretended Plots*, *High-Courts of Justice*, *Spyes*, *Decoyes* &c. Nay (for the very *Dispatch* sake) when they should resolve upon the *Massacre*, (which beyond doubt they meant us) No *Cavalier* must be allow'd so much as the least piece of *Defensive Arms*, by an *Order of Nov. 24. 1655*.

The Persecution of the Cavaliers.

No Person suffer'd to keep in his house as *Chaplain* or *School-Master*, any *Sequestred* or *Ejected Minister*, *Fellow of a Colledge* : or *School-Master*, nor suffer his *Children* to be taught by such. Nor any Person of that *Quality* must be permitted to *Teach* a *School*, either *Publick*, or *Private* ; Nor *Preach*, but in his *Own Family*, nor *Administer* the *Sacraments*, nor *Marry*, nor use the *Common-Prayer book*, &c.

This was the only Party the *Rebels* fear'd and ruin'd ; but for the *Presbyterians* they knew they'd never *Joyn* to help the *King* ; and single they were *inconsiderable*.

The *Common-wealths-Men* finally contented themselves with the Name of a *Common-wealth*, under the *Exercise* of a *Single Person* ; so that by This Method of *Engaging one Party*, *conquering at another*, and *crushing the Third* : This Tyrant gave himself the *Means* and *Leisure* to fortifie his *Interests* some other way.

He had already try'd a *Parliament* of his own *Call* ; that met, *Septemb. 3. 1654*. *Five* or *Six* dayes are spent in dangerous *Debates* about the *Government*, and the *Authority* by which they are *Convened*. This, *Oliver* did not like, and sent them an *Appointment* to meet him (on the 12.) in the

Cromwells Tent of the *House*.

Painted Chamber : where discoursing the *Reciprocaltyes* betwixt Him and his Parliament ; The *Fundamentals* of the Government, as to a *Single Person* ; the *Succession* of Parliaments ; their *mutual Interest* in the *Militia* ; and *Liberty* of Conscience ; and that These Particulars they were *Entrusted* to maintain ; concluded, that *finding a Design* among them to overthrow That *Settlement*, he was necessitated to appoint a *Recognition*, for every Man to sign, before he could be re-admitted into the House ; which *Recognition* was as follows.

The Recognition.

I A. B. do hereby Promise and Engage my self to be true and faithful to the Lord Protector, and the Common-wealth of England, Scotland, and Ireland : and that according to the Tenure of the Indenture, whereby I am returned to serve in This Present Parliament ; I will not propose, or give my consent to alter the Government, as it is settled in one Single Person and a Parliament.

This was no Conventicle for Cromwell's Turn ; so that after Five Months sitting, This Puppet of a Prince did formally dissolve it, in hope the next might use him better.

His Credit though but small at Home, had better luck abroad ; The Dutch, the Sweed, and then the French, entred a League with him, and the effect of this Conjunction hasten'd his Ruine. I must not overslip that One Condition with the French, was the Extrusion of our Gracious Sovereign, with his Adherents, out of the French Kings Dominions.

Flush'd with Success, and Vanity, nothing less serves us now, then the Spaniards part of the West-Indies. By whose advice, it matters not ; but in Decemb. 1654. a Considerable Fleet sets Sail from Ports-Mouth, and about mid-April, 1655. arrives at St. Domingo ; Briefly, the Voyage was disastrous, and those that Scap'd the Fate of That Attempt, dispos'd their After-game for Jamaica. To Ballance This disgrace, Blake made amends at Tunis, firing Nine Frigates in the Port Ferino, and came off fair at last.

Cromwells design upon St. Domingo, Disastrous.

Blake makes amends at Tunis.

His Success against the Plate-Fleet near the Bay of Cadiz.

Olivers nex design was to intercept the Plate-Fleet ; and within four Leagues of the Bay of Cadiz, the English engaged eight Galeons, whereof only One Scap'd, Two were Taken, and the Rest Sunk, Burnt, or Sranded : This disappointment to the Spaniard was a bitter one, and the Success as seasonable to the English ; Yielding them both a Prodigious Booty, and a Dreadful

Dreadful Reputation. But these *Successes* were to *Cromwell*, as a good *Hand*, or two, to a *Young Gamester*; only *Temptations* to a *Course* will ruine him.

While these *Exploits* were driving on, *Abroad*, Others were in the *Forge* at *Home*. *Here*, to gain *Love*; There, *Awe* and *Credit*, with as much *Money* toward the *Purchase* as the *Fates* pleas'd. Upon the *Royallists*, his *Flatteries* wrought little, as being a *Party* mov'd neither by *Security*, nor *Profit*, (where the *King's* *Interest* was the *Question*.) Both which, they freely *Sacrificed* in their first dutiful *Engagement* with him: and to the last stood firm, through the whole *course* of *Oliver's* most furious *Extremities*. But other *Instruments* there were of a more tractable and complying *Temper*, and These *Forefooth*, (*Ten*, *Twenty* perhaps in a *Country*) worship'd the *Golden Calf*, and in the *Name* of the *People* of *England*, *Addressed*, *Congratulated*, [*Engaged themselves to stand by and assist him to the Uttermost, in the discharge of the Trust which so remarkably was devolved upon him.*] This is the *Style* of that from *Bucks*. Addressees.

To these *Appearances* of a general *Good-liking*, were added the *Conjoynnt-endeavours* of his *Dependents* and *Allies*; which being *Numerous* in *Truth*, and *Considerable* by *Employment*, gave no small *Succour* and *Support* to his *Ambitious Project*, and *Tottering Greatness*. As by the *Influence* they had upon the *Juncto*, in *Sep.* 1656, more eminently appear'd; consisting of near a 100 *Military Officers*, 40 or 50 of his *Allies*, *Domesticks*, and particular *Creatures*; (I speak the *least*) beside their *Seconds*: a mixture there was likewise of certain *Persons* truly *Honourable*, but divers being *excluded*, and the rest *over-voted*, their *Interest* came to *nothing*. Oliver's Kindred stood his Friends.

These were no *Strangers* to their *Masters* pleasure, and what *That* was, may be collected from the *Votes* they passed to please him. The *Main* were these:

1. *An Act for Renouncing and Annulling the Title of Charles Stuart to the Three Kingdoms.*
2. *For the Securing of the Protector's Person, and preserving the Peace of the Nation.*
3. *The humble Petition and Advice.*] Wherein was plentifully provided whatever might conduce to his *Establishment*, the most material *Points* being these following. (Only *Protector* should have been *King*, if he had pleas'd.)

The Petition
and Advice to
Declare his
Successor.

1. *That under the Name and Style of Lord Protector, &c. He should in his Life-time Declare his Successor, and Govern according to the Petition and Advice, in Matters therein express'd, and in other things according to the Law of the Land.*

2. *That he would call Parliaments for the future, Consisting of Two House, &c. ----and Triennial at least.*

Oliver's Other
House.

3. *That the Quorum of the Other House be One and twenty, and the Number not above Seventy, Nominated by his Highness, and Approved by that House.*

Privy-Council.

4. *That the Quorum of his Privy Council be Seven, and the Number not exceeding One and twenty: and that Sitting, the Parliament, the Standing Forces of this Commonwealth be disposed of by the chief Magistrate, with the Consent of both Houses; and in the Intervals, by advice of his Council.*

Revenue.

5. *That a constant yearly Revenue of Thirteen hundred thousand pounds be forthwith Settled, and no Part thereof to be raised by a Land-Tax: A Million of this Money for the Navy and Army, the rest for the Support of the Government: Other Temporary Supplies being left to the Judgment of the House of Commons.*

Cavaliers in-
capable of
Office.

6. *That all that ever serv'd the King Loyally and Constantly, be made Incapable for ever of any Office or Place of Trust in any of the Three Nations. The Rest is Formality.*

To these Propositions, his Highness *A M E N* is not to be doubted, and in Form, May 25. 1657.

The *L O R D P R O T E C T O R* doth Consent.

Here's in the *First*, his Family Secur'd. In the *Second*, his Interest; (3. *One House* consisting of his own Creatures). In the *Fourth*, the *Standing Army* is his own; (that is, in the *Intervals* of Parliaments, which he can Dissolve at pleasure). In the *Fifth*, a *Revenue* propos'd: And lastly, His *Enemies* cast at his Feet.

On the Day following (June 26. was presented an *Additional and Explanatory Petition and Advice*: Desiring,

That Forty and One Commissioners be appointed by Act of Parliament, who, or any Five of them, shall be Authorised to Examine the Capacities of Members to be chosen into future Parliaments, and every unqualified Member to forfeit a Thousand pounds, and suffer Imprisonment till he pay it.]

The Forms of several Oaths are likewise offered, to be taken by the Protector, his Council and Members of Parliament; and, his Highness is further desir'd to Issue forth his Summons in due form

of Law to such as he should think fit to Call to his Other House.
To all which----

The LORD PROTECTOR doth Consent.

Divers Bills his *Highness* pass'd, that his people scarce thank'd him for; *Money-Bills* very many, and so the Thing was Adjourn'd till the *Twentieth* of Jan. next.

But we must not forget the Solemn Investiture of the Protector, by Authority of Parliament; (forsooth) and yet we must not make the Bauble Proud neither, by saying too much on't.

The Foolery was perform'd in *Westminster Hall*, where his *Highness* was presented with a Coat: to wit, *A Robe of Purple-Velvet, lin'd with Ermins; A Bible, Gilt and Boss'd; a Sword: And lastly, a Scepter of Massie Gold.* When he was Girt and Vested, he lift up his Eyes to Heaven, and took an Oath, (not the First he had broken by many a Thousand) which being dispatch'd, Mr. Manton Consecrated the Independent Foppery, with a *Presbyterian Blessing*; after which his *Highness* being Publish'd and Proclaim'd, the Comedy concluded.

Cromwell Installed Protector.

But Comedy and Mr. Manton will scarce agree in the same Period: and why? Let us *Expostulate*. Does not a Counterfeit or a *Mimique* better become a Stage than a Pulpit? Or is it not as lawful to see Honest Lacy play a snivelling *Schismatick*, as a perfidious bloody Traytor to sustain the Person of a Gracious Prince? Yet here his *Holiness Acts his Part himself*; (or in the *Gibberish* of the Brethren) performs the Duty of the Day: Pronouncing a Blessing upon the *herrid and ridiculous Spectacle*.

Did not Mr. Manton know that Cromwell was an *Impostur*; and that the Purple Robe he ware, belong'd not to his Shoulders? How as a Minister of the Gospel then, could he Officiate to such a piece of Pageantry? It minds me of *Mazarine's Kinsman*, that upon a Good-Friday, in Derision, Crucified a Frog.

He knew moreover, that he was a Murderer, and an Usurper, and that the Gawdy Bible then before him, was but to Him the Book he Conjur'd by. How as a Christian could he own the Augury?

Further, He knew whose Blood he had Spilt, whose Rights he usurped; and that the murder'd Father, and his injur'd Successor were Both his SOVERAIGNS: The Ceremonial Sword and Scepter likewise he knew the meaning of. How as a Subject then could he submit to Countenance so Undutiful an Undertaking?

Laſtly, He knew that the *Design* was (in *Truth* utterly *Atheiſtick*, but in *ſhem*) *Independent*. *How* as a *Presbyterian* could he agree to't ?

For all this now, Mr. *Manton* may thank himſelf. 'Tis true, he did Exceeding well, on the late *Faſt*, to reckon *Drunkenneſs*, and *Prophanneſs* among Thoſe *Crying Sins* that draw God's *Judgements* upon a People, and Earneſtly to preſs a *Reformation*. But, how come *Plays* into the *Rank* of theſe *Provoking Sins* ? Or, what does *Hiftrionaeſtic* in the *Pulpit* ? [*The Theaters* (it ſeems) are ſo *Throng'd* with *Coaches*, his *Greatneſs* can ſcarce paſs the *Streets* : *Thoſe Temples of Satan*, &c.] And what would he now have the *World* believe of Thoſe that *Frequent* Them ? Is not this, *Laſhing* of a *Party*, under the diſguiſe of *taking* a *Vice* ? or Certainly, 'tis a *Strange Conſcience*, that adores *Catiline* in a *State*, and *Scruples* him upon a *Stage*. Would not a *Whip* on the *Other* hand do well ſometimes ?

I would go *Five Miles barefoot* to hear a *Preſbyterian* Preach, that the *fiſt War* in 1642. *Rays'd* by the *LORDS*, and *COMMONS* was a *REBELLION*.

It muſt not be ſuppoſed that the *fiſt Tender* of the *Petition* and *Advice* under the *Recall* Stile, was without *Cromwells* *Privy*, and *Liking* ; and beyond doubt, the *Title* was a *Bait* he *Lick'd* his lips at : but the *Old Fox* durſt not *Bite* ; and he had *Reaſon* to be ſhy, finding how great a *Flame* the *fiſt Bruit* of the *Propoſition* had *Rays'd* among the *Seſtaries* : That very *Ninth of April*, when a *Committee* was appointed, to treat his *Highneſs* *Scruples* into a *Satisfaction*, being deſign'd for a *Tumultuary Attempt* upon his *Government* ; and divers of the *Plotters apprehended*.

'Twas *This*, that put the *Gentleman* to his *Hums* and *Hans* ; that makes him *Sick* to day, *Late* to morrow, *Buſie* the next ; and when he ſpeaks, *Chew* *false*, or utter *Oracles* : all theſe *put-offs*, tending only to gain *Time*, to ſee how the *Title* ſerves, and Taſte how the *Propoſal* Reliſhes. At Laſt, the *Craſty Sir*, fearing the diſtance too wide for a *ſenſible Step*, reſolves rather to make *Two* on't ; and to content himſelf at preſent to be *Install'd* *Protector*, with ſuch *Additional Powers* as were then offer'd, leaving the *Complement* of his *Regality* to the next meeting.

During the *Prorogation*, *Cromwell* patch'd up his *Other House*, *Olivers Other House.* who took their seats (the Term of the Adjournment being expir'd) in the *Lords House*. Such *Peers* they were, as in good Truth the *Commons* were not only *asham'd* of, but gall'd to see the Affront they had done Themselves, by their own Follies Enraged the in permitting them. Some few there were of *Quality*, and *Commons*. *Moderation*, Whose Names were only mix'd to Grace the *Rabble*.

And now forsooth the *Mushrome-Fobs* begin to talk of *Dignities* and *Priviledges*. *Predigious Impudence* and *Folly* ! Two of these Fellows *Pride*, and *Berkstead* quarrell'd upon the Bench at *Hicks* his *Hall*, about the meaning of [the P R E A M B L E that went A F T E R.] *ThenewPeers.*

The *Commons* (though a little late) resent'd the Indignity of *Truckling* under such Cattell, and not enduring an *Upper-House* so like a *Bear-Garden*, they presenly took in their formerly Secluded Fellowes, and fell to work upon the Authority of That *New Creation*, not sparing His that *Flac'd* them there. *The Commons pick a Quarrell with the Other House.* This course would soon have bred ill blood ; and *Cromwell*, after 15 Dayes tryal of their Humour, did Prudently Dissolve them.

From that Degree of *Confidence*, to Fall beyond *Ressource*, and from That point of *Power*, to become *Ridiculous* ; did but demonstrate to him the *Vanity* of his *Ambitious Hopes*, and that he aim'd at Things *Impossible*.

Of all the Cross-Encounters of his life, This sank the Deapest, and the Impression of That Anguish, went with him to his Grave ; as may be fairly Gather'd from the wild disproportion of his following Actions : which, well consider'd, will appear rather the Products of *Revenge*, *Rage*, and *Despair*, then the form'd Regular Politicks of his wonted Reason. *Olivers heart-breaking cross.*

Yet that he might not seem to abandon the pursuit, and utterly despond ; some Five weeks after the breaking up of the late Assembly, The *Major* of *London* and his Brethren were summon'd to *White-Hall*, and there (March. 2. 1658.) the *Cits* are told a Formal Tale of the King of *Scots* ; *Secco Men in Readiness*, and 22 Vessels to Transport them. *He Fools the City of London.* A General Flot, The City to be fired, and twenty Terrible Things, to start and Settle a New *Militia*, which in some Six weeks time was perfected.

And Now from all Parts are to be procur'd Addresses :
which

which are no other then *Leagues Offensive*, and *Defensive* Betwixt the *Faction*, and the *Ujumper*.

Addressees.

Sweet *London* leads the way; Then *Michell's*, *Ashfields*, *Cobbetts*, *Regiments*: The *Officers* of the *English-Army*; and the *Commission-Officers* in *Flanders*. All these in *March*.

In *April*; the *Officers* of *Biscoes Regiment*: and the *Commission Officers* of the *Militia* in *Suffolk*, *Leicester*, *Suffex*, and my *Country-men* of *Norwich*. After *These*, follow the *Souldiery* of *South-Wales*, and *Daniels Regiment*. The *Well-affected* of *Nottingham*, &c.

These Numerous and *Pretending Applications*, were but *False Glosses* upon his *Power*; and *Cromwell* was too wise to think them *Other*; Gain'd by *Contrivement*, *Force*, or at least, *Importunity*. Half a *Score* pitifull wretches call themselves the *People* of such or such a *County*, and here's the *Total* of the *Reckoning*. 'Tis *Rumour'd* that his *Daughter Cleypoole*, in the *Agonies* of her *Death-Sickness* rang him a *Peal* that troubled him. Whether 'twere so, or no, 'tis past *Dispute*, his *Grand Distress* was for the *Loss* of *That* which while he hop'd to gain, made the most horrid of his *helpfull Sins*, seem *Solaces* and *Pleasures*.

Barbarous
Cruelties.

While by the *Artifice* of *These Addressees*, his broken *Interest* is pieced as *Fair* as well it may, his *Care* is *Divided* between the *engaging* of *One Party*, and the *Destroying* of *Another*. And under the *Masque* of a *pressing* and *Pious Necessity*, he breaks out into such *Enormous Cruelties*, such *Wanton*, and *Conceited Butcheries*, that, had not his *Brain* been *Crackt*, as well as his *Conscience Sear'd*, he would not have gone so *Phantastical* a way to the *Devoll*. Some of the *Martyrs Hearts* were quick and *Springing in the Fire*, (as I had it from several *Eye-Witnesses*). *Ashton* did but *desire* to be *Beheaded*, and it was seemingly *Granted*, but the *Order kept* till 'twas too late, and Then tendered with a *Jeere*.

London was made the *Altar* for *These Burnt Offerings*: God grant *That City* be not at last purg'd by *Fire*, (I mean, before the *General Conflagration*) for *Those Polluting Flames*. The *Crime* was *Loyalty*, and made out against them, more by the doubling *Artifice* of *Mercenary Tongues*, than any *Pregnancy* of *Prooffe*.

What could *This Furious* and *Inhumane Rigour* avail *That miserable Politician*, further then as it *Gratifi'd* his *Malice*, and
Revenge,

Revenge, for his *Lost Hopes*, and *Fortunes* ! Without a *Parliament*, or somewhat like one, he *Perishes* for want of *Money* ; and an *Assembly* to his mind *throughout*, he utterly *despairs* of : so that no *Remedy* remains, but by extremities of *Violence* and *Bloud* to do his *Business*. And to That end, he faintly labours the *new Modelling* of his *Army*, a way, which he had found by *Long Experience*, made *Enemies*, as well as *Friends* : Those *certain*, and *Implacable* ; These, prone to *change* their *Interest*, and without *Money*, *True* to *None*. In fine, his *Fate* was *Irresistible*, and his *Tormented Soul* *Inconsolable*. He *Sinks*, *Sickens*, and *Dies* : Upon the Day of his grand *Anniversary*, for *Dunbar*, and *Worcester*. (Sept. 3.)

The Night before his *Death*, arose a *Tempest*, that seem'd to signify the Prince of the Ayre had some great work in hand : and 'tis Remarkable, that during his *Usurpation*, scarce any *Eminent Action* pass'd without a *furious Storm*. Cromwell's Death.

I have drawn This Chapter to a length beyond my intention, and should be too too Tedious to run through all his *Wiles*, which were No other than an *Habitual Craft*, diffused throughout the entire Course of his *Tyranny*. But certain General rules he impos'd upon himself, which must not be omitted.

One was, to Buy *Intelligence* at any Rate, by That means making every Plot bear it's own Charges. Olivers Maxims.

2. Never to Engage *Two Parties* at once ; but to *Flatter*, and *Formalize* with the *One*, till he *Ruin'd* the *Other* : Which was the Reason that he durst never make the *Presbyterians* *Desperate*, for fear of *Necessitating* them to side with the *King*.

3. To extirpate the *Royallists* by all possible means, as *Poverty*, *Bondage*, *Executions*, *Transplantations* ; and a *Devise* he had to dispose of several *Levies*, out of That Party, Some to serve the *Spaniard*, Others the *French*, that they might be sure to meet in *Opposition*, and cut One the Others *Throats*.

4. He ever made his *Army* his own *Particular Care*.

5. To keep the Nation in a perpetual *Hatred*, and *Jealousie* of the *Kings Party* ; which he promoted either by *forging* of *Plots* ; or *Procuring* Them.

So much for *Olivers Temper*, *Straights*, and *Politicks*.

C A P. VII.

A short Account from the Death of the Tyrant Oliver, to the Return of Charles the Second, (whom God Preserve from his Fathers Enemies.

THE Heart of the Cause was broken long since, and now the Soul of it is gone; though the Protectorate be formally devolv'd to *Richard*, as the *Declar'd Successor* to his Father. Whether *Declar'd* or not, was (I remember) at That time a Question. But whether Thus or So, it Matters not. *Oliver* is Dead, his Son Proclaim'd, and at night Bon-fires, with all the Clamor, Bustle, and Confusion that commonly attends those Vulgar Jollities. The Souldiers took the Alarm, and in my hearing threatned divers for daring to express their Joy so unseasonably: but they came off with telling them that they were glad they had got a *New Protector*, not that they had lost the *Old*. In Truth, the *New Protector* was look'd upon as a Person more *Inclinable* to do Good, than *Capable* to do *Mischief*, and the *Exchange Welcome*, to all that Lov'd his Majesty.

By the Court-Interest (as they call'd it,) *Addresses* thick and threefold were brought in, to *Condele*, and *Gratulate*; but Those Compliments had no *Sap* in them: The *Dutch*, the *Suede*, and the *French*, sent their *Embassadours* on the same Errand. And now the *Funerals* come on; A *Solemn*, and *Expensive Pageantry*; yet, in my Conscience, the *Chief-Mourners* were his *Highness Drapers*.

These Ceremonies over, to keep the Wheel in Motion, a Supply was Resolv'd upon for the King of *Suede*, and little further of Moment, before Jan. 27. When (in the Language of the Time) met *Richards Parliament*. The First, and Last of his *Reign*.

Richard Recognized upon condition.

It cost These people some time to agree the Powers of the *Chief-Magistrate*, and the *New Peerage*, which came to this result, that *Richard* should be *Recognized*; but with *limitations*, consistent with the *Rights of Parliament*, and *People*: and that for quiet sake [they would transact with the Persons then sitting in the Other House, as an House of Parliament during that Session.]

The *House* proceeded by Degrees to make dangerous Inspections into the *Militia*, the *Revenue*; to look into the Exorbitances of *Major Generals*, to threaten the *Excise*; and finally, by all Popular pretences, to engage the Multitude; Effectually against both *Protector* and *Army*, enduring the Government neither of the *One*, nor of the *Other*.

Whereupon, the *Officers* set up a Counsel at *Wallingford-House*, the *Protector* advises at *White-hall*, and *April* 6. 1659. comes a Paper to *Richard* from the Generall Counsell of Officers, Entitled, A Representation and Petition, &c. importing, [the great danger the Good Old Cause is in, from Enemies of all sorts, the Poverty of the Souldiery; the Persecution of Tender consciences, &c. which Particulars they Petition his Highness to represent to the Parliament, with their Desire of Speedy Supply, and Certainty of Pay for the future: Declaring likewise their Resolution, with their Lives and Fortunes to stand-by, and assist his Highness and Parliament, in the plucking the Wicked out of their places wheresoever they may be discovered, &c.]

The Paper boded a Purge, at least. Sign'd it was by 230 Officers, presented by *Fleet-wood*; Publish'd throughout the *Army*, and followed soon after with a Day of Humiliation: (the never-failing Sign of Mischiefe at hand.)

In this Juncture, Each of the Three Parties was Enemy to the Other Two, saving where Either Two were united to Maintain themselves against the Third: and All Three of Them Enemies to the Good of the Nation.

Each of the
Three Parties
Enemy to the
Other Two.

The *House* being Biass'd for a Common-wealth, and not yet enabled to go Through with it, Dreaded the *Army* on the one hand, and Hated the Single-Person on the Other.

Richard, finding his Power limited by the Members, and Envy'd by the Officers, willing to please Both, and Resolv'd to Hazard nothing, becomes a Common Property to the *House* and *Army*; a Friend to Both by Turns; *Theirs* to day, *T'other's* to Morrow, and in all Tryals Meekly submitting to the Dispensation.

The *Army* on the other side had their *Protector's* Measure to a Hair; and behind him they Stalk'd to Ruffle That Faction in the *House*, that was now grown so Bold with the *Military Interest*: and it behov'd them to be quick, with (as the Case stood Then) so Popular an Enemy.

The *Army*
Ruffles the
House.

The Members kept their Ground, and *April* 18. pass'd These following Votes.

E

First,

The House
Opposes the
Army.

First, That, during the sitting of the Parliament, there should be no General Counsell, or meeting of the Officers of the Army without Direction, Leave, and Authority of his Highnesse the Lord Protector, and Both Houses of Parliament.

Secondly, That no Person shall Have and Continue any Command, or Trust in any of the Armies, or Navies of England, Scotland, or Ireland, or any of the Dominions and Territories thereto belonging, who shall refuse to Subscribe, That he will not disturb or interrupt the free meeting in Parliament, of any the Members of either House of Parliament, or their freedom in their Debates and Counsels.

Upon these Peremtory Votes, *Richard Faces about*, joyning his small Authority, to forbid their Meetings; and great Assurances are Enterchang'd, to stand the Shock, of any Opposition.

Richard dis-
solves his Par-
liament.

Two or three days they stood upon their *Guards*, continuing in that snarling Posture, till April 22. when *Richard* at the suit (or rather menace) of *Dicborough* and his Fellows, signs a *Commission to Dissolve* his Parliament; which to prevent, the *Members Adjourn* for Three days; and to avoid the shame of falling by an *Enemy*, the *Catoes kill themselves*. For at the Three days end, they find the *Dore shut*, and a *Guard* upon the Passage, to tell them, *They must Sit no more*; Their *Dissolution* being also *Published by Proclamation*.

And is laid a-
side himself.

His *Highness* steps aside next; and now the *Army* undertakes the *Government*. They *Modell, Cast about, Contrive*, and, after some Ten Days fooling with the *Politiques*, they found it was much a harder matter to *Compose a Government*, than to *Disorder* it, and at This Plunge, besought the Lord [after their *Wandrings* and *Back-slidings*, to *shew them where they turned out of the Way*, and where the *Good Spirit* left the *Good Old Cause*, that through *Mercy* they might *Return* and give the Lord the *Glory*.

The Army ac-
knowledge
their back-slid-
ings.

At last, they call to mind, that the *Long Parliament* sitting from 1648. to 1653. were eminent *Assertours* of that Cause, and had a *Special Presence of God* with them: Wherefore they *Earnestly desire Those Members to Return to the Exercise of their Trust*, &c.---]

And invite the
old Parliament
to sit again.

This is the Tenor of that Canting Declaration, which the *Army-Officers* presented *Lenthall* (the *Good-Old-Speaker*) with, at the *Rolls*, May 6. in the Evening; where a *Resolve* was taken

taken by several of the Members, to meet next morning in the Painted Chamber, and There to advise about their *Sitting*.

They met accordingly, and made a shift, by Raking of Goals, to get together a *Quorum*, and so they sneak'd into the House of Commons, and There Declar'd for a *Commonwealth*, passing a Vote expressly against the Admission of the Members, Secluded in 1648. The Rump.

This Device was *far-fetch'd*, and not *long-lev'd*, but these were Old Stagers, and no ill Menagers of their Time.

To make short; they Erect a Counsel of State, Place, and Displace; mould their *Faction*; settle the Godly, appoint their Committees, and so soon as ever they are Warm in their Gears, begin, where they left in 1653; *Fleeing the Nation*, and *Flaying the Cavaliers*, as briskly, as if 'twere but the *Good-morrow* to a *Six-Years Nap*.

But the sad Wretches were filthily mistaken, to think Themselves brought in again to do their own Business; for the Army makes bold to Cut them out their work in a *Petition of May 12.* containing 15. Proposals; desiring,

First; a *Free-state*.] 2. *Regulation of Law and Courts*.] 3. *An Act of Oblivion, since April 19. 1653.*] 4. *All Lawes, &c. since 1653. to stand good until particularly Replea'd.*] 5. *Publique Debts since 1653. to be Paid.*] 6. *Liberty of Worship, &c. not extending to Popery or Prelacy.*] 7. *A Preaching Ministry.*] 8. *The Reformation of Schools, and Universities.*] 9. *The Exclusion of Cavaliers, and loose Persons from Places of Power, or Trust.*] 10. *The Employment of the Godly in such Places.*] 11. *To provide for a Succession of the Legislative Authority.*] 12. *That Charles Fleetwood be Commander in Chief at Land.*] 13. *That the Legislative Power be in a Representative of the People; and of a Select Senate, Coordinate in Power.*] 14. *That the Executive-Power, be in a Counsell of State.*] 15. *That the Debts of his Late Highness, and his Father, contracted since Decemb. 15. 1653. may be satisf'd, and Twenty Thousand Pounds per Annum settled upon him, half for Life, and half to him and his Heirs for ever.* The Armies Petition.

The Principal point was *Fleetwoods* Command, which they agreed to ; only reserving the *Supreme Power* to *Themselves*, and constituting the *Speaker, Generalissimo ; in the Name of the Parliament* : which wariness shewed that they understood *one-another*.

For a while, the *Junto* treated the Army like *Apes*, with a *But* and a *Knock*, *Flattering* some and *Removing* others, as they saw expedient : Particularly the Two Sons of the Late *Urfurper*, were fairly laid aside, Submitting and Resigning in Excellent Form, and without making two words on't.

The *High and Mighty* did not, all this time, forget, that the Key of the Work, was *Money* ; nor in Truth did they well consider, that they were call'd back by the *Army* only to *Raise* it. But *On* they went through *Thick and Thin*, and such Ignoble, fordid Courses they took to *Levy* it, that, in Effect, to Stop the *Souldiers* Mouths, they brake their own Necks ; the Nation not enduring any Longer that such a pilfering Covy of *Pick-Pockets* should call *Themselves* a *Parliament*.

This Universal *Harred*, and *Disdain* of their Proceedings, provoked a General Seizure of Men, Horse, and Arms : and in Effect, the Plot was General ; but what by *Treachery, Delays, Fabling, Disappointments*, and *Scruples* of taking in the Royal Party, (by those that never meant His Majesty, or his Friends should be the better for't) the whole was Dash'd.

I well remember one Particular, in That Transaction, that pass'd my Understanding, and Methought smelt of Treason. It was extreemly labour'd, that the King might be perswaded to come Over ; and That too, before any Port was secured, or *Men* Embodied, on the bare hopes of the Design, to engage his Sacred Person.

After the *Cheshire-Rout*, *Lambert* Retires to his House at *Craven*, and there ('tis thought) contrives the Ruine of the *Rump*. Which unforeseeing Creature, (dreaming of nothing Less) flies higher now then ever, Imposing upon the *House*, and the *Militia*, an Oath of *Abjuration*, not only *Renouncing* the Title of *Charles Stuart*, but the whole *Line* of the Late *King James*, And then besides *Excise, Customs, Forfeitures*, and *Confiscations*, out comes an *Assessment* of 100000 l. per *Month*. They *dis-incorporate* the City of *Chester*, &c.

In the *Carrier* of their head-strong, and unbridled Fury, the first Check they receiv'd, was from a *Petition* and *Proposals* then

The Faction
flies high.

The Rump
and the Army
Clash.

then on foot in *Lamberts Army*. Whereupon they Order *Ashfield, Cobbet, and Duckenfield*, (Three of the Principal Abettours of it) to bring in the Original Paper, which was accordingly done, and Caus'd this Vote,

That to have any more General Officers in the Army, than are already settled by Parliament, is needless, chargeable and dangerous to the Common-wealth.

Upon this Vote, the Officers appear'd to acquiesce; but *Octob. the 5.* Matters were re-enforced, *Desborough* presenting the House with a Representation, and Petition, from the General Councell of the Army. For which, from the Teeth outwards, the Officers had Thanks.

The *Conventicle* and the Army began now to speak English, and the Members seeing their Dissolution at hand, however cast This Block in the Armies way; *Enacting,*

That it should be adjudg'd High-Treason for any Person or Persons after the Eleventh of Octob. 1659. to Raise Monies without the Peoples Consent in Parliament.

This being passed; They Uncommission'd Nine of the Army-Officers; to wit, *Lambert, Desborough, Berry, Kelsey, Ashfield, Cobbett, Creed, Packer, and Barrow.* They voyded Fleetwoods Commission also, Investing the Command of the Army in Seven Persons, himself being one, and any Three to be a Quorum.

Hereupon the House adjourns, and *Hazelrigg, Morly and Walton* (Three of the Seven) repair to the Speakers Chamber, forthwith dispatching Orders to Draw their Troops together. The Army-Party do the like, and March to the Palace-Yard at *Westminster*, (their Appointed Rendezvonz) where The Two Parties for That Night and part of the next day made Faces at Oneanother; and finally, the Souldiery dismiss'd the Senate. The Rump thrown out.

Now was the Government once again in the Army; who after Thirteen days deliberation how to bestow it, *Octob. 26.* Disposed of it to a Committee of Safety, consisting of 23 Persons: Empower'd at Large; to advise upon Occasion, with the Principal Officers of the Army; and within Six-weeks time, to bring in a Form of Government. Their Reign was short and troublesom; as 'tis reported, *Feak* told Sir *Harry Vane* upon his Unction, that his was like to be. They make *Fleetwood* their Commander in Chief, and constitute a New Militia. The Army settles a Committee of Safety.

Scarce

General M.
Secures Scot-
land.

Scarce were these Worthies warm in their Seats, but the News comes that *Scotland's* in Disorder, and *Barwick* in a wrong hand. Whereupon *Lambert* marches *Northward*; soon after which, comes on a *Treaty*, that gave General *Monk* (now *Duke of Albemarle*) leisure to purge his Army, and to put *Scotland* in a Posture of Security. By These Delays, and want of Monys. *Lambert's* Army Moulders away; and briefly *London* is left so Thin, that Sir *Harry Vane's* Privy List of *Congregationals* was the danger they most Apprehended.

The first step toward their Deliverance, was a *Petition* desiring the Assistance of the Common-Counsell for the Procurement of a Free-Parliament: Promoted by the Honest-Part of the City, and Cross'd by some Factious Magistrates of the *Wallingfort Leaven*.

Hemfons Inso-
lence toward
the City.

This Baffle did but more Incense the Petitioners, and upon *Monday, Decemb. 5.* Horse and Foot were Commanded into the City to hinder the prosecution of it. Where, by surprize, *Hemfson* the *Cobler* knocks Two or Three Citizens on the head, barbarously wounding and affronting others, till at last, Multitudes being drawn together, and ready to fall in among them (where not a *Red-Coat* could have escap'd without a Miracle) the Quarrel, forsooth, was taken up by some of the *Formalities*, and then excus'd, to the Committee of *Safety*, as if the fault had been the Cities. The Army had at this time their Guards in *Pauls*, and *Gresham-Colledge*.

Hazelrigg sei-
zes Portsmouth

During these Broyles, *Hazelrigg*, *Morly*, and *Walton*, possess themselves of *Portsmouth*, and the Forces employ'd to reduce it, joyn with them. The Fleet drives the same Interest likewise: only the Troops in *London* were at a stand, and fair for any Purchaser, but the Opportunity was slipp'd.

The Rump sits
again.

Upon the 26. of *Decemb.* the Rump sits once again, and Empowers *Seaven Commissioners*, or any Three of them, to Command the Army; Here, the Secluded Members of 1648, put in for their Right of Sitting; whereupon a Vote is pass'd for taking the Case of *Absent Members* into Consideration, upon the fifth of *January* next; and upon the Day appointed, they Resolve,

That the Members Discharg'd from Voting, or Sitting in 1648. and 49. do stand duly Discharg'd by Judgement of Parliament, and that Writs do Issue forth for New in their Places.

And

And now They think their Game *Cocksure*, having already Voted the *Disbanding of Lambert's Army*; Settled their Counsell of One and Thirty; and Offer'd Grace to the Revolted Officers, (*Lambert himself*, by Name) that would lay down before the Ninth of January; whereupon, *Lamberts Forces disperse*, He himself submits, and the General receives an Invitation to London.

Lambert and his Party submit.

In Conclusion, after Many Indignities cast upon the Honest Part of the Nation, for desiring a Free-Parliament, by That wretched Conventicle, that intended only to Perpetuate it self; The General arrives at London, Feb. 3. and upon the 7. comes out the 100000 *l. Tax*, which produced a Common-Counsell the day following to advise upon it: where it was Resolv'd, To adhere to a former Vote of the Court in the Negative. This Refusal puzzled the Counsell of State, who without being Masters of the City, and of Money, were able to do little; so that they forthwith Order'd the Reducing of the City, by Emprisoning half a Score of their Citizens; and, upon another Denyal, to take away their Posts, and Chains, and destroy their Gates and Portcullisses; which was accordingly Executed, but with such Regret, that thereupon they lodg'd the Government of the Army in Five Commissioners, (the General being One) with Evident Design to wipe him of his Employment. But Their Ingratitude wrought little with him, whose Actions were only steer'd by the Compass of Loyalty and Prudence. So that having humour'd the People at *Westminster*, till they had made themselves sufficiently Odious, and abundantly try'd the Affections of the City to his Design in hand: Upon the 11 of Feb. he gave the House to understand the Necessity of their timely Dissolution, in order to the right of Successive Parliaments; the very hopes of which Release gave the People a Joy, to the Degree of Madness.

The City refuse to Levy Monies.

The Rump offended with the City.

Upon the 21. were re-admitted the Secluded Members of 1648. by whom were Writs Issued out for a Representative, to meet upon the 25. of April 1660. and March 16. 1659. they formally Dissolve themselves, Committing the Government in that Interval, to a Counsel of State. Upon the day Appointed, the Convention meets, but not altogether so Leaven'd as-by the Qualifications was intended; Excluding Father and Son of such as had serv'd the King, from the Election. In fine, the Major Part of that Assembly, according

The Secluded Members re-admitted.

to their Duty, gave the King his own again, without those Shackles and Conditions which the *Qualifiers* would have impos'd upon his Majesty : Upon whose *Legal* and *Imperial* Freedom, depends the *Safety* and *Well-being* of his People.

C A P. VIII.

The Usurper Oliver was principally distress'd by the War with Spain, and his Standing Army.

WE have now brought *Rebellion* from the *Cradle* to the *Grave* ; We have seen it *Triumphant*, and now we see it in the *Dust*, subjected at the Feet of our Most Gracious Sovereign, to account for the Blood of his Royal Father. Be it our Business next to enquire, *What* hindred *Oliver* from Establishing himself ? Upon what *Reason of State*, *Cause*, *Error*, or *Necessity*, that prosperous *Usurper* fail'd.

But *some* will not allow he fail'd ; as if the sole *Fatality* of the *Cause* was his *Decease* ; and the *Design* only miscarried through the ill *Manage* of a *weak* *Successor*. For granted ; by good Order, it might have been *Cuddled up*, and kept *above ground* a little longer : But still it seems to Me, that before *Oliver* Dy'd, the *Cause* was *Bed-rid*, and *Hedrick*, past Recovery.

Cromwell's Rise to the Sovereignty.

Opinion is Free ; any *Mans* as *Mine*, and *Mine* as any *Mans* : so that submitting my *Reasons* to the *Wise*, and Recommending my *Weakness* to the *Charitable*, I proceed.

Cromwell did wisely to take his *Rise* to the *Sovereignty* upon the *Necks* of those *Usurpers* whom he cast out in 1653. For in the same *Action*, he *Oblig'd* the *People*, *Master'd* his *Enemies*, and *Fill'd* his *Pockets*. Yet were not those *Means* that *advanc'd* the *Tyrant*, sufficient to *Establish* him.

What hindred his Establishment.

One *Obstacle* was the *Inconsistence* of his *Doctrine* with his *Design* : for the same *Arguments* that *Rais'd* him, *Ruin'd* him. The *People* were instructed to *Destroy* *Kings*, not to set them *Up* : and beside, he that had so many *Sharers* in the *Hazzards* of the *Rebellion*, could not fail of some *Competitors* for the *Benefit* of it.

Further,

Further, he had no considerable Party *sure* to his *Interest*; and all, but his Meer *Creatures* and *Allies*, were utter Enemies to it. The *City* Hated him for their *Loss of Trade*; the *Country*, for their *Taxes*; the *Royalists*, for his *Rebellion*, and *Cruelty*; the *Presbyterians*, for his *Breach of Covenant*, (That is, for not destroying the King after *Their Way*); The *Levellers*, for his *Ambition*; and, in fine, all the hope he had, was to *New-Modell* an Army to his purpose; that fail'd him too at last, for want of *Money*, and *Credit* to maintain it. Which *Want* was chiefly hasten'd, and procur'd by his precipitate *Breach with Spain*, together with the *Necessity* of keeping up a *Standing Army*.

He was Generally Hated.

The *Former* of These was doubtless his *Mistake*; (or rather a *Temerity* scarce advised upon.) For having brought the *Hollander* to his *Knees*, (the only *Stranger* he had then to fear) and after That, *shak'd hands* with him; his next Course should have been by *Thrift* and *Popularity* to *Ingratiate* himself at *Home*, and not by a *Rambling*, *Needless*, and *Expensive War*, to squander away the *life-blood* of the *Nation*, and in That *Indigent Extremity* of the *State*, to make *Ducks and Drakes* with the *Publick Treasure*. Nor was the *Consequence* less *Fatal* to him, than was the *Enterprize* (to a common Eye) *Imprudent*: the hopes of carrying his *Design*, in no wise *Countervailing* the *risque* he ran of losing all he had *Got*, in case he *missed* it.

The war with Spain was an Oversight.

I might Instance in a *Thousand ways* of *Profusion*, and *Oppression* Common to all *Usurpers*, both *Practis'd* by Him, and *exposing* him to great *Necessities*, but I shall rather bestow the rest I have to say, upon the *Fatality* of that *Tyrant's Condition*; Which forced him to make use of for his *Safety*, the greatest of all *Dangers*, to wit, *A Standing Army*.

A Standing Army dangerous.

For Order sake, We'll first Consider, Upon what *Pretense*, and to what end 'twas Rais'd.

In the Next Place; We'll see what it produc'd, and weigh the *Benefits* with the *Inconveniences*.

Lastly; Wee'll look into the probable *Effects*, and *Influence* of it; as related to the *English Temper*, *Custom*, and *Government*.

To the first; what I here call a *Standing Army*; was but the *Improvement* of a *Slight Temporary force* rais'd, (in pretense at first) as an *Expedient* against *Plots*, (being indeed it self the Greatest) but *Encreas'd*, *Continu'd*, and *Clarified*, by the

The Rise of Cromwells Standing Army.

Exact Collect.
Pag. 44

Ibid.

and Power. This Project came from the *Cabale* in 1641. Couch'd under the Notion of *A Guard for the House of Commons*: [*Who conceiv'd that they could not with the Safety of their Persons, (upon which the Safety and Peace of the whole Kingdom did then depend) sit any longer Unarmed, and Unguarded*] --- so great were their [*Apprehensions, and just Fears of mischievous Designs, to ruine and destroy them*]

This was the Popular Colour for that *Guard*; *Plots*, and the *Safety* of the *Publick*. Where the *Plot* was, in *Truth*; and where the *Real Danger*; may be gather'd from the *Praetises* of Those *Armies*, whereof The *Guard* afore said was but the *Rise* and *Foundation*. (And That's the point we handle next.)

The Consequences of the House of Commons Guard.

The setting of This little Force a foot, was a fair Step toward the *Militia*; One *Guard* begetting *Another*; and the same Reason standing good, for the *Augmenting*, and *Upholding* of Those *Troops*, which was employ'd for the first *Raising* of them. The *Parliament* was first in *Danger*; the *City*, Next; and Then the *Nation*: and as their *Jealousies* Encreas'd, so must Their *Forces*, till by Degrees they grow to an *Army*. The *King*, and his *Adherents*, they call the *Common-Enemy*; whom they *Invaide* and *Vanquish*.

Here's their work done in short; what have they now to fear? Only *New-Modelling*, or *Disbanding*. A blessed Translation of the *Government*, from the *Rule* of the *Law*, to the *Power* of the *Sword*! and There to abide, till One *Army* be remov'd by *Another*: That is, the *Tyranny* abides; tho' under several *Formes*, and *Tyrants*.

Our *LEGIONS* of the *Reformation*, were Rais'd by certain *Rebellious Lords*, and *Commons*; and *Seconded* by the *City of London*. We'll see now, how they behav'd themselves towards their *Masters* and *Friends*.

The Effects of a Standing Army.

In 1647. the *Army Reformes*, and *Purges* the *House*; *Presses* their *Dissolution*. Seizes their *General Pointz* in the *North*; *Squeezes* and *Menaces* the *City of London*; *Marches* up to it, and in *Triumph* through it. Takes *Possession* of the *Tower*; Charges the *Mayer* with divers *Aldermen* and *Citizens*, of *High-Treason*. Alters their *Militia's*, and *Common-Counsel*; and finally, gives the *Law* to the *House*, and *That* to the *Nation*.

In Decemb. 1648. the *Army* gives the *House* another *Purge*; and the year following, *Cromwell* himself had like to have been out-trick'd by the *Levellers* about *Banbury*.

In

In 1653. The *Army* Casts off the *Old Conventicle*, and up-
goes *Oliver*, who calls *Another*; only to get a *Tax* and
Title: and when They had done the *One* half, and made way
to the *Other*; off goes *That* too. The *Next* was call'd in
1654. another after *That* in 1656. and Both were serv'd
with the same Sauce.

If *Cromwell* could as easily have moulded the *Army*, as *That*
did the *House*, his business had been done with half the Cere-
mony; but *Money* was *Their* business, and *Kingship* *His*, so that
they help'd him in the *One*, and Cross'd him in the *Other*.

In *Septemb.* 1658. *Oliver* Dies; and Then, they are *Rich-
ard's Army*; whose *puisne Highness* must have *His Parlia-
ment* too. They meet; and notwithstanding a huge Pack of
Officers and *Lawyers*, the *Vote* prov'd utterly *Republican*, and
Friend, neither to *Single-Person*, nor *Army*.

Note.

Now, *Richard* takes his turn: but first, down goes his *Par-
liament*: and for a while, the *Army-Officers*, undertake the
Government.

Some *Ten days* after, up with the *Rump* again, and then
they'r *Lenthall's Army*: which, in *Octob.* 1659. throws out
the *Rump*, and now they'r *Fleetwood's Army*. Enter the *Rump*
once more in *Decemb.* and once more the *Army* comes about a-
gain. The *Rump's* next *Exit*, is for ever, *March* the 16. 1660.

Exit
The Rump.

Behold the *Thorough Reformation*; and every *Change* Seal'd
with a *Sacrament*, to have been an *Act of Conscience*, and gui-
ded by a *Divine Impulse*.

Behold the *Staff* of the *Rebellion*; both the *Support* and *Pu-
nishment* of it; a *Standing Army*.

While *Plots* could either be *Procured*, or credibly *suggested*,
the *Innocent* were their *Prey*, and when *That* entertainment
fail'd them, they worried one another: never at *Peace*; betwixt
the *Strife*, first to *Subject* the *Nation*, and then to *Govern* it.

So long as the *Royal Interest* was in *Vigour*; it was the
Faction's Policy to engage all sorts of *People*, whom they
could possibly *Unite* against *That* *Interest*, however *Disagree-
ing* among *Themselves*, their first work being only to *Destroy*
the *King*) and *This* was the *Composition* of the first *Army*.

All Factions
unite against
the King.

From *Killing* they Proceed to *take Possession*; and here En-
sues a greater *Difficulty*.

They divide.

A *Force* is *Necessary* still, but the *State* of the *Dispute* being
Chang'd, the *Former Mixture* is not for their *present purpose*:

the Conspiratours that *agreed* to overthrow the Government, being now *Divided* who shall Enjoy it. Hereupon, they fall to Sorting and Purging of Parties; the *Independent* at last carrying it, and *Oliver* in the *Head* of them.

And Subdivide

After this Decision of the Contest betwixt the Two Factions, the *Army* it self *divides*; and *Cromwell* is now more puzzled with the Private Contrivements of his own *Officers*, then he was before with the open Power of his profess'd *Enemies*, for they are clearly for his Ruling with them, but not over them: so that unless he can both *Uphold* them for his *Security*, and *Modell* them for his *Design*, he does nothing: In Both He labour'd, and beyond Question, Dy'd in the Despair of perfecting *Either*, finding upon Experience, that his *Ambition* was as *Intolerable* to his Party, as the *Charge* of *Continuing* his *Army* was to the *Publique*; and what the *Latter* was, we'l read in his own words, deliver'd at a Conference, April 21. 1657.

The present Charge (says he) of the Forces both by Sea and Land, including the Government, will be 2426989 l. The whole present Revenue in England, Scotland, and Ireland, is about 1900000 l. I think this was Reckoned at the Most, as now the Revenue stands: Why now towards This, you settle by your Instrument 1300000 l. for the Government, and upon That Account to maintain the Force by Sea and Land, and This without Land Tax I think, and this is short of the Revenue, that now may be Raised by the Government, 600000 l. because you see the Present Government is 1900000 l. and the whole Summ which may now be Raised, comes short of the Present Charge to 542689 l. And although an End should be put to the Spanish War, yet there will be a Necessity of the Preservation of the Peace of the Three Nations, to keep up the Present Established Army in England, Scotland, and Ireland; and also a considerable Fleet, for some good Time; until it shall please God to Quiet, and Compose Mens Minds, and bring the Nation to some better Consistency: so that Considering the Pay of the Army, coming to upwards 1100000 l. per annum, and the Government 300000 l. it will be necessary, that for some convenient Time, seeing you find things as you do, and it is not good to think a Wound healed before it be; that there should be Raised over and above 1300000 l. the Summ of 600000 l. per annum, which makes up the Summ of 1900000 l. That likewise the Parliament

Parliament declare how far they will carry on the Spanish War; and for what Time, and what farther Summ they will raise for the carrying on the same, and for what Time, and if these Things be not Ascertained, as one saith, Money is the Cause certainly, what ever the Cause is; if Money be Wanting, the business will fall to the ground, and all our Labour will be Lost, and therefore I hope you will have a care of our Undertakings.

How many Souls, Lives, Millions; and Noble Families; How well a Temper'd Government; How Gracious a Prince, and happy a People, were by This Cursed Army Destroy'd; will need no more then their own Consciences to determine, when Divine Vengeance shall call them to a Reckoning. It brought forth (briefly) the worst of Crimes, and Mischief, without the least Tincture of a Comfort, or shadow of a Benefit. Nor was it likely to do other, if we consider either the People, Place, Custome, or Government, they were to work upon.

Concerning the People (*first*) [*Populi ferè omnes ad Aquilonem positi, Libertatem quandam spirant*] 'Tis Bodin's observation, that your Northern Nations are Generally keen Assertours of Freedom; (which for their Parts, the English made too true) How could it be Expected then, that a People, which Oppos'd their Lawful Prince for the fear of Slavery, should ever finally Submit to a Rebellious Usurper under the Actual and Shameful Extermity of it? This Reluctancy of Humour in the Generality, joyn'd with the Particular Vigilance, Loyalty, and Enterprizings of the Royalists; render'd those Courses Necessary at present, to the Usurper, which must certainly sink him in the End.

The English
Impatient of
Slavery.

Nor was it more against the Genius of the People, than against the Interest and Reason of the Place.

The Place, we are to consider as an Island; no Foreign Danger then in view, to Palliate the Oppression of an Army; nor any Subject whereupon to turn the Influence of it. No Stranger in the Case concern'd; only at Variance with our selves; we breed and nourish in our proper bowels, the Evil that Devours, or, at the best, Consumes us. The Army fear'd the Plots, but 'twas the Nation felt them, and the Result of all was only a Dispute betwixt the Civil and the Military Power; Law, and Necessity: so that Effectually (the two Parties of
this

this Division thus Enterwatching and Counter-Plotting one another) we were rather in a State of *War* than a Posture of *Security*, the *People* being at this Election, either to *Resist*, or *Starve*, and the *Army*, as much oblig'd, to make good their undertaking, or fall to nothing. What could be Rationally the Issue of these *Provocations*, and *Animosities*, but either the Destruction of the *Army* by the *People*; or of the *People* by the *Army*, in Order to a General *Quiet*? Neither of them being safe, but by the Ruine, and Subjection of the Other. If the *People* refuse to *Pay*, they are Presently *Dis-affected*; if the *Souldiery* be their own *Carvers*, they are lookt upon as *Tyrannical*, and *Insolent*; and here's Matter furnish'd for a *Civil War*.

Now That which makes the Case Worse, is (as I said) that being *Islanders*, and wanting the Colour of Arming against Dangerous *Neighbours*, we are forced to spend that humour in *Mutiny* among our selves, which might Otherwise be Diverted by, and Employ'd upon, a Publique Quarrel.

A Digression to the State of FRANCE.

This was calculated for
1662.

It seems to be the Interest of France to maintain a Standing Army.

Upon the *Continent* 'tis Otherwise; as in *France*, (for the Purpose) where though the King Entertains a *Standing Army* of 12000. and about *Fourscore Regiments* more, in *Flanders*, *Italy*, *Catalogne*, and *Luxemburgh*; (besides *Strangers*) There's yet the Countenance of an *Interest*, and a *Prudential Ground* for't: to *Ballance* the Power, or at least *Check* the Progress of his Ambitious Neighbour *Spain*. For (says the Duke of *Rohan* in his Interest of *France*) *Il faut opposer La Force à la Force. Car ni les persuasions, ni la Justice des armes, ne fera la loi à celui qui sera armé, tellement que la France doit se retrancher de toute autre despence moins utile, & estre toujours puissamment armée.* [*Force must meet Force, for 'tis the Sword that gives the Law to Equity, and Reason; wherefore let France rather be sparing in any other way, than in the Constant Entertainment of a Puissant Army*]

It may be Argu'd too, that the Exercise of *Armes*, is the Profession of the *French Nobility*, and in Effect, 'tis only *War* abroad keeps them in *Peace* at home. Yet even in *France* it self, where the Necessity of a *Standing-Army* is bolster'd up with so many fair *Appearances*, the *Effects* are Dismal, how plausible soever the first *Occasion* seem'd. Where

Where it began, or what it was, not a rush matter, but, that by Gradual *encroachments*, from *small* and *Temporary* Pretences, 'tis now grown to a *Constant*, and *unlimited Excess*, he that knows any thing of *France*, cannot be Ignorant.

They that fetch it from *Guntran* King of *Orleans*, 587. look too far back methinks, and entitle the *Tyranny* to too fair a President. His Case being This.

Guntran was the Survivor of Four Brothers; Sons of *Clotaire* the First; the other Three, being *Cherebert*, *Chilperic*, and *Sigibert*. The Eldest of these, Dyed Childless, and the Other two were Murther'd by the Practises of *Fredegonde*, (first the *Mistress*, and afterward the Wife of *Chilperic*.)

'*Sigibert*, supinely indulging himself in the height of his Conquests, and Pleasures, was Stabb'd in his own Palace by a Couple of Souldiers, employ'd by *Fredegonde*, who did as much at last for her Husband *Chilperic*; having first Caused him to Murther his Son *Clovis*; to Divorce one Wife, and Strangle another. The Story is Short, and a little Curious.

'*Fredegonde* had a Gallant, called, *Landry de la Tour*, by Her, Preferr'd to be Duke of *France* and Mayor of the Palace).

'The King comes one Morning in his Hunting-Dress into the Queens Chamber, as she was busie about her Head, with her Hair over her Eyes; and (without a word speaking) tickles her on the Neck with the Twigg-end of his Riding-wand, *Ah Landry* (says she) *That's not Cavalier like, to come Behind*. The King was as much surpriz'd with the Discovery, as *Fredegonde* with the Mistake; and went his way with the Thought of it in his Countenance. *Landry* is presently sent for by the Queen, They discourse the Accident, Debate the Consequences, and in the End, Complot to have *Chilperic* Murther'd as he returns from the Chase; which was Executed, with much Ease and Security, the King being only attended with a Single Page, who Dy'd with his Master, and the Murtherers escap'd.

This *Chilperic* had, by *Fredegonde*, *Clotaire* the Second, (but Four Moneths old at the Death of his Father) and the Regency of King and Kingdom was Committed to *Guntran*, (the young Kings Uncle by the Fathers side) The Regent, warn'd by the Miscarriage of his Brothers, and being enformed that the same Hand by which they fell, sought His Life also: Establishes

A Guard both
Sutable and
necessary about
the Person of a
King.

The Majors of
France abus'd
the Confidence
of their Ma-
jors.

a Considerable Guard, constantly to attend his Person : which was both suitable to his Wisdom, and Dignity ; as a Security, against not only the Stroke of Violence, but the very Thought of it, and a fit Circumstance of Majesty.

The Influence of This Force went not far, nor, in Truth, the Royalty of their first Race of Kings, much farther : whose either Lenity or Aversness to Business of State, gave their Great Counsellours the means to Usurp, and Transferr Their Authority, which Confidence they abus'd to the Supplanting of their Masters.

Complaints, Suits, References, Addresses, must be made, forthwith, to the Majors, not to the Kings : They undertake the Disposition of Monies, and Offices ; the Menage of Treaties and Alliances : They Grant, Revoke at Pleasure : Briefly, from 632. to 750. France was rather under a Majoralty, then a Monarchy : and Then, (Pope Zachary, having first Absolv'd the French of their Oath of Obedience) the Race of Chilperic is Laid By ; Himself (the Fourth of that Name) formally Degraded, and Cast into a Monastery, by Decree of Parliament ; and Pepin Install'd in his Stead. Thus did the Son of the Last Great Subject make himself the First of the Second Race of Kings : of which, in requital for too much said upon the Former, I shall say nothing at all. Nor much more upon this Subject ; save only that Charles the VII. and his Successour Lewis the XI. Laid the first firm Foundation of the Military Power ; to which, Charles the VIII. Francis the I. &c. have since furnish'd their Additionals, and Superstructures, to make the Tyranny compleat.

'Tis Truth ; the Splendor, and Profusion of the Court and Camp, is Dazling, and Prodigious ; they swim in Pleasures and Plenty : but he that turns his Eye toward those Miserable Animals, the Peasants, that with their Blood, and Sweat, Feed and Support that Luxe, and Vanity (with hardly bread for their own Mouths,) will find it much a different Prospect ; the great Enhancers of the Charge claiming Exemption from the burthen of it.

He that would see the Glory of the One Part, and the Slavery of the Other, needs only read *L'ESTAT de la FRANCE*, of 1661. Treating of the Officers of the Crown, Honours, Governments, Taxes, Gabelles, &c. He shall there find the Venality of Offices, and Their Rates ; the Privileges of the Nobility,

The State of
France.

ty, and Their *Encroachments*; Who are *Exempt* from *Payments*; or rather, that the *Country-man* *Payes* for *All*. To make an end, let him also observe the *Power*, and *Partiality* of their *Supereminent Parliament* of *Paris*.

The Book I mention, is of undeniable Authority, wherein Account is given of, at the least, *Eight Millions* (*English*) arising from *Three Taxes* only; and for the sole behoof and *Entertainment* of the *Souldery* (their *Tailles*, *Taillon*, and *Subsistance*) Beside their *Aides*; (an Imposition upon all sorts of Merchandise, *Salt* excepted) which must needs be a *Vast Income*: and their *Gabelle* upon *Salt*; that brings in near *Two Millions* more. Not to insist upon *Casualties*, and infinite other Inventions for squeezing, which they practise: *The Plough maintains the Army*. [Take notice that this *Reflection* was Calculated for the *State of France* in 1661.]

The effects of
a Standing Army
in France.

Give them their Due, their *Noblesse* are *Brave* and *Accomplish'd* Men, and the *Brunt* of all *Hazzards* lies totally upon *Them*; but scarce in Nature is there a more *abject Commonalty*: and to conclude; Such is their Condition, that without *War*, they cannot *Live*: if not *Abroad*, they are sure to have it at *Home*.

Let it be Noted too: the *Taxes* follow'd their *Army*, not their *Army* the *Taxes*; for 'tis *One* thing to *Levy Money* to *Raise Guards*, and *Another* thing to *Levy Guards* to *Raise Money*: the *One* appearing to be done by *Consent*, the *Other* by *Force*. (I use *Guards* and *Army* promiscuously, as only taking a *Guard* for a small *Army*, and an *Army* for a stronger *Guard*.)

IF a *Standing Army* subjects *France* to so many Inconveniences, (whereof History is full) where the *Strength* lies in the *Nobility*; How much more *Hazzardous* was it to *England*, where the *Welfare* of the *whole*, depended upon the *Affections* and *Interest* of the *Middle-rated* People: Especially under an *Usurper*, that was driven to uphold himself upon the daily Consumption of the Nation: (and a *Body* that becomes every day *Weaker* than *Other*, must not expect to be long-lived.)

A Standing Army more
hazardous in
England, than
in France.

So much for the Inconvenience of *Cromwell's* Standing Army, as to the *Situation* of *England*, together with a View of the Effects of it in *France*. We'll now consider what Wel-

come it was like to find upon the *Point of Experience*, or *Custom*.

Alterations of
Customs dan-
gerous.

Alteration of Customs, is a work of *Hazzard*, even in *Bad Customs*; but to change Customs under which a Nation has been happy, for *Innovations*, which upon *Experience* they have found *Fatal* to them, is matter of great *Peril* to the *Under-taker*. But I look upon *Oliver's Case*, as I do upon a *Proposition*, of such or such a *Mate at Chess*: where there are several ways to come within *One* on't, and *None* to *Hit* it. The *Devil* and *Fortune* had a mind to *Puzzle* him. He *Prefers* his *Pawns*; *Transposes*, *Shifts* his *Officers*; but all will not do: He still wants either *Men* or *Money*; if he *Disbands*, he has too few of the *One*; if he *holds up*, he has too little of the *Other*. Such in Truth, was this *Tyrant's Exigence*, that he was forc'd to That, which the *Lawful Possessors* of the *Englisk Crown* would never venture upon: No, nor the *Usurpers* neither, before our *Blessed Reformers* of 1641. But

----Where will those People stay,
That thorough God, and Majesty, make way.

Our Saxon
Kings kept no
Standing
Army.
Nor Edmond
Ironside.

Our *Saxon Kings* contented themselves with a Law, *What Arms every man of Estate should find, and a Mulct upon such as did Detractare Militie*.

Edmond Ironside after his *Duel* with *Camillus the Dane*; and a *Composition*, to divide the *English* and *Danish Kingdoms* betwixt them and their *Heirs*, kept no *Army* on *Foot* to *Guard* the *Agreement*; Neither did the *Danes* (who after his *Death*, *Treacherously Seiz'd* the *Kingdom*) to maintain their *Conquest*.

Nor William
the Conque-
rour.

William the Conquerour, that subdu'd both *English* and *Danes*, thought himself safe enough in creating *Tenures* by *Knights-Service*, and permitting *Proprieties*; though at that time under such *Jealousies*, that he took divers of his *English Prisoners* into *Normandy* with him, for fear of a *Commotion* in his *Absence*.

Nor William
Rufus.

William Rufus, and, after Him, his Brother *Henry the First*, (tho' the *Usurpers* of the *Senior Right* of their Elder Brother *Robert*) set up his *Rest* upon the same *Terms*: And so did *Henry the II*, after a long *Contest* with King *Stephen*, and notwithstanding the *unruliness* of most of his *Sons*.

Henry III, and then *Edward I*, after the *Barons Warrs*
Employ'd

Employ'd no *Standing Army* to secure themselves: neither did *Edward* or *Richard the Second*; notwithstanding a Potent *Faction* of the *Nobility* bandying against the *Latter* of them.

Nor *Hen. 3.*
Edw. 1. Edw.
 nor *Ric. 2.*

Neither did the *Henries IV, V, and VI*, in the Grand Schism of *York* and *Lancaster*, ever approve of it. Nor *Henry VII*, (as *Wise* and *Jealous* as any of his *Predecessors*.)

Nor the *Hen-*
ries 4, 5, 6, & 7.

If any thing could have warrantd the Adventure, methinks the *Topsie-turvy* and *Brouillery* which *Henry the VIII*, Introduc'd, might have perswaded, or provok'd it. But neither *There*, nor in the following *Toss* and *Tumble* of *Religion*, from *Edward VI*, to *Queen Mary*, and then back again to *Queen Elizabeth*, was it put in Practice.

Nor *Hen. 3.*
Edw. 5. Queen
Mary, nor *Q.*
Eliz.

King *James* had no Temptation to it. King *Charles the Martyr*, was indeed charg'd with the *Intention* of it, and so he was with being *Popishly affected*; (In Truth, with what not?) and the *One* as true as the *Other*. But who were They that laid This to His Charge? Even *Those very Persons* (some of them that advis'd *Oliver* to keep a *Standing Army* of 10000 Horse, and 20000 Foot, to Awe and Scourge the Nation. A Course unknown to our Forefathers; and by the *Best* and *Worst* of Former Princes equally disallow'd; the *Bad* not judging it *Safe*, nor the *Good*, *Expedient*.)

Nor *K. James*,
 nor *Charles*
 the *M A R-*
T Y R.

But other more Convenient, and as Effectual, means they had, either to Prevent Dangers, or Suppress Them, as their Custom of *Friborghes*, or *Frank-Pledges*, *Enquests*, *Oathes*, and *Penalties*, *Tenures by Knights-Service*, *Commissions of Array*, &c. Which being of approv'd Benefit, and Equality, were much more suitable to the *Genius* and *Interest* of the People, than a *Standing Army*; which to allow, had been no other than to deliver up the Strength of the Nation, into the hands of a *Faction*.

Expedients to
 prevent or
 disappoint
 Dangers.

Now was it less against the Government, than against the Humour of the Nation. Put a Parliament over the Nation, and an Army over the Parliament. Who Governs? But all *Oliver's Geese were Swans*; and his *Souldiers Saints*. Did they not Take what they would; Give what they would; Raise and Pluck-down at Pleasure? Nay, Effectually, did ever any *Standing-Army* Other, if they had nothing Else to do? Had they not already got the trick of calling the people together,

A Standing
 Army destruc-
 tive to the
 Government.

to get money of them; and then sending them away like Buz-zards, when they had gotten it; of *Packing*, and *Qualifying*; *Engrossing* of Powers and Offices; *Cantonizing* the Nation? Was it to be expected they should restore the *Right Line* again, when they had set up the *Wrong*? The *King*, when they had erected a *General*; The *Law*, when they had Master'd it by the *Sword*? They did not Tug so *hard*, for that they meant to part with *Easily*. What they got by *Rebellion*, was to be maintain'd by *Tyranny*; and *Necessity* was sure at Last to do the work of *Conscience*.

An Army without Pay, is the most Dangerous Enemy
 I Think, more need not be said to *Oliver's Standing Army*. His *Army* could not last *always*, and when he wanted *That* once; he was certain to find his *Army* as *Dangerous* an *Enemy*, as it had been a *Faithfull Friend* to him in his *Prosperity*.

Nay truly, 'bate his *Usurpation*; his want of *Faith* and *Honour*,—But rather then Prophane the Sacred Character of *God's Vicegerant* by joyning *Majesty* and *Cromwell* in the same Supposition; let us Imagine rather a *Wise* and *Lawfull Prince* in the place of that *Usurper*: and yet it may be a Question, How far a *Standing Army* would have Consisted with the Interest, even of a *Rightfull Monarch*.

First; As the Nation was *Poor*, and in no Condition for the Charge of it. *Next*; as it was Impoverished by an *Army*; and therefore ill-persuaded of *That Expedient*. *Thirdly*; the Prince himself must have been *Poor*; (in *Olivers Place*) and what should a *Poor Prince* have done with a *Standing Army*, over a *Poor* and *Discontented People*?

Money is the Interest of the World.
 The Interest of This world is *Money*. *Subjects Rebel*; *Armies Divide*; and *Kingdoms fall to nothing*, for want of it: That which *Fools* call *Fortune*, being (to men of clearer sight) only the *Favourable Influence of Treasure*. 'Tis *That*, which Carries *Towns*, *Causes*, and *Armies*; puts *Knaves* in *Honest mens places*; *Corrupts Counsells*, and *Supplants Governments*: the People wear their hearts at their purse-strings; and a *General Oppression*, is ever accompanied with a *General Desire* to Remove it. I speak of what they do, not what they ought to do; for all men are not of a *Constitution* to hang, and Starve for *Conscience*. In fine, where the State is *Necessitous*, and a *Faction Wealthy*, That Prince (as is already hinted) that erects a *Standing Force*, in that condition, does but provide an *Army* for his *Enemies*. Not to insist upon the hazzards, arising

arising either from the People, if the *Principal Officers* have too little Power; or from the *Officers Themselves*, if they have too much; by which, not only the *Publick Peace*, but the *Monarchy* it self, is *Endanger'd*: the *Kings Crown* depending upon the *Revolt* of a *Province*. What can be more perillous then *This Conjunction*; where there is so great a *Temptation*, on the one hand, and so great a *Provocation* on the other; where the *Multitude* wait only for a *Head*, and the *Ambitious* for a *Party*?

But why do I discourse the *Mischiefs* of a *Standing Army*? They are too many, great and *Obvious*, to admit a *Question*. What are the *Benefits* of it Rather? Is it either *safe* to any Purpose, or *usefull* to the *common* and *pretended end* of it, even under a *Lawfull* and *Hereditary Monarch*?

What's the Benefit of a Standing Army.

It's true; a Prince may deal with his *Dominions*, as the Gentleman did with his *Estate*, that turn'd an *Inheritance* into an *Annuity*, because he would rather have it *Large*, then *Long*, and That's the *Fairest* of a *Forc'd Government*; Suppose he save himself for his *own time*; what will become then of his *Successour*? But that we'll waive too; and Consider, what's the *Fruit* of it to *himself*?

Is he the Richer for't? Alas, the *Contrary*: the *Nation* bears a *Double Burthen*, and the *Army* Sucks the *better half* of the *Advantage*. *Is he the Safer*? Neither: for a *Mutiny* in his *Army*, is both more *likely*, and more *dangerous*, then a *Tumult* among his *People*. In fine; A *Standing Army* may promote a *Faction*, but 'tis the *Law* preserves the *Publick*, and consequently the *King*.

The mischief and danger of it.

That Monarch that Secures himself from *Private Practises* by a *Choice*, *Full*, and *Honourable Guard*, well *Paid*, and *Disciplin'd*, about his *Royall Person*; as to the Rest shall find the *Strict* and *timely Execution* of *Good Laws* the best *Publick Security* against *Sedition*.

A Royal Guard necessary and sufficient. With the timely execution of good Laws.

'Tis a *Cheap Remedy*, and therefore *Acceptable* to the *Generality*: A *Legall* one; so that the *Delinquents Themselves* cannot *Complain* of it; and *Lastly*, 'tis a *Sure* one: which if it be, what can be more *advifable* for any *Prince* and *People*? In *Truth*; so *Sure* it is, that I'm to seek (bate only *Matter of Claim*) where ever any *Setled Government* was *Embroyld*, but either by the *Interest* of a *Standing Force*; or the *Remissness* of *Authority*, in the *Execution* of *Establish'd Laws*.

The

The *Necessity* of a Royall Guard is Evident ; the *Number* must be suited to the differing Exigences of *Times* and *Places* : but with This *General Regard* : That it be not only sufficient to the *Safety* of a Prince ; but *Honorary* likewise, and Accomodate to his *Dignity* ; and Demonstrative rather of his *Power* than of his *Danger*.

But be the Body *Great* or *Small* ; Nay, we'l suppose it equal, to a *Standing Army* (but not Distributed (as That is) into *County-Troops*, and *Provincial Governments*) Call it a *Guard* still, for the very *Name* of the *Other* sounds like a *Grievance*. The *One*, supposing only the *Peoples Care* of their *Sovereign* ; the *Other* intimating the *Sovereigns Jealousie* of his *People*. Let me not be understood as in allowance of This *Overproportion* : for such a *Guard* is but an *Army* in *Disguise*.

There may be *Temporary Occasions* indeed, for *Temporary*, and *Extraordinary Levies*, but the word *Temporary*, is commonly attended with such a *Train of Reasons for Perpetuity* ; that if the *Occasion* be not very *Manifest*, the *World* is apt to doubt of the *Necessity*. Not that the *Generality* have any *Right* to *judge* of, or *Debate* the *Grounds* of a *Change* ; but I suppose that Their *Opinions*, and *After-feelings* will not be deny'd to have some *Influence* upon the *Event* of it.

To *Conclude* ; That Prince is *Great*, *Safe*, and *Happy*, that Commands by his *Armes*, *Abroad*, and Governs by his *Laws* at *Home*. The *Apprehension* of *Conspiracies* and *Plots*, in my opinion, weighs not much ; or if there be any danger ; the failing is rather in the *Constitution* or *Administration*, then in the want of *Power* to keep the *People* quiet : *Good Laws*, and *Good Officers*, will do the *Business*, without an *Army* ; and if the *Instruments* be *bad*, The *Hazzard's* *Tentimes* greater with it.

It will be needful here, for the *Clearing* of the *Question*, to make a *Particular Enquiry* concerning *Seditions* ; and that's the *Point* we'l handle in the *Next Chapter* ; which, for *Order* sake, we shall divide into *Seven Sections*, with their *Subdivisions* as occasion shall require.

C A P. IX.

Of Seditions in Particular; and shewing in what manner they arise from These Seven Interests. The Church, the Bench, the Court, the Camp, the City, the Countrey, and the Body Representative.

IN the first Chapter of this Tract, we have touch'd upon the *Matter and Causes of Seditions in General*: We must be now a little more *Particular*.

The *Scene's Utopia*; and we'll *Divide* it, into *Seaven Interests*, The, *Church, the Bench, the Court, the Camp, the City, the Countrey, and the Body Representative*: the least considerable of which, being in any great disorder, hazzards the *whole*; and That, either by engaging in some *Actual Violence* against the Government; or by some *Irregularity of Proceeding* that may *Provoke* or *Cause* it. Of *These* in their *Course*, and *first* of the *Church*.

§. I.

Seditions arising from the C H U R C H.

THose Troubles in the *State* which derive from Distempers in the *Church*, proceed either from *Faction, Ignorance, or Scandal*.

The Strongest Tie upon Reasonable Nature, is *Conscience*; and the *Stubborneſt Conſciences*, are Those that do they know not *What*, they know not *Why*. In Truth, what is *Conscience* without *Understanding*, but a *well-meaning Madneſs*? And That's the Faireſt Sense my Charity can afford to the Blind Zeal of a Transported Multitude. If *Conscience* bids them *Kill the King; Rob the Church; and Tear up the Foundations of Both Governments*; They'll do it: Nay, *More*, This has been done, and *Providence* it ſelf Proclaim'd for the *Der* of it. Great Heed ſhould then be taken, what Persons are Entruſted with the Care of Souls, ſince the *Conſequence of a Faction* Preacher, and a *Miſtaken Conſcience*, proves many times the Ruine both of *Prince and People*.

Conſcience the ſtrongeſt Tie.

Under

Under the Note of *Faction*, I comprize all *Opinions* delivered *Publickly*, and with *Design*; against the *Doctrine*, *Practice*, or *Authority* of the *Church*. Reduce it, in Short, to *Heresie*, and *Schism*. The *former* whereof, reflecting only upon Matters of *Faith*, concerns rather *Religion*, then *Government*: and lyes beyond the Line of my purpose; but in This Place; the *Latter* is the Question, and, briefly as we may, we'll take a view of the *Rise*, the *Method*, the *Design*, and the *Effects* of it.

It is with *Church-men* as with *other Mortals*; There are of all Sorts, *Good*, *Bad*, and *Indifferent*. Some we have known, whom neither the *Loss* of *Dignity*, *Fortune*, *Freedom*, no, nor the *Loss* of *Life* it self, could ever move from the strict *Rule* of *Conscience*, *Magnanimity*, and *Duty*. Others we have seen to *Exercise* these *Cruelties*, (though *Ecclesiasticks* themselves) upon the Nobler Sort of their own *Function*. And some again, we have observ'd to *shift* with every *Turn*, and *Steer* by *Interest*; still putting on the *Livery* of the *Prevailing Party*: *Squaring* the *Rule*, and *Will* of *Heaven* to the *Appetites* and *Passions* of *Humanity*. So that upon the whole, 'tis evident; some *Clergy-men* are *Quiet*, because they have *Preferments*, and Others *Troublesom*, because they want them.

The Principal *Ingredients* into *Schism*, are These; *Ambition*, *Avarice*, *Popularity*, and *Envy*; The *Scope* of it is to *destroy Authority*, and advance a *Faction*. Now how to accomplish This, is the *Great Work*; for a *Rent* in the *Church* signifies nothing without a *Sedition* in the *State*: and in This manner they proceed.

The Rise of
Schism.

First, In a *Style* of *Holy Tenderness* they slyly disaffect the *People* against the *Rights* of the *Church*, as in themselves *unlawful*; and utterly *Destructive* of *Christian Liberty*.

The method
of it.

To strengthen, and advance the *Imposition*, what do they next, but rip up all the *Failings*, and shew the *Nakedness* of their *Superiours*? Still *aggravating* what they find, and creating *Scandalous Matter* where they want it.

The motion of
Schism into
Sedition.

When the *Multitude* are once mov'd in *Conscience* against the *Impositions*, and in *Passion* against the *Imposers*; their next attempt is upon the *Authority*, and then They divide into *Separate Assemblies*, which under colour of so many *Conscientious Dissenters* from the *Ceremonies* of the *Church*, are infallibly so many *Contrivers* against the *Peace* of the *Kingd m*.

For

For here comes in the Civil Power to prohibit their Seditious Meetings, and Then, the Saints (they cry) are Persecuted: The Cause is God's; and they are ty'd in Conscience to bind their Kings in Chains; and through all Extremities to pursue a Reformation: This is the Fruit of Tolerating, a Faction under a Countenance of Conscience. Nor is it any wonder to see those wretches draw their Swords against Their Sovereign in the Field, whose Souls are turn'd against him in the Pulpit.

But 'tis Objected, that some Ministers do really make a Conscience, of Conformity. Truly, the better for Them, if they forbear upon That Account; but 'tis the same thing to the Publick, upon what account soever; for they Prescribe, what they Practise, and by the President of Sticking upon a Doubt of Conscience, they open a Door to Disobedience upon any Pre- And Effect
tence of it, breaking the Bond of Unity in favour of a Particu- of it.
lar nicety of Opinion.

Very notable is The Determination of the Lord St. Albans, in This Case [*In Points Fundamental, he that is not with us is against us. In Points not Fundamental, he that is not against us, is with us.*]

Note.

Let this suffice to shew the Political Inconvenience of Entertaining Schismatical Preachers. It may be now a Question, How far a Christian Magistrate may justify the sufferance of any man to exercise the Ministry, within his Dominions, that's a profess'd Enemy to Episcopacy: Which I Offer, with the fit Modesty of a Proposal, and with Reverence, to the better inform'd. But if, as the Danger of such a Mixture is Evident, so the Lawfulness of it shall appear doubtfull, their own Argument is then turn'd against Themselves, and we have both Scripture and Experience on our side, over and above.

Qu. May an enemy to Bishops exercise the Ministry?

The Three Questions, wherewith King Charles the Martyr Choak'd the Presbyterian Ministers in the Isle of Wight, Remain still Unresolv'd, and they are These.

First, Is there any Certain Form of Church Government at all prescrib'd in the World?

Secondly, If there be any Prescript Form, Whether or no may the Civil Power Change the same, as they see Cause?

Thirdly, If any Prescript Form there be, and That unchangeable; If it were not Episcopal, what was it?

In Fact, the Constant Exercise of Church-Prelacy is so manifest, that the whole stream of Story, and Tradition Runs E-

Three Questions propounded by King Charles the Martyr, concerning Church Government.

p.iscopal: which to Oppose, were to deny the only Means of knowing whether it were so, or not.

Is it the *Right* they Question? Take then the learned Bishop Sanderfon's Deduction of it.

Leaving other men to the liberty of their own Judgments, my opinion is, that EPISCOPAL GOVERNMENT is not to be derived meerly from Apostolical Practice or Institution: but that it is originally founded in the Person and Office of the Messiah, our Blessed Lord JESUS CHRIST. Who being sent by his Heavenly Father to be the great Apostle [HEB. III. 1.] Bishop and Pastor, [1 PET. II. 25.] of his Church, and anointed to that Office immediately after his Baptism by JOHN, with power and the Holy Ghost [ACT. X. 37---8.] descending then upon him in a bodily shape [LUK. III. 22.] did afterwards, before his Ascension into Heaven, send and empower his holy Apostles, (giving them the Holy Ghost likewise as his Father had given him) in like manner as his Father had before sent him. [J. O. H. XX. 21.] to execute the same Apostolical, Episcopal, and Pastoral Office for the ordering and governing of his Church. untill his coming again: and so the same Office to continue in them, and their Successours, unto the end of the World. [M A T. XXVIII. 18-----20. Thus far the Reverend Bishop.

Some will Pretend, that *This only proves the Authoritative Power they receiv'd by their Mission, but no Succession to the Office.*

For *That*; Observe the Mandate, [*Go, Teach ALL Nations.*] *Personally*, and *Actually* they could not do it; but in *Effect*, and *Virtually*, 'tis out of doubt, they did it: and *How*, but by their *Delegates*? For otherwise; our Saviour Com-manded them a Thing *Impossible*. Briefly; if the Gospel was to be Preach'd to *All Nations*, (which no *Christian* will deny) and if (according to the *Literal* direction of the Order) the Gospel could *not* be Preach'd to all Nations, by so few Persons as were Then Commission'd; what follows, but the Evident *Necessity* of a *Substitution*; which *Delegation* being granted, clears the Dispute: for 'tis Indubitable that *What Authority* soever our Saviour vested the Apostles with, the same likewise was from Them transmitted to their Successours; Who (in the words of his late Sacred Majesty) succeed into the same Apostolical Power, and Function, which the Apostles, as Ordinary Pastors, had. *Qui in Domum alterius succedit,*

The derivati-
on of Episco-
pal Govern-
ment.

Christ's Man-
date to the
Apostles.

Jure ejus uti debet. He that succeeds to the Government of another, succeeds also to his Rights of Governing. And Mark This further; that the Apostles Powers, and Commissions, were granted before the Descent of the Holy Ghost: and relating only to matters of Ordinary use, and perpetual Establishment in the Church; the extraordinary Gifts of the Apostles not at all proving them extraordinary Officers.

Now how far a Prince may safely either Act, or Suffer the violation of a Church-Government of This Authority, I am not yet instructed. Episcopacy unalterable.

In fine; it is most certain, that a Divided Clergy makes a Divided Nation; and by how much Religion is the fairest of all Pretences; Conscience the deepest of all Impressions; Preaching and Praying the most Popular and Publick of all Operations: by so much are Dissaffected Church-men the most Pernicious and Intolerable of all disloyal Instruments. No Calumny being so Plausible, as That which drops from the Lips of Persons famous for an External form of Piety: No Hypocrites so abominable, as Those that Tithe Mint, and Cummin, and yet neglect Mercy and Judgment: that under colour of long Prayers devour Widows houses, &c. And no sting so Deadly, as That from a Snake in a mans own bosome.

Corruptio Optimi, Pejima.

We have now done with the Schismatick; the Active and Industrious promoter of Seditions. The Matter he works upon, is Scandal; either Suppos'd or Real; and That comes next.

In all Invektives against the Church, the Scandalous, Negligent, and Insufficient, March hand in hand: to which are opposed a Party that stile themselves a Godly, Painfull, and Able Ministry. Thus with the Boasting, and Censorious Pharisee, does the Proud Schismatick advance himself above his Brethren, calling Good Evil, and Evil Good; imposing equally upon the People, by an uncharitable Judgment, and Report, on the One side, and a fictitious Holiness, on the Other.

The method of Schism.

Not to excuse all Clergy-men, nor to extenuate the Crimes of any of them. Judas his Treason was the Fuller because of his Profession: and yet the Eleven were never the worse, because of Judas his Treason.

We'll Grant, that for a Minister to spend one Hour of the week in a Pulpit, and the rest in a Tavern; to Undo a good Sermon by an Ill Example; and to discredit a Strict Doctrine

A Scandalous Clergy, makes a Seditions Tavern.

by a *Loose Life*; is to extinguish the *Reverence* that is due to the *Function*; and to make *Preaching* look only like a *Poltrick Ordinance* to keep the People in *Order*. Not that the *Doctrine* is ever the worse for the *Person*, nor the *Priesthood* the less *Venerable* for the *abuse* of it; but it ministers matter of *Scandal*, and *Exception*: and with the *Simple* it passes for an *Argument* against the *Government*.

Slander is the
Sin and Pra-
ctice of the
Devil.

But as the *Habit* of *Drunkenness*, and *Prophaness*, in a *Churchman* is most *unsufferable*; so is it on the other hand a *Practice* *Diabolical*, to put all their *Actions* upon the *Tent*, and skrew up every *allowable*, and *social Freedom* to the construction of a *Scandal*. As if there were no *Medium* to be admitted, betwixt the *Angel* and the *Brute*. Are they not *Men*; and equally subjected to *Infirmities*, with other *Men*? 'Tis true; their *Calling* is *Divine*, but their *Persons* are *Humane*; and as much is required, in regard of Their *Ministry*: so somewhat also is to be *born with* in respect of their *Humanity*. Remember, there were those that call'd our Saviour himself a *Wine-bibber*.

Alas; For a Minister to *Drink* a *Glass* of *Wine* in a *Tavern*, is made a mighty business: Nay, to be only *Pleasant*, and *well-humour'd*, is by *some*, cast in their dish as an *Ayre too Light* for the *Severity* of their *Profession*: as if the *Messengers* of *Joy*, the *bearers* of *good-tidings* to the world, were only to be *sad Themselves*, and look, as if either They *suspected* the *Truth* of their *Errand*, or their *Title* to the *Benefit* of it.

Shun Appear-
ances of Scan-
dal.

However, since there are Those that will make use of *small Occasions* to do *great Mischiefs*; It is a Point of *Pious Prudence*, fairly to shun appearances of *Scandal*; but 'tis indeed of high, and absolute *Necessity*, to *Punish*, or *Remove* the *Scandal* it self: as That which both *provokes* a Judgment from *Heaven*, and stirs up the *People* to *execute* it. Yet let us put some difference betwixt Sins of *Appetite*, and *Sense*; and Sins of *Malevolence*: in the *Former*, a man plays the *Beast*; but in the *Latter*, he plays the *Devil*.

Ignorance a
Species of
Scandal.

I look upon *Ignorance* also, as a *Species* of *Scandal*; even although in a *Good Man*; for every *Good Man* makes not a *Good Minister*; nor do I know which is more tolerable; *Habitual Prophaness*, and *Sensuality* in a *Deacon*, or *Ignorance* in a *Teacher*: the hazard of *False Doctrine*, or the Influence of an ill *Example*.

Touch.

Touching the *Body* of the *Clergy*, enough is said, to shew the dangerous Effects of *Schism*, and *Scandal*; the *One* tending *Directly* to *Sedition*, the *Other*, *Consequently*.

There remains another *Stumbling-block*, and That concerns the *Governours* of the *Church*; who are commonly charged with *Innovations*, *Rigour*, *Pride*, or *Avarice*. They are capable of All This, as they are *Men*; but never the more blameable for a *Clamour* Levell'd at them as they are *Bishops*: There being great *Difference*, betwixt *Personal Reproof*, and a *Faction's Confederacy*: betwixt the *seasonable Freedom of Counsel*, or *Reprehension*, duly Circumstanc'd; and the contumacious *Insolence* of *Subjects* toward their *Superiours*. In fine, a *likely Tale* does their *Feat* as well as a certain *Truth*; only they accommodate all their *Stories* to the *Design* of over-turning the *Government*, and to the *Gust* of the *Multitude*.

Bishops blamed by the more blameable.

The Sound of *Innovations*, and of *Popery*, in some places, goes a great way with the *Common People* toward a *Sedition*. They *Fear*, they *Wish*, they *Love*, they *Hate*, they know not what: and yet against this *Terrible Nothing*, shall they engage their *Lives* and *Fortunes*, as *Zealously*, as if their *Souls* lay at *Stake*; and as *Ridiculously*, as if they *Phanfy'd* These same *Innovations* to be an *Army of Flying Dragons*, and the *Pope* leading them on upon a *Hobby-horse*. With this *Device*, the *Multitude* is first startled, and then every *Bush* is a *Thief*; *Church-Habits* are the *Trumpery* of *Rome*; *Decency* is *Superstitious*; *Kneeling*, direct *Idolatry*: And finally, to *Impute* all This, is interpreted, *A violence upon the Consciences of the Godly*. Thus from the very *Method of Agreement* is rais'd an *Argument for Separation*; and *Christian Liberty* is render'd *Destructive of Humane Authority*.

Bishops charged with Pride, by the prouder Brethren.

Another General Objection, among the *Prouder Brethren*, is the *Pride* of *Bishops*; their *Lording it over God's Heritage*: which through the *Person*, Wounds the *Office*, Incensing the *Multitude* against the *Power* it self, under pretext of blaming the *unlawful Exercise* of it. Suitable to the *Dignity* of *Bishops*, and Correspondent to the *Duty* of them, ought to be the *Revenue*: (that is, sufficient both for *Honour* and *Hospitality*) in which Particular, the *Ecclesiastical Patrimony*, is by some People thought as much too *Large*, as the *Jurisdiction*; and from a false and envious *Calculation* of *Bishops* *Rents*,

Rents, occasion is taken to inveigh against their *Avarice*; exposing them at once, both as a *Grievance*, and a *Booty*. Thus, like the *Devil*, the *Schismatick* advances his Kingdom by *Slander*, and thrives by the *Sins of the People*.

We have dwelt long upon this Subject of the *Church*; but with the next, The *Bench*, we shall be quicker.

§. II.

T H E B E N C H.

THE Two main *Springs* that Move and Govern the Affections of reclaim'd Nature, are *Conscience* and *Law*. By the *Former* we are oblig'd, in relation to our *Immortal Being*; and by the *Other* as *Men* Link'd in *Society*. Our *Priests* and *Judges*, are the Oracles we depend upon, for *Counsel*, and *Instruction*; in both these Grand Concerns: and if *They* deceive us, what greater Misery can befall a Nation, than to have *Jugglers*, and *Imposters*, take up the *Bench* and *Pulpit*? Confusing the *Vulgar* with *False Weights* and *Measures*, of *Truth* and *Reason*; and uttering their Licentious *Prevarications*, for *Law*, and *Gospel*? In which *Case*, the greater the *Modesty* and *Virtue* of the *Common-people*, the greater is the *Peril* of the *Delusion*: it being their Duty to submit, to the *Reason* of the *One*, and to *Believe* the *Doctrine* of the *Other*, without *disting*uishing either, unless in Matters most *Notoriously* Repugnant to the Elements of *Polity* and *Religion*. And he's not his *Crafts-master*, that cannot give, even to the foulest *Purpose*; a *Colour* fair enough to cheat a *Multitude*. What *Wickedness* is there, for which a corrupt *Divine* shall not produce a *Text*; and a *shifting Lawyer* a *President*? But enough is said of the *Former*, and too much in *Preface* to the *Latter*.

Conscience
and Law go-
vern the
World.

Occasions of
Sedition.

Those *Faults*, among the Professors of the *Law*, which frequently cause *Seditions* (although not in *Themselves* *Seditious*) are, *Corruption*; *Partiality*; *Oppression*; *Chargeable Delays*: or, in a word, the *Non-administration* of *speedy Justice*. Whereupon must necessarily ensue *Poverty*. *Factions*, *Animosities*, &c.

The Consequences are *Dangerous* likewise, of *over-straining* the *Prerogative*; and so of *Depressing* it: both which may be done, either out of *Zeal*, or with *Design*. But, be the
Intention

Intention of the Doer what it will, the *Effects* of the Thing done are *Mischievous*, for it infects *Fears* and *Jealousies* of *Tyranny*, on the one side; and begets *False* and *bold Opinions* and *Attempts* of *Liberty* on the other: engaging all *Humours* against the *Government*, whom either the *Hopes* and *Gust* of *Freedom*, or the *Dread* of *Oppression* can work upon. But *Personal Vices* and *Mistakes*, we may put upon the *Roll* of *Slow Poysons*, that do the *Deed*, though it be long first.

There are another sort of *Lawyers*, whose *Malice* is of a *Quicker*, and *Stronger Operation*; under whose *Lips* is the *poison of Asps*: or rather, whose *Tongues* are *Daggers*, turning the *Point of Law*, upon the *Law* it self; wounding the *Eagle* with a *Feather* from his own *Wing*, and *Stabbing* the *Persons* of *Princes* with their own *Authority*. These are the *Execrable Regicides*; and the *Tumultuary Rabble* are but the *Ministers* of their vile *Purposes*. Alas! in *Matter of Law*; by whom should the simple *Multitude* be directed, if not by *Lawyers*? (as by *Divines*, in point of *Conscience*.) Whether is the greater *Offender* then; that *Ignorant Wretch* that draws his *Sword* against his *Sovereign*, on the behalf of *Law* and *Religion*: (as he supposes:). Or, Those *Abominable Seducers*, that by *wrested Scriptures*, pretended *Inspirations*; by *misconstruction* of *Laws*, *misapplying* of *Presidents*; *Torturing* or *Embezelling* of *Records*; *inveigle* the *Poor Creature* into a *Good Opinion* of so *foul an Enterprize*? What signifies the *Event* of a *Popular Action*, compared with the deliberate *Contrivance*, *Allowance*, and *Direction* of it; more than the *Effect* of some dull *Passive Instrument*, employed by such or such an *Agent*? Or, if a *Prince* be *Murther'd*; whether's the more to blame, the *Axe*, or the *Executioner*; the *Bullet*, or the *Marks-man*? So much for the *BENCH*, now to the *COURT*.

§. III.

The C O U R T.

BY the *Court-Interest*, is meant *That Party*, which more *Immediately* depends upon the *Grace* and *Favour* of the *Prince*: and here (aselsewhere) *Seditions* are either *Plotted* or *Occasion'd*.

Plotters of Sedition.

Touching the *Plotters* of *Seditions*; Some out of *Avarice*, with *Judas*, *Betray* their *Masters*. Others, are spurred on by *Ambition*, with *Absolom* to *Supplant* Them. One man is puff up by *Popularity*; a *Second*, stung with *Envy*; a *Third*, with *Jealousie*; a *Fourth*, *Transports* himself with *Revenge*, or some other *Personal Animosity*. In fine, These various *Humours*, make but *One Party*; and the *Covetous*, *Ambitious*, &c. — agree in the same *Conspiracy*.

Are of three Sorts.

Of the *Contrivers* of *Sedition*, some strike directly at the *Governour*; Others, at the *Government*: and a *Third Sort*, by crafty *Circumstances*, and *Windings*, chuse rather to *Mine* the *Regal Authority*, then *Batter* it; and to *work out* a *Prince* by a *Skrew*, rather then *force* him by an *Army*.

Usurpers.

The *first sort* of *Contrivances* here *Specifi'd*, are such as *clayming* to the *Crown*, *Themselves*, *Challenge* the *Prince* that *wears* it, as an *Usurper*: And These, by making a fair *Title* to the *People*, joyn'd with a little *Popular skill* of *Humouring* the *Multitude*, may with great ease engage a *Party*, in *favour* of a *Person* whom they *Love*, against a *Right* which they cannot *understand*.

Monarchomachists.

Concerning such as directly oppose the *Form* of *Monarchy*, upon a *Principle* of *Judgment*; much needs not be said, because they are neither *many*, nor *considerable*: for, to maintain That *Paradox*, they must overthrow all *Story*, *Sacred*, and *Prophane*; the *Practice* of all *Ages*, and the *Reason* of all *Governments*.

Jesuited Puritans.

A *Third sort* of *Contrivers*, are Those who under fair appearances of *Loyalty*, and *Publickness*, of *Spirit*, *Masque* their *Seditions Intents*, and *Drive* on a *Particular Interest*. From which kind of evil Instruments, even the *Cabinets*, and *Private Counsels* of *Princes* are not absolutely *Free*; and (according to *Sir Francis Bacon*) the *hazzard* arises, either from an

Over-

Over-greatness in one Counsellour ; or, an Over-strict Combination in Divers ; which are (says he) things soon found and holpen. For Perspicuity sake, we'll treat of this Division in Subsections.

Subsection. I.

Over-greatness in one Counsellor.

THe *Over-greatness in one Counsellour*, is to be understood Principally, in Respect of his *Credit* with his *Master* ; and partly, in Regard of those great *Offices*, and *Riches* which are commonly heap'd upon great *Favourites*, giving them the means of *over-awding* the *Honesty* of their *Inferiours*, and of *ingratiating* themselves with the *People* ; at least with so many of them as will be drawn to their Party, either by *Fear*, or *Promotion*.

Where it happens that a *Prince* his Heart is touch'd with the *Magick* of so much Kindness for a *Subject*, as to make him dangerously *Over-great* : it is not either *Wisdom*, or *Virtue*, that can properly deliver him from That *Charme*, but it must be rather *Time*, and *Experience*, that shall *Dis-enchant* him, Nor is it a *Fault* in a *Prince*, to comply with a *Natural Inclination* ; but it is a *Barbarous Ingratitude* in a *Subject* to abuse it, by Endeavouring, (Comparatively) to *Darken the Sun*, with the *sparklings* of a *Refracted light*, shot from his own *Glory*.

Time is the best Tryal of Fidelity.

In This Case, the Happiness of a Nation depends not absolutely upon the *Prudence* of the *Governour* ; but, in some Degree, upon the *Honesty* of the *Favourite* : not altogether upon *Counsell*, but much also upon *Enformation* : nor upon *That* neither, so much concerning the *State* and *Quality* of *Affairs*, as touching the *Fitness* of *Instruments* to *menage* them, and the *Faith*, and *Abilities* of *Persons*. [In vain is it, (says the Profound St. Albans) for *Princes* to take *Councell* concerning *Matters*, if they take no *Councell* likewise concerning *Persons*.]

The Knowledge of Persons, is more than the Understanding of Matters.

Is a *Kingdom* in *Danger* of *Invasion*, or *Sedition* ? To Obviate That *Danger* by a *Force*, is a *Rational Expedient*. But he that Arms his *Enemies* instead of his *Friends*, *Encreases* the *Danger*. It were neither safe, nor *Royall*, for a *Prince* to *Walk*, or *Sleep* without a *Watch* about him. But

were he not better be *Alone*, then take *Affassins* into his *Guard*, or *Bed-chamber*? In fine; *Great* is the *Hazard* of *Mistaking Persons*? *Great* is the *Crime* of the *Industrious Authors* of such *Mistakes*; and *Great* the *Infelicity* of a *Monarch* so *Mistaking*.

The Noblest
Natures most
easily Decei-
ved.

Nay, which is worst of all, in This Particular, the *Noblest Dispositions* are the most lyable to be *Deceiv'd*, and only *Om-niscience*, or *Ill-Nature* can totally *Secure* a *Prince* from the *Delusion*. Imagine a *Servant* receiv'd into the *Arms* of his *Master*, *Crowned* with *Honour* and *Bounty*; and in This *State* of *Favour*, giving advice concerning *Persons* that are mere *Strangers* to the *Monarch*: Who *fit*, or *unfit*, for such or such *Employment*; who *false*, or *Loyall*, &c. How should a *Prince* suspect a *Subject* under so many *Obligations* to *Fidelity*?

Abuses from 1
Great Persons
hardly Recti-
fy'd.

Although Abuses of This Kind are in *Themselves* suffici-
ently *Mischievous*, yet are they the *more* so, by reason of the
Difficnly, and *Perill* to *Rectify* them; for, in many *Cases*,
(as *Sir Francis Bacon*) the *Truth* is *hard* to *know*, and *not* fit to
utter.

What he must
do that under-
takes it.

He that would ducly *Execute* This *Office*, must first, *Resolve*
to *feel* the *weight* of a *Potent Adversary*; and *Sacrifice* his
Hopes, his *Fortunes*, his *Freedom*, (nay, and perhaps, in Con-
sequence, his *Life*) to his *Duty*.

He must be *wary* too, that not a *Syllable* pass from his *Lips*,
or *Pen*, which by the utmost force of *Misconstruction*, may
seem to glance upon the *Monarch*: wherein, his *Loyalty* is not
less concern'd, than his *Discretion*; for 'tis a fouler *Crime*
Publickly to *Defame* a *Prince*, then *Privately* to *mis-persuade*
him. Let him but keep himself to the *Fact*, (as whether This
or That be *True* or *False*, not meddling with the *Equity*, and
Reason of the matter) he may with as much *Honour*, and good-
manners, advertise his *Prince* of a *Mistake*, as believe that he
is *no God*.

The *Application* of This *Over-greatness* is exceeding *vari-
ous*, nor is the *Grace* it *self* less *Beneficial* to the *Publick*, when
Nobly Lodg'd, than it is the *Contrary*, when so *large* a *Bounty* is
pour'd into a *Thirsty* and *Narrow* soul. But we are *Ty'd* in
This *Place* to discourse the *Irregularities* of *Power*, not the
blessed *Improvements* of it.

We might reckon the Art of *Flattery*, among the main *The Art of*
Conducements to a *Court-Design*: But, *That's one of the Knacks* *Flattery.*
we Learn without a Teacher. So Common it is, that he that
 cannot *shift* his *Face* and *Humour*, 'tis odds, can hardly *shift*
 his *Limbs*: (he is so *Poor*, I mean) In This Particular: the
*Confidenc*e of *Princes*, being generally of their *Masters Age*
 and *Inclination*, or thereabout, have great *Advantages*, both
 for the *Freedom of Access*, and *Privacy*: the *Timing* of *As-*
fairs; and the more *Clear Discovery* of their *Natures*.

How the aforesaid *Inconveniencies* may be *holpen*, shall be
 the Subject of the next *Chapter*; but to *Discern* them in the
Intention, falls properly under *Consideration* in *This*.

To give the better *Guess* at the *Design* of This *Over-*
great-One, see how he stands *Affected*, first to the *Religion* of
 the Place he *Lives* in. 'Tis possible, the *Conscience* of a *Ca-*
tholick Good, may over-rule him, to the *Hazard* of a Good
 which he conceives less *Universal*: and some *Light*, may be
 taken toward this *Discovery*, from the *Observation* of his
Familiars; but much more from his *Natural Temper*, and
 from the *Tenor* of his *Life*. (i. e. if he be *Naturally Melan-*
cholick, and *Scrupulous*) he may be suspected to be *Conscien-*
tiously Seditious. Conscientious
Sedition.

Is it *Ambition* moves him? Ye shall then find him scatter- An Ambitious
Person.
 ing his *Donatives* among the *Souldiers*. The *Town* has not
Poor enow for him to *Relieve*, nor *Rich* enow for him to *Ob-*
lige. He carries his *Hat* in *One Hand*, and his *Heart* in the *O-*
ther. Here he *Lends* a *Smile*; There he *Drops* a *Nod*:
 with These *Popular Incantations* bewitching the *Multi-*
tude.

Is the *Good* of the *Subject* the *Question*? Who but He to
Ease the *People* in *Publick*, of the *Grievances* which *himself*
 had *Procured* in *Private*; and in fine, *no man so fit to be made*
a Judge in Israel. To All This; he must be *Daring* in his
Person, *Close* in his *Purpose*, *Firm* to his *Dependencies*, and
 rather *stooping* to the *Ordinary People*, than *mixing* with
 them, he'l do no good on't else.

To *Proceed*; let him be *Watch'd*, how he *Employs* his *The Test of*
Power, and *Favour*, whether (with *Machiavel*) more to the *an, Honest*
Advantage of his *Master*; or, to his own particular *Benefit*: *Favourite.*
 and Then, whether (according to the *Lord St. Albans*) He
 applies himself more to his *Masters Business*, or to his *Nature*;

and rather to Advise him, than to feed his Humour. If he be found to study his Masters Passions, more than his Honour, and to Prefer his Private Interest, to his Duty, 'tis an Ill sign.

An ill sign.

Another as bad.

And 'tis no good one, if the Favourite grows Rich, and the Prince Poor: (especially if the Former be the Cause of the Latter) but it is much a worse, if he Presume to grasp Authority, as well as Treasure. It looks as if the suppos'd Equality of Friendship, had Drown'd the Order of Subjection.

Note.

Take Notice next, of the Proportion betwixt the means he uses, and his suspected ends.

Does he Engross the Disposition of all Charges and Preferences? See in what Hands he Places Them. Does he endeavour to obstruct all Grants of Grace, and Benefit, that pass not through his own Fingers? That's Dangerous: For (says Sir Francis Bacon) [When the Authority of Princes, is made but an Accessary to a Cause, and that there be other Bands that Tye faster, than the Band of Sovereignty, Kings begin to be put almost out of Possession.

Mark again.

Mark then again what Kind of Persons he Promotes, and for what likely Reasons, whether for Money or Merit; Honesty, or Faction? Observe likewise the Temper and Quality of his Complicates and Creatures; and whether his Favours be Bounties, or Purchases. If the Former, Judge of his Design, by his Choice. If the Latter, 'tis but a Money-business; which Avarice meeting with an over-weening vanity of mind, is many times mistaken for Ambition. In fine; what Ambition does at Hand, Corruption does at Length; nor is the Power of the One, more dangerous, than the Consequence of the Other.

Sub-section II.

The Combination of divers Counsellors.

Proceed we now, from the Greatness of One Counsellor, to the Combination of Divers: which (to vary the Phrase) is no other than a form'd Confederacy in the Council against the Monarch. Wherein we shall briefly lay down; first, The Advantages of the Faction; the Method, next: And lastly, The Marks of it.

Their Advantages are great, and many; in Regard both
of

of their Priviledges, exempting them from *Questions*; - *Salutary* -
 power to offend their *Enemies*, and *Protect* their *Friends*; and
 a Consideration of their *Opportunities* to look into both hands,
 and play their *Cards* accordingly.

In their Method of proceeding, This is their *Master-piece*; Their Method
 not only to do all the *hurt* they can, under a colour of *Good*;
 but to Engage Persons of more *Honesty*, than *Understanding*,
 in Offices, seemingly *Serviceable*, but Effectually *Pernicious*
 to the *Publick*: By which *Artifice*, those that are *Friends*
 to the *Government*, do unwarily serve the *Crafty Enemies* of
 the *Prince*, under the pretext of *advancing* his *Profit*; lessening his *Power* at *Home*,
 under the *Disguise* of making him more *formidable* *Abroad*;
 and where they cannot *persuade* an *Interest*, if it be *con-*
siderable, they will not stick to purchase it.

As to the rest, the Method is rather *tacitly* to *Invite* and
Countenance a *Sedition*, than openly to *Head* it; and to En-
 gage rather for it, then *with* it, till the hazard of the first on-
 set be over. In truth, the first *Essay* of a *Tumult* is but a
Tryal how the *Ice* will bear; and the *Popular Faction* in the
Council, is more concern'd, in case of a *Disaster*, how to
 bring their *Friends* Off, than to venture the leading them On,
 for fear of One. Whence it comes to pass, That by the *Obliv-*
ion of *Encouraging*, and *Preserving* their *Party*, they are
 cast upon a *Scurvy* *Necessity* of *Discovering* Themselves.

Their *Marks* are many; for they are known by their *Haunts*;
 by their *Cabales*; by their *Debates*; by their *Domesticks*; by
 their *Favorites*; and by their manner of *Conversation*, and
Behaviour.

If there be any *Schismatical* *Teacher* that's *Craftier*, and *Sly-*
 er than the *Rest*, you may be sure of my *Lord's* *Coach* at His
Preachment: It gives a *Reputation* to the *Conventicle*, besides
 the *Gracious* *Looks* at *Parting*, that pass betwixt his *Honour*
 and the *Brethren*: which *Emterchange*, is but a *secret* way of *Seal-*
ing and *Delivering* a *Conspiracy*.

Look into their *Cabales*, and ye shall find them all of a *Tribe*, By their *Ca-*
 and *Leaven*; *Close*, *Sedulous*, and *United*: Their *dayly* *bales*.
Meetings relishing of a *Design*, as being *Compos'd* rather for
Council, than *Entertainment*.

In their *Debates*, you'll know them by their *Pleas*, *Shiftings*, *De-* By their *De-*
layes, *Extemporations*, *Distinctions*, their, *Frequent*, and *Industrious* *bates*.
Obstructions

ges of a Con-
 federacy in
 Councill.

Rather to
 Countenance
 a Sedition,
 then Head it.

How to know
 the Faction.

By their
 Haunts.

By their Ca-

By their De-

Intercessions for the Enemies of the Prince, and their Coldness for his Friends; by their watchfullness to Seize all Opportunities of helping the Guilty, and of Surprizing the Innocent: by their injecting of Snares, and Scruples, to Amuse, and Distract those that are for the Government, in Order to the Benefit of such as are against it; wherein it is worth a Note, that they all Vote the same way, and, without Question, to the same Purpose: for they shall sooner destroy a Loyal Subject upon a Calumny, than punish a Traitor Convict; and prosecute one mad for Writing, or Saying, that it is possible for a Prince to have a Judas in his Counsell, when another shall scape unquestion'd, or perhaps be justifi'd, that calls his Sovereign a Tyrant; and defends the Murder of Kings.

By their Domesticks.

They may be guess'd at likewise in some measure, by their Domesticks: Especially, by those of near Relation to Trust, Privacy, and Business; Chaplains, Secretaries, &c. Nor is it enough to have it, like Master like Man, unless it be, like Lady like Woman too; for the pure Strain must run quite Thorough, for fear of Tales out of School, and Discovering the Secrets of the Family. But This Rule is not Universal.

By their Favourites.

From their Favourites, much may be gather'd; first, from their Principles, and Abilities. And Then from the Frequency, Privacy, and Particularity of their Entertaining them.

The True Composition of a Confident fit for such a Statesman as we here speak of, is This.

The Composition of a fit Instrument for a Corrupt States-man.

He must be One that knows the Right, and Opposes it; for there is then less Danger of his Conversion, and Consequently, of Discovering his Patron. Let him be likewise a man of Sobriety, in his outward appearances; of Reputation with his Party; and well-grounded in the Niceties of the Controversie: he must be also a Master of his Passions, Peremptory in his mistakes; and (wright or wrong) never without a Text at hand for his Opinions.

When a Person of This Character, repairs often to a Counsellour of State, a man may, without a Scandalum Magnatum, take the Boldness to suspect his business. But if to Frequency, be added Privacy, it makes the Matter worse; and These Instruments are commonly taken in by Owl-light, or at the Backdoor.

Nor is the Particularity they shew to this kind of Cattell less

ess Remarkable. Ye shall see a Factious *Libeller*, or *Schismatick*, taken into my Lords *Closet*, when a Person of *Honour*, and *Integrity* cools his heels in the *Hall*. One *Lawyer* admitted, that has Got just as much by *Betraying* his Country, as *Another*, (that is *Rejected*) has *Lost* by *Serving* it. Briefly; look through the *Offices* they dispose of, both *Civil*, and *Military*, and in the *Persons* you may see the *Cause* they Favour.

Another way of *Detesting* them, is from their *Conversati-
on*, and *Behaviour*. They take up other *Looks*, *Phrase*, *Accent*, *Habit*, *Motion*, *Gesture*, than their Neighbours. All which together, are but a Certain *Idiome*, or *Propriety*, of the *Faction*.

By their Con-
versation and
Behaviour.

Further; ye shall see a *States-man*, on the sodain, grow more *Devout* in *Publick*, than many an *honest man* is in *Private*; and Start from his *Politicks*, into *Cases of Conscience*. This Affords matter of *Wonder*, if not of *Question*: but observe him; and if he be more *Scrupulous* of Obeying the *Law* in some *Cases*, than he is of opposing it in Others, Pronounce him a *Jugler*.

So much for the *Contrivers* of *Seditions*.

Another sort there are of *Honest* *Ill Subjects*; a People, I mean, that *Hate* the *Sedition* it self, although they *Love* the *Occasion* of it. Than *These*, none make a Greater *Conscience* of *Speaking Reverently* of their *Sovereign*; yet none in shew more *Careless* what they make Others *Think* of him. Fiercer *accusers* against *Rebellion*, there are not in the world; but do they *Imagine* that it is *no sin* to *Cause*, what is so horrid an *Impiety* to *Commit*? They'l say perchance, *I* *do not Cause* it; Yes, yes, there are that do. That is; there are *In-
satiable* *Beggars*, that suck like *Leeches*, till they *Burst*; Asking they very *Bread* out of the *Mouths* of *Famishing* *Thousands*; only to *add* unto their *Private Superfluities*, or furnish *Orna-
ment* for *Luxe*, and *Vanity*. Are not these *Persons* in a high *Degree* *Accountable* for the *Effects* of That *Oppression*?

An honest
sort of Ill Sub-
jects.

If Those that follow Courts, would but Consider, how many *Snares* beset the *Thrones* of *Princes*; what *Envy* waits upon their *Trayn*; how many *Spyes* upon the *Actions* of their *Servants*; They would tread warily. This is not yet to *Blame* all Courts, but where they are *Vicious*, or *Corrupt*, to shew the *Desperate Events* of those *Disorders*: whereof a *General Poverty* is not the least *Considerable*; and *That* inevitably begets a *General Discontentment*.

A Caveat to
Courtiers.

But what's all This to a *Sedition*? Shall People Rebel because they.

they are Poor? No no, they should not; but what if they will do, what they ought not to do? [*Let no Prince (says the Lord St. Albans) measure the Danger of Discontentments, by This; whether they be Just, or Unjust: for That were to Imagine People to be too Reasonable.*] So that the Question is not, whether the Cause can warrant a Commotion; but whether probably it may Provoke one? And whether the Multitude will not rather Tumult, then Starve. It is not Here, *Delirant Reges, Plectuntur Achivi*—but on the Contrary; *Delirant Achivi, Plectuntur Reges*; The Faults of Servants are Reveng'd upon the Heads of their Masters. But to Reason the Matter orderly, and by Degrees, take it Thus.

The Politicks
of the Vulgar.

All men do naturally Covet Power; Partly for their Security; and in Part, for Glory: not considering, that *what Each Individual desires, All cannot enjoy*; but finding Themselves Plac'd by Nature in a State of Equality, they are apt to Believe, that One man has as good a Title to Dominion as Another: and from this Levelling opinion proceeds that Envy which we find Generally in the Common-People against their Governours.

Upon the same Grounds, they Contend for Liberty; and since they cannot Rule, they would at least be Free from the Restraint of Laws and Impositions. But this must not be, neither.

Why Then, let them but know the Bounds of their Subjection, the Law, by which they are to be Govern'd. Yes, That they may; and when they are once enur'd, and wonted to the soft yolk of Political Order, and Authority; their further Care is chiefly Profit, or Pleasure; and to provide themselves of such Conveniences, as to man's Life are either Necessary or Delightfull, and Here they Rest.

This is the sum of the *Vulgar Politicks*: Allow the People These Private Conveniences, and keep but the Priests, and Lawyers, from Prating to them of Christian Liberty, and Fundamentals; the Generality shall never trouble the State with Seditions: but he that strips them of their little Lively-hood, rises a Nest of Hornets. From whence ensues This double Mischief: A Great deal of Money is drawn into a few hands; and a Great number of People are left without any at all: Two Hazards that might pose a wise Prince which rather to submit to.

As a General Poverty yields the most desperate matter for Sedition; so are the disorders of a Court the most likely means

to produce a *General Poverty*: and it is done, by *Corruption*.
Begging, or *Non-Payment of Debts*.

Corruption is a great *Dreyner*; for he that *Gives* must *Take*; he that *Buyes*, will *Sell*. But the Influence which *Corruption* has, upon the *Constitution* and *Morals* of a Court, is more *No-*
torious; especially, if it begin *Above*; and in a place where the *Honestest Part* is the *Poorer*. First, it facilitates the *Intro-*
ducing of a *Faction*; for he that designs to make a *Party*, shall be sure to out-bid him that only offers at an *Office*. Beside that it makes men *Knaves* in their own *Defence*; after a dear *Bargain*, to lick themselves whole again: and quenches the most generous *Inclinations*, by frustrating the bravest *Acti-*
ons; and conferring those *Dignities*, and *Preferments* upon unsuitable Persons for *Mony*, which are the *Proper Rewards* of *Virtue*, and *Honour*. In all these *Transactions*, the *Prince* is sold into the hands of his *Enemies*.

The Effects of
 Corruption in
 a Court.

In short; *Corruption* does more *Immediately expose* a *Mo-*
narch, and *Embroyle* a *Court*; but *Inordinate Begging* does more *Court-Beggars*
Empoverish and distress a *People*: particularly, if the *Request* be *preter-Legall*, and *pinching*, either upon *Trade* or *Tillage*: in which cases the *Benefit* of a *Single Person* enters into *Com-*
petition with the *Quiet*, and *Security* of a *Nation*.

There is an *Evill* yet behind, which of all *Evills*, so trivial
 in appearance, is (possibly) of the most *fatall*, and *malitious*
consequence: and That is, the *Non-Payment of Debts*: which
 not only draws upon a *Court* the most *Violent* of all *Passions*;
 (*Envy*, and *Hatred*) but upon *Monarchy* it self, a *Popular Pre-*
judice.

Non-payment
 of Debts.

'Tis *Dangerous*, in regard both of the *Quality*, and *Number*
 of their *Creditours*; They are (for the most part) *Citizens*;
Poor, and *Many*. They lie together in a *Body*, meet daily,
 conferring, and dispersing their *Complaints*, and *Clamours*: they
 Break at last, and Then they *Tumult*.

Sect. IV.

The CAMP.

The Interests
of the Souldie-
ry.

THE Two Grand Interests of the Souldiery, are *Pay*, and *Honour*; that is such *Honour* as belongs to them as *Sword-men*. As for Instance; 'tis their Profession not to put up *Affronts*: They do not love to have their *Under-Officers* rais'd over their *heads*: *New-Modelling*, or *Disbanding* is a Thing they do not like; and a *Publick disgrace* is never to be forgiven.

By Ill Order in These Two Particulars, are commonly occasion'd *Mutinies*, and *Revolts*: which become then most perillous when a *disobliged General* has a Purse to Engage a *Discontented Army*. We speak here, of an *Army* Employ'd by a Prince, as a Security against his *own Subjects*, which is quite another Case then against a *Foreign Enemy*; for the same *Popular* and *Ambitious Humour*, that in a Commander *Abroad*, is most *Proper*, and *Necessary*, is, on the Contrary, as *Dangerous* at *Home*. The *safety* of the *State* depending only upon the *Insuperable Virtue*, and *Fidelity* of such a *Person*.

An Ambitious
Commander
does better A-
broad then at-
Home.

A Holy War is
a Contradiction.

Some Armies we have known to Prove Troublesome, and to Divide, upon Pretenses of *Religion*; but, a *Holy War* is a Contradiction; and a Story only fit to pass upon *Women* and *Children*. Upon the whole, it seems that an Army, within it *self*, and without any *Separate Interest*, may be troublesome upon These *Three Accounts*: Either *Want of Pay*; which causes a *General Mutiny*: or *Disgrace*; which (more Peculiarly reflecting upon such or such *Officers*, *Troops*, or *Parties*) provokes *Animosities*, *Factions*, and *Revolts*: or *Ambition*; which more directly attempts upon the *Sovereignty*. It may be also *Hazardous*, by reason of some *Errour* in the *Constitution* of it. That is; if it be composed of Persons *Ill-affected* to the Government, it cannot rationally be expected, that it should labour to *Preserve*, what it wishes to *Destroy*.

But we are treating of Distempers *acquir'd*; and rather proceeding from the *ill menage* of an Army, than from the first *Mis-choice*, or founded in the *Judgment* of it. Concerning a *Standing-Army*, enough is said in the foregoing Chapter:

a word.

a word we'll add ; It is in This Regard , an Affair of a Peevish Quality ; that *either a General has too little Power to do his Masters Business, or enough to do his own.*

As it is not safe for a *Monarch*, at any time, to entrust the Chief Officer of an Army, with so much Power, for fear of a *Sedition*, as may enable him to move a *Rebellion* : So is it a work of great *Skill* and *Difficulty*, so dexterously to *Resume*, or *Ballance* that *over-grown Power*, as to bring it under *Command*, without discovering such a *Jealousie*, as may Provoke him to *abuse* it. Let This suffice, as to the Disorders of an Army *within it self*.

Hazard not a Rebellion in one Place, for fear of a Sedition in another.

Another Hazard is, lest it be *Corrupted* into a Dependence, upon some other Interest : into which Defection, it may be partly Driven by the *Neglect* or *Unkindness* of the *Prince*, and partly Drawn by the *Allurements* of Profit and Reward.

Having spoken of the Mischief a *Seditious Army* may Doe ; very briefly let us behold what Mischiefs a *Vicious* and *Undisciplin'd Army* may Cause.

There never fails to be an Opposition betwixt the *Civil*, and the *Military Power* ; and in like manner betwixt the *People* and the *Souldiery*. Whom nothing else can Reconcile but down-right *Force* and *Necessity*. So that the fairest State of a Nation over-aw'd by an Army of their own Country men, is an *extorted Patience*, accompany'd with Readiness to embrace any opportunity of working their Deliverance.

If at the best, the bare appearance of a Force be so Generally distastfull ; what Havock will not the Licentious *abuse* of it Cause in a *Kingdom* ? Especially in Populous Towns where *One Affront* Exasperates a *Million*, and 'tis not two hours work to destroy an Army.

A *Royall Guard* is of another *Quality* ; and such it ought to be for *Choice* and *Number* ; as both *suitable* to the Charge they undertake, for the *Safety* of The Sacred Person of their Prince, and *sufficient* to the *Execution* of it.

The Constitution of a Guard-Royall.

Sect. V.

The CITY.

BY the *City*, we intend the *Metropolis* of a Kingdom; which, in many Respects, challenges a Place and Consideration in This Chapter of *Seditions*; Particularly, in Regard of *Inclination* and *Power*.

Court and City seldom agree.
The Reason of it.

There is not (Generally speaking) so fair an Intelligence between the *Court*, and *City*, as for the Common Good of Both were to be wish'd: and This proceeds Chiefly from a *Pride of Blood*, on the *One* side, and of *Wealth*, on the *Other*; breeding *mutual Envy* between them.

This *Envy*, by degrees, boyles up to an *Animosity*, and Then, Tales are Carried to the *Monarch*, of the *insolence* of the *Citizens*; and Stories, on the other side, to the *People*, of the *Height*, and *Excesses* of the *Court*; and Here's the *Embryo* of a *Sedition*. From Hence, each Party enters into a *Cross Contrivement*. These, how to tame the *Boldness* of the *One*; and Those, how to supplant the *Greatness* of the *Other*: Both equally unmindfull of their Inseparable Concerns: the *Citizen*, that he holds his *Charter* of the Bounty of his *Prince*; and the *Courtier*, that it is a *flourishing Trade* that makes a *flourishing Empire*. By These Heats, is a *City-Humour* against the *Court*, improv'd into a *Popular Distemper* against the *King*: and here's the *Inclination of a Disorder'd City*.

The Power of a City.

As to their *Power*; they have *Men*, *Money*, and *Arms*, at an hour's warning; the very *Readiness* of which Provision makes it worth double the *Proportion*. Their *Correspondencies* are Commonly *strong*, and *Firme*; and their *dependencies* *Numerous*: for the *Pretense*, being *Trade*, and *Liberty*, looks in all Places of the *same Interest*, to the *same Faction*: Beside That, General device, (*seeming Religion*) that stamps the Cause, and Prints a *GOD WITH US* upon it. In fine; a *Potent*, and a *Peevish City* is a *shrew'd Enemy*.

The Manner of Preparing the People for Seditions.

Their first work is to Possess the *Vulgar* with This Notion, that in some Cases the *Monarch* is limited, and the *Subject* free: intending, that the *Prince* is bounded by the *Law*, and that the *People* are at *Liberty*, where the *Law* is

silent

silent; and so likewise in points of *Conscience*. (By which Argument, the *People* Govern, where there is *no express Law*, and the *King* only where there is.)

Taking it once for Granted, that the *Prince* is *Limited* by the *Law*; (which *Conscientiously* he is; for in *observing* the *Law*, he does but *keep his own word*) They presently Conclude, that if the *King* *transgresses* the *Rule* of his *Power*, he *forfeits* the *Right* of it: and that for such a *Violation*, he is accountable to the *People*, for whose *Behoof* the *Law* was made. This is a *Specious*, but a *Poysonous Inference*, and rather adapted to a *Mutinous Interest*, than to a *Peaceable*, and *candid Reason*. A Seditious Principle.

Let a *Transgression* be *supposed*; are there any *Laws Penal* upon the *Monarch*? But there are none that warrant *Tyranny*. Right; but there are some yet that *forbid Rebellion*; and (without questioning the cause) that declare *all Violences whatsoever*, upon the *Person*, or *Authority* of the *King*, to be *Crimina Laesæ Majestatis*, or *Treason*. Are there any *Laws* now on the *Other* side, that *depose Kings* for *Male-administration*? If none, the *Law* being *Peremptorily against* the *One*, and only not for the *Other*: what does it, but constitute the *Subject*, in all cases, accountable for his *Resistance*, to the *Sovereign*; and Leave the *Supream Magistrate*, in all cases, to answer for his *Mis-government* to *Almighty God*? But let the *Controversie* pass, for we are not here so much to enter into the *True State* of *Matters*, as to deliver their *Appearances*. The King only Accountable to God, and the People to the King.

And now is the time to bring the *Faylings*, and *Misfortunes* of the *Prince* upon the *Stage*; and by exposing him *Naked* before the *Multitude*, to make his *Person Cheap*, and his *Government Odious* to his *People*. Which they Effect, by certain *Oblique Discourses* from the *Prest*, and *Pulpit*; by *Lamentable Petitions*, craving *Deliverance* from such and such *Distresses of Estate*; or *Conscience*: and These they *Print*, and *Publish*; converting their (pretended) *supplications* for *Relief*, into bitter *Remonstrances* of the *Cruelty* and *Injustice* of their *Rulers*. Curfed be the Sons of Cham,

By These wiles are the *Vulgar* drawn to a *dislike* of *Monarchy*; and That's the *Queene* to a *discourse* of the *Advantages* of a *Popular Government*. (The next step to the *Design* of introducing it) There's none of This or That they cry at *Amsterdam*: and in short; from these *Grudgings* of *Ministry*:

tiny; These *Grumbings* against *Authority*, they slide Insensibly into direct, and open *Practises* against it. Alas! what are These *Motions*, but the *sparkling* of a *Popular Disposition*, now in the Act of *Kindling*; which only wants a little *Blowing of the Cole*, to Puff up all into a *Flame*?

From the *Leading*, and *Preparatory Motives* to *Sedition*, now to the more *Immediate* and *Enflaming Causes* of it: which are reducible either to *Religion*, *Oppression*, *Privileges*, or *Poverty*.

Subsection I.

Seditions which concern Religion.

Religious Sedition, either referring to Heresie, or Schism.

Those *Seditions* which concern *Religion*, referr either to *Doctrine*, or *Discipline*: *Heresie*, or *Schism*. The *Former*, is a *Strife* (as they say) for a better, or a worse: a Contest betwixt the *Persuasion* of the *People*, and the *Religion* of the *Government*, in matter of *Faith*; and tending either to *Overthrow* the *One*, or to *Establish* the *Other*. In This Case, the *People*, may be in the *Right*, as to the *Opinion*, but never so as to justify the *Practice*: for *Christianity* does not dissolve the *Order of Society*. To Obey God, rather than *Man*, is Well: Let us Obey him then; in not *Resisting* those *Powers* to which his *Ordinance* hath *Subjected* us.

Rebellion upon a point of Heresie, more Pardonable, then That from Schism.

Touching This, (with the Brethren's Leave) I take it to be the more *Venial-Mortal Sin* of the Two. That is; the *Rebellion* of *Heresie*, is less *unpardonable*, than That of *Schism*: in regard first, that the *Subject* of the *Difference* is a matter of greater *Import*: Secondly, 'tis not *Impossible*, but the *Mis-persuasion* may be founded upon *Invincible Ignorance*. I do not say that I had rather be an *Arrian*, than a *Calvinist*; but I averr, that he is the *foulest* *Rebell*, that for the *Slightest Cause*, upon the *Least Provocation*, and against the *Clearest Light*, *Murthers* his *Sovereign*.

Seditions arising from Schism.

Those *Seditions*, which are mov'd upon account of *Schism*, are commonly a combination of *Many against One*; of *Errour against Truth*: and a *Design*, that strikes as well at the *Civil Power*, as the *Ecclesiastick*.

This being a Subject which both in the *first Section* of This Chapter, and *Else-where*, is sufficiently discours'd upon ; we shall rather address our selves to the *Means* (Peculiar to a *City*) of *comforting*, and *aiding* these *unquiet agitations*, as more properly the Business of our present Argument.

The Means of provoking Sedition.

Great Towns have first the Advantage of *Great Numbers of People*, within a *Small Compass of Place* ; where, with much *Ease*, and *Privacy* ; Those of the *Faction* may hold their *full*, and *frequent Meetings*, *Debate*, *Contrive*, nay, and *Execute* with all *Convenience*. For when the *Plot* is *Laid* ; the *Manner*, and the *Time*, *Appointed* : there's no more trouble for the *Rendezvous* ; the *Partie's* *Lodg'd* already, the *Town* it *self* being the most *Commodious Quarter*. 'Tis in respect of these favourable *concurrences*, that men of *Turbulent*, and *Factionous Spirits*, rather make choice of *Populous Cities* to *Practise* in.

The Advantages of Great Towns for Seditions.

Another Hazard may arise from the *Temper* of the *Inhabitants*, as well, as from the *Condition* of the *Place* ; and from the very *Humour*, and *Application* of the *Women*, in a notion distinct from That of the *Men*.

From the *Temper* of the *Inhabitants* ; first, as partaking usually of the *Leaven* of their *Correspondents* ; whom we find very often, both *Famous* for *Trade*, and *Notorious* for *Schism*. (*But Men are Generally so good-Natur'd, as to think well of any Religion they Thrive under.*)

Cities are inclinable to Seditions, from the Temper of the Inhabitants.

Further ; their *Employment* being *Traffick*, or *Negotiating* for *Benefit* ; and their *Profession* being to *Buy* as *Cheap* as they can, and to *Sell*, as *Dear* : without any measure between the *Risque*, or *Disbursement* ; and the *Profit* : they are commonly better *Accountants*, than *Casuists* ; and will rather *stretch* their *Religion* to their *Interest*, than *shrink* their *Interest* to their *Religion*.

They have again, so superstitious a Veneration for the *Justice* of *Paying Money upon the Precise Hour* ; that they can very hardly believe any man to be of the *right Religion*, that *Breaks his Day*. And observe it, let a Prince run himself deep in *Debt*, to his *Imperial City*, they shall not so much *Clamour* at him for an *ill Pay-Master*, as upon a *Fit of Holiness*, suspect him for an *Hercick*, or *Idolater* : Proposing a *Tumult*, as the ready way to *Pay themselves* ; and *That* I reckon as the first step into a *Rebellion*.

Now, how the *Women* come to be concern'd? That first:

first : and *Then* ; why the *City-Dames* more then *Other* ?

Religious Innovatours begin with Women. It is the Policy of all Cunning *Innovatours*, when they would put a Trick upon the World in matter of *Religion*, which they desire may be *Receiv'd* with *Passion*, recommended with *Zeal*, and *Dispersed* with *Deligence*, to begin (with the *Stronger Sex*, though the *Weaker Vessel*) that excellent Creature, *Woman*. And This Course, they take out of These Considerations.

Four Reasons why. *First*, as *That Sex* is Naturally *scrupulous*, and Addicted to *Devotion* ; and so, more susceptible of *delusive Impressions*, that bear a face of *Piety*.

1. *Secondly*, as it is too *Innocent*, to suspect a *Deceit*, and too *Credulous*, to *Examine* it ; so is it probably not *crafty* enough to *Discover* it.

2. *Thirdly*, *Women* are supposed, not only to *Entertain* what they *Like*, with more *Earnestness* of *Affection*, but also to *impart* what they *know*, with a *Greater Freedom* of *Communication* : which proceeds from a *Particular propensity* in *That Gracious Sex*, to enter into a *strict Intelligence*, concerning *Matters Curious*, and *Novell*.

4. A Zealous Sister. *Fourthly*, They are as well the *Best Advocates*, as the *Freest Publishers*. Get them but once engaged, and at next word all their *Children* are to be taught *short-hand*, and new *Catechisms* ; the *Table* shall be *blest* in a *Tune* ; not the *Heel* of a *Lark* ; no, not so much as a *Prune* in the *White-Broth*, shall scape without a *Particular Benediction*. And *Then*, the *Wrought Cushion* ; the *Damask Napkin* ; the *Best Room*, and the *First Cut* at the *Table*, are reserved for the *Adored Genius* of the *Family*. The *Good Man* of the *House*, shall not presume to *Close his Eyes*, without an *Opiate*, (to make it *English*) according to the *Directory* ; and when he *opens* them again, next day, 'tis odds, he finds his *wakefull Bedfellow* *Shifting* her *Linnen*, and *Preparing* for a *Mornings Exercise*. This *Reverend Wight* has commonly some *Skill* in *Physick* too ; enough to *Comfort* a *Professing Sister* that *Keeps her Bed*, (for grief no doubt) *because her Lord* (perhaps) is *call'd aside* by *State*, or *Business*.

And her Confessour.

Nor does The *Pious Matron* *Confine* her *Bounteous Dispositions* within the *Circle* of her *Private Family* ; but with an *Over-flowing Charity*, reaches a *helping hand* to all the *Members* of the *Distressed Brother-hood* ; and (like a *Christian* to the very

very Letter) Layes every thing in Common. These are the Early and Late Advocates; the warm Sollicitresses; What Husband would not Glory to see his Wife, and Fortune so dispos'd of?

Let not some few Mistakes persuade the world yet, that Woman is [not,] of all Creatures, the most accomplish'd, and the best dispos'd to the End she was made for.

That Women are (in General) the fittest Agents of all Others, for a Religious Errour, to me seems past a Question: Now; why a City-Dame, is for That Purpose, the fittest Instrument even of all Sorts of Women.

First, her Employment's Little; she keeps much at Home; and her dead Leisures, are, beyond doubt, not absolutely Thoughtless. Is not her Mixture Sociable, as That of other Mortals? Phansie her Solitary Entertainment now. Does not she wish to see, and to be seen, as well as other Women? Nay, does she not Contrive too, how to Compass it? Plays there are none perhaps, at hand; Festivals come but seldome.

While shee's Thus casting, *How and How*; in Steps the Tempter; dreams out an Hour or Two in Prologue, and at last, happily hits her Humour; asks her what Church she goes to? and invites her to a Lecture. Away she goes; enters her A Shee-Professor a Member of his Congregation; never to be Reclaimed, and lye. so Farewell she.

After all This, let me profess, I take the better sort of Citizens, for an Intelligent, Frank, and Sober People; nor do I find more Prudence, Modesty, Virtue, then under That Denomination. Yet is it not to be Expected, that so Vast a Multitude should be without some Loose Examples. And I divide the Blame, even There too, betwixt an Idle Course of Life, and the Alluring Artifice of their Seducers. But this I stick to: A Schismatical Clergy infects the Women; They the City; and a Schismatical City destroys a Kingdom.

L

Subject-

Sub-section II.

Oppression.

Oppression provokes Sedition, many waies; and many waies it is *Procur'd*, even by the most *Seditious Themselves*; with *Express end*, that it may provoke Sedition.

Oppression
causes Sedi-
tion.

The Haughty, and Imperious Rudeness of a *Churlish Officer*, that without either *Proof*, or *Hearing*, *Law*, or *Reason*, hand over head *Condemns* and *Punishes*: (only perchance to Vaunt his Power,) This is a Boldness, that Reflects upon the *Safety* and the *Honour* of his *Master*; rendring both the *Minister* *bated*, and the *Prince* *suspected*.

Unlimited Protections, *Irregular* and *Heavy Taxes*, *Billetting* and *Free-quartering* of *Souldiers*; The *Denyall* of *Equal Right*, &c. Stir up *Seditious Humours* in a *City*. But These are *down-right Provocations*.

A Presbyte-
rian Trick.

There are that go a cleaner way to work, that *squeeze* the *People*, under Colour of *erving* the *King*; winding up the *Pin* of *Authority*, till they *Crack* the very *strings*, by which *That* and *Subjection* are *tack'd* together. They *undo* all, by *Overdo-*
ing; and under an humble shew of *holding* the *Stirrup*, till the *Prince* *seats* himself, they *draw* so *hard* they *turn* the *Saddle*: or if he needs a *Lift* to help him *Up*, they'l *give* him one, but such a One, shall cast him *Over*:

The Politick
Hypocrite.

In fine; what ever may be *Plausible* for the *present*; *fatal* in the *Consequence*; wherein the *Promoters* may either seem *Innocent*, or not appear at all; and a *Publick Obloquy* rest upon the *Sovereign*; This is a *Device* to do Their *Business*.

Is there any *Colourable fear* of a *Sedition*? Their *Counsell* will be then, to raise such a *Force*, as in all likely-hood will cause a *Rebellion*. Are the *Prince's Coffers* full? *Occasions* will be fought to *Empty* Them; by *Breaking* with *One Interest*, *Wedding* *Another*. A *Thousand Remedies* there are for that *Sur-charge* of *Treasure*. When they have drawn the *Monarch* *dry*, they know he must be *re-supply'd*; and they know what a *Peevish* task it is, to fix *Regality* upon a *new Bottome*.

As their *first Aime* was to *Provoke Expence*, that he might *Want*; it will be now Their work, in such manner to *solicite* his

his, *Supply*, that he shall suffer more by the *Ill Method* of it, then *Gain* by the *Recruit*. Briefly, if they can Effect, that what *Themselves* call a *Supply*, the *Generality* may understand to be an *Oppression* (and so *They wish it Understood*) The *City Clamours first*; and *Popular Tumults*, are but the *Forlorn* to a *Rebellion*.

Not that either *Force*, or *Cruelty*, can ever discharge a *Sub-Loyalty* is *in-*
ject of his *Allegiance*; Nay, should his *Prince* command one *dispenfable*.
of his *Armes* for *Dogs-meat*; he were a *Traytor*, should he yet
refuse to serve his Master with the other.

Sub-section III.

Privileges.

A *Third Particular* of no small *Force* upon the *Genius* of a *Citizens are*
City, is what concerns their *Privileges*; whereof they *tender of*
Principally are *Tender*. *First*, in points of *Trade*, and *Com-* *their Privi-*
merce: *Secondly*, in *Affairs of Order*, and *Customs*, relating *ledges*.
to the *Counsell*, and *Government* of the *City*: *Thirdly*, in
Matters of Personal Freedom, and *Advantage*.

Any *Empeachment* in the point of *Trade*, they take hain-
ously; as *Disappointing* at once, the very *Purpose* of their *Principally in*
Incorporations, the *Hopes* of their *Well-being*; and the main *point of Trade*
Business of their *Lives*. In this *Respect*, they are many
times so *Delicate*, as not to distinguish between *Benefits* of
Grace, and *Rights of Privilege*: *clayning a Title* to Those *Ad-*
vantages which they hold only by *Favour*.

They are likewise *Subject* to forget, that even their clear-
est *Immunities* are but *Dependent*, and *Precarious*: and they *Immunities are Pre-*
had need be minded, that to *believe* them *Other*, is to *Forfeit* *carious*.
them. For it implies a *Disacknowledgement* of the *Sovereign*
Power; which *Mistake* being once set a foot, obliges the
Prince to *Resume*, for the *Safety* of the *whole*, such *Indulgen-*
ces as were only *Granted* for the behoof of a *Part*. To This
he is *Ty'd* by evident *Reason of State*, and by *Political Equity*;
both as a *Wise Prince*, and as a *Pater Patria*, a *Father* of his
Country. Wherefore away with These *Dividing Niceties*,
since neither *Prince*, nor *People* can be *Secure*, but by *Agree-*
ment. What can a *Single Monarch* do without the *Obedience*,
Love, and *Service* of his *People*? Or what becomes of a *Di-*

Neither
Prince nor
People can be
secure but by
Agreement.

stratted Multitude, without a *Head to Govern Their Confusions* ? But *This* (in the words of a most Ingenious Person) is a *Text upon which the Wise part of the world has used in vain to Preach to the Fools.*

Since so it is, that the *Vulgar* will neither be *Taught* by *Experience*, nor *persuaded* by *Reason*, we are to take for *Granted*, that some *Grievances* lead to *Seditions*, almost as *Orderly*, as *Natural Causes* to their *Effects*, the *Multitude* ever *siding* with *Interest*, against *Virtue*.

The *Liberty of Exporting Native Commodities raw*, and *unwrought* ; and of *Importing* (possibly) the same *Materials in Manufacture*, is a *Matter of Evill Relish*, and of *Dangerous Consequence*. So likewise is the *Employment of Strangers*, where the *Natives want Work* ; and the *advancing of Forraign Trade*, to the *Sterving* of it at *home*.

Concerning the *Other two Particulars*, before mentioned, the *One Relating to the Frame of a City-Government*, the *Other*, to their *Personal Privileges* ; it shall suffice to *Note*, that an *Encroachment upon either of them*, *Endangers a Sedition*.

Sub-section IV.

Poverty.

Poverty an Irresistible Incentive to Sedition.

THE *Last*, and the most *Irresistible* incentive to *Sedition* in a *City*, is *Poverty*. That is, a *Poverty* proceeding from *Misgovernment*. Not but that *Want*, upon what account soever is bad enough : Whether from *Dearth*, *Losses by Fire*, or, *Storme* ; *Piracies*, *Banquerupts* ; the *Ravages of Warr*, &c. Yet *Here*, there's something in the *Fate*, the *Accident*, or *Manner*, of the *Calamity*, to allay the *Anguish* of it. Men *Quarrel* not with *Providence* for *ill Seasons* ; nor with the *Winds*, the *Waves*, or *Flames*, because of *Wracks*, or *Conflagrations*. To suffer by *Pirates*, or *Banquerupts*, is but the *Chance of Traffick*, and the *Extremities of Warr* are *Common Injuries*. But where a *Pinching Poverty* Seizes a *Populous City*, and from a *Cause* too that's within the *Reach of Malice*, or *Revenge* ; That *State's* concern'd betimes to look to the *Disorder*.

The most dangerous Poverty.

The *Immediate Cause* of This *Necessity* among the *Common* sort is *want of Work*, which proceeds from the *decay from Trade*, arising chiefly from a *General Scarcity of Money* ; which

which may be Imputed to *One* or *more*, of These Ensuing *Reasons*.

First, *The Insatiate Corruption of Rapacious, and Great Officers*; in whose *Coffers*, as in the *Grave*, *Monies* are rather *Buried*, then *laid up*. Nay, as in *Hell* it self (I might have said) for they are as *Bottomless*; and of the *Treasure* that lies *There Condemn'd*, the *Doom's* almost as *Irreversible*.

Corruption
the Cause of
Scarcity.

These *Private Hoards* cannot chuse but produce a *Publick Penury*; when That *Wealth*, which would suffice to *Employ*, and *Relieve Thousands*, that either *Beg* for want of *Work*, or *Sterve* for want of *Bread*, is drawn into so *narrow* a *Compass*. And yet in This suppos'd *Extremity* of *Affairs*, I make a *Doubt*, whether is more *Miserable*, the *Needy*, or the *Oppressour*?

Private Hoards
breed Publick
Penury.

Can any *Composition* more certainly destroy a *Nation*, then a *Concurrence* of *Power*, *Pride*, *Avarice*, and *Injustice*, in the *same Persons*? But Then again, when the *Storme* comes; These are the *Jonasses*, that by the *Rabble* will be first cast *Over-board*, to save the *Vessell*. And This they cannot but *forethink*, and *Tremble* at; at least, if ever they get *Leisure* for a *Sober Thought*. And let them *Look* which way they *Please*; *Backward*, *Forward*, *Round-about*, *Upward*, *Downward*, *Inward*, they are beset with *Objects of Terrour*, and *self-af-frighted*, from the *Glass* of their own *Consciences*.

The Compo-
sition of wick-
ed Ministers
of State.

The Misery of
them.

Behind them, they see *dreadfull Presidents of Corrupt Mini-sters*, thrown from their *Slippery*, and *ill-menag'd State of great-ness*: *Torne* by their *Enemies*; scarce *Pitty'd* by their *Friends*; the *Mirth* of their own *Creatures*, and the mere *Mockery* of Those that *Rais'd* them.

If either they
look back;

Forward, they find *Themselves*; upon a *Precipice*, and in great hazard to encrease the *Number* of those *sad Presidents*.

Forward;

If they look *Round-about* them, they are *Encompass'd* with the *Cries* of *Widdows*, and of *Orphans*; whose *Husbands*, or whose *Fathers*, lost their *Lives*, in the *Defence*, (perhaps) of *their Prince*, and *Country*. With These, are *Mingled* the *Faint Groans* of *Sterving Wretches* in the *Last Agonies*, whose *Modesty* chose rather to *Die silent*, then *Complaining*; and to abide the worst *Effects* of *Want*, rather then tell the more *In-rollerable Story* of it. But *This to Them*, is not so much, as to *perceive Themselves* at *Bay* amidst a *Snarling Multitude*.

Round about;

In short; *Above* them, there's an *All-seeing Eye*, an *Un-changeable*

Above them;

Below : or
within them.

changeable Decree, and an Incorruptible Judge, that Over-looks, and Threatens Them. Below them, Hell: (or rather 'tis Within Them; an Accusing Conscience) If This be their Prospect, how Deplorable is their Condition!

The Sollicitous estate of
the Guilty.

Are not Their Pillows stuff'd with Thorns? Or when they Venture at a Nap, do they not Dream of Robberies, and Seditious? Whom, or What do they not fear? Where is't they think Themselves Secure? Is not Their Table Spread with Snares? Does not Every Bribe look like a Bait; Every Servant, like a Spy; Every Strange Face, like somewhat that's worse? And what are their Near Friends, but either Conscious Partakers, or Dangerous, and Suspected Witnesses? They find Themselves Arraign'd by the Preacher; Condemn'd by the Judge; and Strangl'd by the Executioner: For being Guilty of the Crime, and Worthy of the Punishment They cannot but Apply the Process to Themselves, and in Imagination, bear the Malefactor's Company, even from the Pulpit, to the Gibbet.

Add to all This, the Sting of an Incessant, Restless Jealousie: Not a Lock, Whisper, Hint, or Action, but they suspect Themselves the Subject of it. The Holy Text it self, where it Reproves Their Sins, Sounds like a Libell to Them. Nay, were This silly, Innocent Description of them, but in a Tongue which any man Concern'd could understand; some of Their Ears would Tingle at it.

Taxes may
cause or occasion
a Scarcity
divers ways.

A General Scarcity of Mony, may, in the Second Place, arise from Taxes, and That either Immediately, in Respect of the Burthen; or Consequentially, in Respect of the Occasion; the Inequality; the Manner of Imposing, or Levying Them; or the Subject Matter it self of the Tax.

Touching the Burthen, and Occasion: It Properly belongs to Those in Power to Judge of it, as well how much, as to what end? So in the Rest, The People are likewise to Subject Themselves to such Determinations as their Superiours hold Convenient. Only in case of an Undue Authority imposing, or some Illegal Course of Levying Taxes, there may be some Allowances; which to proportion to their Various Instances, is neither for This Place, nor for my Meaning.

Subjects are to
Obey without
Disputing.

That Subjects are to Obey Lawful Commands, without disputing the Reasons of Them, is beyond Question. Yet is't not in the Power of Humane Nature, to keep men from Surmising, and from Guessing at them. We'll Grant ye too, that

that in some Cases, some People, will in some Sort, do some Things as they ought to do. Yet we are where we were; that is, they will be *Guessing* still.

If Taxes follow quicker, and run higher than Ordinary; they cry: *so much?* and the next Question's *Why?* ('Tis true, they should not *Aske*, but who can hinder them?)

Is it for the *Honor* or *Safety* of the *Prince*? 'Tis Consequently for the *Publick Good*; and he deserves to be expell'd *Humane Society*, that narrowly prefers his Little dirty Interest, before so Sacred, and so great a Benefit.

A *Third*, is the *Inequality* of Taxes; the *Over-pressing* of any *One Party*. As if the Burthen lies heavier upon the *City*, then *Country*; upon the *Gentry*, then *Yeomanry*, &c. If upon the *City*, they call it *Spite*; if upon the *Country*, *Oppression*. And in fine; fall the *Disproportion* where it fall can, it breeds ill blood: for That *Weight* breaks the *Back* of any *One Interest*, which evenly dispos'd, would seem no heavy Load, upon the *Shoulders* of *All*. *Ferre quam sortem patiuntur Omnes, Nemo recusat*. The Consequence of This *Inequality*, is a *Generall Ruine*, but piece-meal, and *One Part* after *Another*.

Touching the Manner of *Imposing*, or *Levyng*, we waive That; and pass to the *Subject Matter* of the *Tax*. (A point (how little soever regarded) scarce less Considerable than the *Total Amount* of it.)

If the *Device* be *Novell*; the *People* shy and ticklish: if there be *Factions* Stirring, and the *Prince* not absolutely *Master*, better raise Thrice the Value in the *Rode* of Levies, then hazzard the Experiment of a *By-way*. 'Tis *Machiavell's* advice concerning *Sanguinary Cruelties*; where Cruelty is Necessary, do it at once; or at least, seldome as possible. But then be sure to follow it with *Frequent Acts* of *Clemency*; by which Means, you shall be fear'd for your *Resolution*, and belov'd for your *Good-Nature*: whereas a *Little*, and *Often*, *Terrifies* Less, and *Disquiets* people much more, imprinting *Jealousies* of further *Inconveniencies*; so that they know not what to Trust to.

Most Certain it is, that as *Many petty Injuries* deface the *Impression* of *One Great Benefit*; so in like manner do *Many slight Benefits* deface the *Impression* of *One Great Injury*; the *Last Act* sinking deepest: For 'tis from Thence, Men Measure their expectation of the *Future*; and as they look for *Good*, or *Bad*, they are *Peaceable* or *Troublesome*.

Where-

Leave no
Mark standing
to remember
a Discourtesie
by.
Joh. 4. 6.

Wherefore, as it is *Duty* to do *Well* always, so 'tis *Wisdom* to do *Well* last; and where a *Pressure* cannot be avoided, not to leave standing (so near as may be) any *Memorial* of it: Least [When your Children shall ask their Father in time to come, saying, What mean you by these Stones? &c.—

The ways of Supplying Princes are *Various*, according to their *Several Interests, Practices, Powers, and Constitutions*. Not to lose my self in *Particulars*, One *General* shall serve for all.

It behoves a State to be very wary, how they Relieve a *Present need* upon the *Foundation* of a *Lasting Inconvenience*: for though in some *Extremities*, there is no *Choice*; yet it very rarely happens, that a Prince is the *Better* for the *Money*, where he is the *worse* for the *President*. Sir Thomas Rowe in a Speech at the *Council-Table*, 1640. (directed to the dashing of a Project, tending to the *Enfeebling* of the *Coyn*, (as he Phrases it) Cites the Lord Treasurer *Burleigh*, and Sir Thomas *Smith*, giving their Opinion to Queen *Elizabeth*; in these words: *That it was not the short end of Wits, nor starting holes of Devises, that can sustain the Expence of a Monarchy, but sound and solid Courses*. Horace his [Rem facias, Rem,—Si possis, Rectè, si non, quocunque modo Rem] will not serve the turn.

Shifting passes
for Wisdom.

'Tis sharply said of Sir Francis Bacon; [That the *Wisdom* of all these *Latter Times* in Princes Affairs, is rather *fine Deliveries, and shiftings* of *Dangers and Mischiefs*, when they are near; than *solid and grounded Courses* to keep them aloof.] (But says he again) [It is the *Solacism* of Power to think to *Command the End*, and yet not to endure the *Mean*.] These are the *Sleights*, the *Ill-husbandry* of Government: through which *Mistakes*, insensibly, a *Great Revenue* moulders away, and yet the State never out of *Debt*.

Excessive
Building.

Excessive Building is another Cause of *General Scarcity*; for it leaves the *Country* too *Thin*, and *Over-peoples* the *City*: Enhancing the *Rate*, and Consuming the *Means* of Living. It wasts the *Nobility* and *Gentry*; It Impoverishes also, and Disobliges the *Populacy*: (All that is got in the *Country*, being spent in the *City*) beside the hazardous disproportion betwixt the *Head* and the *Body*.

One Reason of this *Scarcity*, may be from some Defect in the *Law* it self. as where sufficient Provision is not made for

for *strict* and *peremptory* payment upon *Bond*. Men will not *part* freely with their *Money*, where they may be put off by *Shifts* and *Delays*, and driven to a *Vexatious Suit* to get it *In* again.

Another great Inconvenience proceeds from a *General Grasping* at more *Trade* than they can *Master*: which causes many *Failings* one upon the *Neck* of another.

To what's already said, (not to be endless) we'll only add *Knavery* of *Two Causes* more. The *One*, is the *deceit*, and *Knavery* of *Tradesmen*. *Artizans*, and *Trades-men*; who for a *Private Gain* betray the *Interest* of the *Publick*; and *invert* the *Balance* of *Trade*, by such *Abusive Manufactures*, as are neither *Saleable* abroad, nor *Serviceable* at *Home*, which both *necessitates* the *Importation* of *Foreign* *Commodities*, and *hinders* the *Issue* of *Native*: beside the *Treble Charge*; their *Deareness*, and their *little Usefulness* consider'd.

We shall *Conclude* with *Pride*: which were't in nothing else but what's expended upon *Guildings*, *Gold* and *Silver* *Lace*, and *Forraign Curiosities* of *Needle-work*, would not be *inconsiderable*. But where 'tis *General*, and extends both to *all Sorts* of *Superfluities*, and *all Degrees* of *Persons*; That *City* goes by the *Post* to *Ruine*: for *Pride*, is not only the *Forerunner* of *Destruction*, and the *Cause* of it; but the *Loud*, and *Crying Provoker* of it.

Sect. VI.

The COUNTRY.

THAT *Interest* which *contributes* the *Least* to a *Sedition*, and *suffers* the *most* by it, is That of the *Country*: which is properly comprised under *Tillage*, and *Pasture*. For I reckon all *Populous Places*, (whether *Towns* or *Villages*) that subsist by *steady Traffick*, or *Handy-crafts*, to be no other than *Dependencies* upon the *Metropolis*; which is usually, That in *Proportion* to the *Kingdom*, which the *Principal City*, of every *Province*, is to the *Other Parts* of it.

This *Interest* seldom or never *Heads* a *Sedition* upon it's own *Account*; and when it does engage, under *Protection* possibly of the next *strong Hold*, or in *favour* of some *neighbouring*,

The Country
is sure to be
undone by a
War.

and *Seditious Market-Town*, we do not find much hurt the *Country-man* does, so long as the *Sword*, and *Plough* are managed by the same *Hand*. If they forsake their *Husbandry*, and turn *Souldiers*; they fall under another Notion. But in short; let the *Cause* be what it will, and the event of a *Warr* what it can; *They* are sure to be undone by it: wherefore *They* may well be *Friends to Peace*, to whom *Warr* is so great an *Enemy*.

The Fruits
of it.

Is there a *Warr* commenced? *Their Carriages* must wait upon the *Army*, *Their Provisions* feed them: *Their Persons* attend them, yes, and *Their Contribution Pay* Them. *Their Teams* must serve the *State*; *Their Wives*, and *Girls*, the *Souldiery*: *They* must be *Mounting Dragoons*, when they should be *Plowing*; *Lugging* their *Beans* and *Bacon* to the *Head-Quarter*, when they should be *Sowing*: and at last, scarce a *Lame Jade* to get in that little *Harvest*, which the wild *Troops* have left them: *Their Cattel* are Driven away by one Party to day, *Their Corn* taken by another to *Morrow*, and when they are *Thoroughly Plunder'd*, because they had *something*; they must afterward expect to be *Beaten* too, because they have *Nothing*.

Are not *These* fair *Encouragements* to make *Husbandmen Seditious*? And yet, *This Interest* is several waies made use of to *Promote Sedition*. Particularly, by *Three sorts* of People; *The Discontented Nobleman*, the *Rich Churle*; the *Stiff*, and *Contentious Free-born-Subject*.

A Discontent-
ed Nobleman.

A *Great Person* may become *Weary* of the *Court*, and withdraw into the *Country*, out of divers unquiet Considerations: Out of *Ambition*, *Pride*, or *Revenge*.

Ambition.

If his *Trouble* be *Ambition*, his *Course* is to strengthen himself by *Popularity*, and make a *Party*, by spending his *Revenue* in a *Bountifull*, and *Open Hospitality* upon the *People*: which is the most *Winning* and the most *spreading* of all *Obligations*. His *Jades*, his *Kites*, his *Currs*, are free to all comers: his *Family* is the whole *World*; and his *Companions* are the *Wits*, and the *best of Good-fellows*.

Pride.

If his *Retirement* be out of *Pride* as chusing rather to be the *first Person* in the *Country*, then the *Second* or *Third* at *Court*: His *business* is *Popularity* too, though perhaps not *Aiming so high* (for there are a sort of *People*, insufferably haughty in their *Looks*, *Garbe*, and *Language*; that have not

Courage

Courage enough to be Ambitious) *This Man's* attended by the best *Parasites* that are to be had for Money.

The *Third Distemper* is *Revenge*; and That's the worst of *Revenge*. the *Three*: In *Ambition*, there's somewhat that's *Noble*. *Pride* indeed, is a *Base*, and *Abject Vice*, (that is; a *Cowardly Pride*: Nay 'tis at best, but a *Simple Sin*) But *Revenge* is *Black*, and *Diabolical*. Let it proceed whence it will. Whether from some *Affront*, *Repulse*, *Neglect*; Nay, a *Wry Look*, or a *Mistaken Hint* raises this *Devil*.

This is a *Humour* now of another *Complexion*: *Morose*, *Unpleasant*, and rather *watchfull* to *Emprove* an *Opportunity* of *Mischief*, then *Laborious* to *prepare* it. In the *House* of a *Person* haunted with *This Fury*, you shall find *Throngs* of *Sittenc'd Ministers*, *Discharg'd Officers*, *Crop-ear'd Schismatics*, *Broken Citizens*, &c.

These are the *Dangerous Malecontents*, whose *Differing Inclinations of Temper* are no *hinderance* to their *Unity of Design*, where the *Safety* of the *Prince* and *Government* is the *Question*.

Next to *This Discontented Nobleman*, Follows the *Rich Churle*: which is a *Creature*, that opposing *Wealth* to *Dignity*, becomes the *Head* of the *People*, for his *Sauciness* of *bearing up* against the *Power*, and *Nobility* of the *Court*. It is scarce to be *Imagined*, The *Interest* of this *Churle* in a *Popular Scuffle*; especially, if he has gotten his *Estate* by a *Rusticall*, and *Plodding Industry*: for Then the *Vulgar* *Reckon* him as *One* of their *Own Rank*, and *support* him, as the *Grace*, and *Dignity* of their *Order*.

We come now to the *Stiff*, and *Contentious Free-born-Subject*: the *Quintest*, and the *Sharpest Youth* of the *Three*. He'll tell ye to a *hair*, upon what *Point*, *Prerogative* becomes *Tyranny*: How far a *Subject* may *promote* a *Rebellion*, and yet be *honest* himself, and *Cleave* the very *Atome*, that divides the *Rights* of *King* and *Subject*. Does any *Minister of State*, or *Justice* pass his *Commission*, but the tenth part of a *Scruple*? he cryes, 'Tis *Arbitrary*, *Illegal*, and an *Encroachment* upon the *Birth-right* of a *Free-born-People*. Let him be *Question'd*, and the *Matter* *Scann'd*, here's his *Dilemma*. Either by *Carrying* the *Cause*, he *Justifies*, and *Puffs up* the *People*; or by *Suffering* for it, he *Enrages* them: but still *Obliging* them both waies; the *One way* as their *Champion*, and the *Other*, as their *Martyr*.

The Rich Churle.

The Contentious Free-born Subject.

Upon the Summ of the Matter, That Government must be Carried very even, which These Instruments, in Combination, shall not be able to discompose.

Touching the *Common Sort*; it is so little in their *Power* to Embroyl a Kingdom, and so much less their *Interest* to do it, that This Little is enough said concerning Them; setting aside the Influence they have upon the Subject we are now entering upon.

SECT. VII.

The Body Representative.

THE *Seaventh* and Last *Interest* we are to Treat of, is the *Body Representative*, which is but *One Grand Interest* made up of all the Rest; and as the *Whole* stands well, or ill-affected to the Government, so commonly does *That*. Yet it falls out sometime, that the *Diligence*, and *Stickling* of a *Faction* gets the Start of a *General Inclination*. It would ask an Age, to reckon up all the Inconveniencies which may arrive from the Evill Composition of This Assembly: but so strict an account will not be Necessary, in regard that the Prince may, at his Pleasure, *Remedy* all, by *Dissolving* them.

One great Defect, is that in many places they have no *Stated Rule* how far their Cognisance extends; No *Measure* of their *Privileges*: through which Default, more *Time* is spent, and too too oft, more *Passion* Stirr'd, about the bounds of Their *Authority*, then the main *Business* of their *Meeting*. Beside the desperate Influence of This *Mysteri us Incertainty*, upon the Prince, and *Publick*: Under which Colour, nothing so *Seditious*, but it may both be *Introduc'd* and *Protected*. Suppose a *Notion* in the Assembly directly against the *Crown*: The Prince takes *Notice* of it; and demands *Reason* for it. Is't not a fine Reply, that to deny *Liberty of Speech*; to take *Notice* of any Thing in *Debate*; to *Question* any *One Member* without the Leave of the Rest, is a *Breach of Privilege*.

The *Representative* we here speak of, answers (the nearest of any) to the *House of Commons* in *England*; which *Resemblance* will much facilitate the task we are now upon, having only to look back into the History of *Charles the Martyr*, to find the *Greatest Mischiefs*, and the *Fonleest Crimes* which such

a. Con-

a Convention in disorder may be capable of: not meddling with the Names of Persons, but contenting our selves to discover the Arts, Grounds, and Occasions of Seditions, without reproaching the Authors of them.

The Dangerous Mixture of a Representative, we may divide into these Three Parties: The Designers of Mischief; the Permitters of it; and the Incompetent Judges of it: whose Failings are either of Commission, Omission, or Ignorance.

The Dangerous mixture of a Representative.

To begin with the First. The Designers are either the Ambitious Heads of the Faction, that aim at Power, as well as Profit, in the Subversion of the Government; or such Dependancies, as they can Engage by Menace, Flattery, fair Pretences, Money, or Preferment. These in their Several Places, promote the same Seditious Interest, and every man knows his Station.

The Designing Party.

They have their Contrivers, their Speakers, their Sticklers, their Dividers, their Moderators, and their Blanks: (their I-and NO-men) by which Method and Intelligence, all Debates are managed to the Advantage of the Party and Occasion. They know when to Move, when to Press, when to Quit, Divert, Put off, &c. and they are as Skilful in the manner of Moulding their Business, as they are Watchful for the Season of Timing it. Add to this Agreement and Confederacy of Design, their Zeal and Earnestness of Intention; and what will not an Indefatigable Industry, joyned to these Improvements of Order and Counsel, be able to accomplish? [The Loxer and Weaker Faction is the firmer in Conjunction (says Sir F. Bacon) and it is often seen, that a few, that are Stiff, do tire out a Greater Number, that are more Moderate.]

Their Industry and Combination.

Yet to the Miracles that are wrought by Forecast and Assiduity, there is still requisite a Matter predispos'd, and fit to work upon: and that's the Dress, or Cleanly Carrying of the Project. 'Tis not at first dash to attempt the Person of the King, but the Multitude must by Degrees, be made sensible of the Faults of his Ministers; and Instructed to clamour against Oppression and Profaneness. Why should a Free-born Subject be Press'd with Taxes and Obedience, or a Christian Libertine be ty'd to worship by a Set-form? Is it not against the Fundamentals of a Mixt Monarchy, (That ridiculous supposition) for the Supreme Magistrate to Impose upon his Co-ordinate Subjects? Or, where is it commanded in the Bible, for people to Kneel at the Communion, or to stand up at Gloria Patri?

The Matter they work upon.

These

Their manner
of Proceeding.

These are *fore Grievances* indeed, and now the Humour's ripe for *Petitions* to the *Senate*; which being both Procur'd and Fram'd by a *Caball* of the Senators themselves, cannot fail of being acceptable to the *Faction*: who by this Artifice, get the Credit of being taken for the proper *Arbitrators* of all *Differences* betwixt *King* and *People*, through which Mistake, the *Popular Representative* becomes both *Party* and *Judge*, and it is then no hard matter to Guess what will become of the *Prerogative*.

By making the *most* of all *Complaints*, and the *worst* of all *Abuses*; they bespeak a *Compassion* for the *One side*, and they provoke an *Odium* toward the *Other*: which *Amplification* renders exceedingly Necessary the Remedy of a *Thorough-Reformation*.

The *Subject* is to be *Free* in *One Point*, and the *Monarch* limited in *Another*. These *Courts* are to be *Abolish'd*, Those *Counsellors* to be remov'd, &c.— And in fine, when the Prince has yielded, till they want *Matter* for *Complaint*, their *Fears* are not less *Clamorous* and *Important*, than were their *Complainings*. Of which undutiful and unlimited Distemper, this is the certain Issue; from one Desire they proceed to another, till the Prince, to secure their Jealousie, has parted with all possibility of Preserving *Himself*.

This is their Course, where they find the Government already in Disorder; but how to Introduce that Disorder, is quite another Point of Cunning.

They are here onely to procure those *Grievances*, for which they are afterward to provide *Remedies*, and to cast the State into a *Disease*, that with better Pretense they may give it *Physick*; Siding with the *Prerogative* against the *People*, in the first place, and with the *Prerogative* in the next. In a word, their *Services* are *Snares*; they give a little, that they may take all, and by a *plausible Oppression*, provoke a *Barbarous Rebellion*.

The Permitters
of Seditious Con-
trivements.

Another sort of ill Ministers in a *Representative*, are the Permitters of these Abuses: Such as being Chosen and Entrusted for the *Publick Weal*, Abandon their *Stations*, and Deliver up their *Country*. Betwixt whom, and the Conspirators *themselves*, there is but this *Difference*: The *One* Quits the Breach, and the *Other* Enters: These, throw down
their

their Arms, and Those take the Town; what the One Party carries by Treason, the Other loses by Cowardice.

Of these Deserters, some are taken Off by Profit, Pleasure, Vanity, Sloath, Neglect or Partiality; Others are led by their Passions; as Fear, Anger, &c. In all which Cases, whoever prefers a private Interest to a Publick, Betrayes his Trust.

Some Peoples Mouths are Stopp'd with Offices, Rewards, fair Promises, Hopes of Preferment, &c. And These upon the very Crisis of a Debate, find Twenty Shifts, to waive the Pinch of the Dispute, and let the Question fall; even though the Crown it self depend upon the Issue of it. This is done either by coming too late, or perhaps not at all; by going away too soon, or saying Nothing when they are there: by which Discouragements, the Cause is lost, only for want of their Arguments and Voices to Turn the Scale.

Others are Drawn from their Duties by Pleasure; perhaps a Party at Tennis, Bowles,; Chards; a Pack of Dogs, a Cock-fight, or a Horse-match, a Comedy, a Good-fellow, or a Mistress. And while they are thus Employ'd, the Vigilant Faction steals a Vote that's worth a Kingdom.

Some again are so Transported with the Vanity of Dress and Language, that rather than serve the Publick with One hair amiss, or in One broken Period, they'll let the Publick perish. *Mallent Rem-Publicam turbare, quam Capillos.* These, while their Country lies at Stake, are Ordering of their Heads, and Polishing the Phrase, Shaping the Parts of a Set-Speech, till 'tis too late to use it. Nothing methinks does less become a Grave Assembly, than This same *Facultatula loquendi*: this same Rhetorical Twittle-tattle; it spins out so much Time in tedious Circumstances, that it makes a man e'en sick of a Good Cause, and for the very Form, prejudice the Reason of it.

Sloth and Neglect, are yet more dangerous in a Senatour; not only in Regard of Surprises from the Faction, but of Discontentments likewise from the People. These think a Wet Day, or a Cold Morning, a sufficient Discharge of their Attendance: and while they are taking t'other Napp, or t'other Bottle, the Monarch perhaps has lost his Crown, or the Subject his Liberty.

Come to particular Cases, how many Families are lost by

Disap-

Disappointments; by *Relying upon Promises*; *Delays from time to time*! How many *Just and Sad Petitions* are *thrown aside, unregarded*; as serving only for *waste Paper*? and so far from *Relief*, they cannot obtain so much as a *bare Reading*.

by Partiality.

Distinguishing of Persons; in *Matters of Equity*, is furthermore a great *Abuse*; where a *Friend*, an *Acquaintance*, or some *By-Respect* shall interrupt the *Speedy and Direct Course of Justice*: (I do not say *Divert*; though to forbear *helping the Right*, or not to *hinder the Wrong*, because of such or such an *Interest*, is but a *Negative Oppression*.)

Passion.

Those that are mov'd by *Passions* from their *Duties*, are not less *Culpable* than the *Rest*. For a *Good Patriot* fears Nothing, but to be *Dishonest*; *Hates Nothing*, but *Iniquity*; and knows no other *Friend* but *Justice*.

Fear,

Is any *Thing propos'd*, which to my *Reason* appears of *Dangerous Consequence*; *Unlawful to my Conscience*; *Dishonourable to my Prince, or Country*? Do I *Discharge my Soul to God and to the World*, in not opposing it? because forsooth 'tis my *Lords Interest, or Project*. Where 'tis my *Office to withstand a Publick Injury*, 'tis my *Act* if I *suffer it*: Nor will it serve the turn to say, *Alas! I'm but one Man, what should I struggle for?* A *Noble Truth and Equity*, though single, ought to be maintain'd against the *World*. But very rarely is *That the Case*; for those *Particulars* that, under *Colour of this Singleness*, relinquish and withdraw, would in *Conjunction* cast the *Balance*. The *Question* is but *This*:

Whether shall I rather *venture the Loss of an Office, or the Loss of my Country*? Whether shall I rather *disoblige a Powerful Subject, or betray my Lawful Prince*? Whether in fine, shall I rather choose, *Modestly to Oppose a Faction, or Tamely to desert my Conscience*.

or Personal Animosity.

Some we find *Prepossess'd with Personal Animosities*; and these *Particular Piques, are many times, the Bane of Publick Designs*. They do not so much heed the *Matter*, as the *Man* that *Promotes it*; They are *Resolv'd to like Nothing from That Hand*; and while they are *Cavelling about Niceties, and Nothings*; the *adverse Party* runs away with the *Sum of the Contest*.

Another *Infelicity* is where *Elections* are *Carried by Recommendation, Fortune, or Affection*; without any *Regard to the Abilities of Persons*.

These

These are a Dangerous Party, and a fit Subject to work upon. Fools are fit for being more addicted to follow the *Appearances*, then *Capable of Comprehending the Reasons of Things*; They are not only *Liable to fall into Mistakes*, but *Obstinate Maintainers of Them*; and in all Cases Determinable by *Plurality of Voices*, the *Greater Number of Fools* weighs down the more *Prudentiall Counsels of Fewer wise Men*: Nay, which is most *Ridiculous and Miserable*; (but that in *Popular Suffrages* it must be so) *His Vote many Times Casts a Kingdom*, that has not *Brain enough to Rule his Private Family*; *Deciding the Question*, without *understanding the Debate*.

We have Prosecuted This Theme of *Miscariages*; far enough. From the *Discovery*, our next *advance* is to the *Remedies* of them: *The harder undertaking*; for *Faults are more easily found, then mended*.

C A P. X.

How to prevent the Beginnings, and hinder the Growth of Seditions in General; together with Certain Particular Remedies, apply'd to the Distempers of Those Seven Interests, mentioned in the foregoing Chapter.

THE Two main Pillars that support Majesty, are *Love and Reverence*: To which are oppos'd, (as the *Foundation of a Prince his Ruin*) *Contempt and Hatred*. What are *Disloyal Actions*, but the *Issue of Disloyal Thoughts*? Or what are *General Tumults*, but the *Rationall Effects of General Discontents*? (The *Violent* part being no other, then the *Manifestation of a Treason already Form'd and Perfected in the Affections*) So that to set the *Heart Right*, is the *Prime Duty of a Good Subject*, and *Then to observe the Law*, for *Love of the Authority*. *Kings are first Render'd Odious, or Despis'd*; and in *Perjuance of Those Passions* they come at last, to be *Dethron'd, or Murther'd*. That is, to be *Dethron'd, or Murther'd Actually*; (for even the *first Malitious Motion was Murther in the Heart*; and betwixt *God and our own Souls every Seditious Thought is a Rebellion*.)

Although no Prince can be *Mighty*, without the *Love of his People*,

The Power of
a Prince de-
pends upon
the Love of
his People.

People, or *Secure* under their *Hatred*; (the *One* being *Necessary* to his *Greatness*, and the *Other* *Sufficient* to his *Undoing*) yet must we not suppose the *Subjects* *Love* more *Needfull* to their *Prince*, than *His* to *Them*: since upon *His* *Protection* depends *Their* *Welfare*; no less then, upon *Their* *Support*, *His* *Power*.

Because the *Hazard* of disuniting is *mutuall*, it must not be suppos'd that it is therefore *equal*; nor that the *Crime* is so, where *Tumult* and *Oppression* are the *Question*. They are *Both* *ill*, but with exceeding odds of *worse* betwixt them: The *One* does but affront the *Mode* of *Government*; the *Other* strikes at *Government* it *self*: the very *Ends*, and *Reason* of it; --- *Peace*, *Order*, and *Society*.

A *Prince* without the *Hearts* of his *Subjects*, is in a *bad* *Condition*; but he that falls from *Hatred*, to *Contempt*, his *Case* is *Desperate*. For when they neither *Love* his *Person*, nor *Fear* his *Power*; They are both *Provok'd* to *Contrive* mischief, and *Embolden'd* to *Execute* it.

The Grounds
of Sedition.

These are the *Generall*, and *Enflaming* *Grounds* of *Seditions*; which may be easily prevented, and *Cut off* in their next *Immediate Causes*. The *Difficulty* is, for a *Prince* to be *Popular*, without making himself *Cheap*; to *Gratifie* his *People*, without *Derogating* from his *Authority*; and so to *Comply* with the *Interest* of his *Subjects*, as not to be wanting to the *Necessities* of his *Crown*. In the *Due* *Temperation* of which *Mixture*, *Consists*, in a *Great* *measure*, the *skill* of *Governing*; and thereupon depends the *Peace*, and *Safety* of the *Government*.

Let a Prince
Stick to his
Laws, and his
People will
stick to him.

In all *well-ordered* *Monarchies*, there are certain *Meres* and *Boundaries*, that *Part* the *Rights* of *King*, and *People*; and *These*, are either *Laws*, or *Customs*; providing for the *Common* *Good*, and *Safety*, both of the *Subject* in his *Obedience*, and of the *Sovereign* in his *Authority*. Let a *Prince* therefore *stick* to his *Antient* *Laws*, and he may be *sure* his *People* will *stick* to him; and more he needs not ask, being by *Those* *Laws* armed with *Power* sufficient to the *Intent* of *Government*: or, at the *worst*, if any *Defect* there be, the *Fault* is imputed to the *Constitution*, and not to the *Person*.

There may indeed occur such *Cases*, and *Emergencies* of *Imminent*, and *Publick* *Danger*, as (being un-foreseen by the *Wisdom* of former *Times*) are left without a *Rule*. Of *These*, beyond *Dispute*, The only *Supream* *Governour* is the only *Supream*.

pream Judge ; and under so strict a *Necessity*, he not only may, but ought to *dispense with Common Formalities*, in Order both to the *Discharge of his Duty*, and the *Welfare of his People* : His *Oath of Protection*, Implying him Vested with a *Power of Protecting* ; and his *Conscience*, as a *Governour*, obliging him to be *careful of his Charge*.

The Oath of Protecting, implies a Power of Protecting.

The Objection is *Frivolous*, that *This Supposition opens a door to Tyranny* ; because that at *This Rate*, a *Prince* has no more, but to *pretend a Danger*, and Then to *do what he pleases*. 'Tis very right, a *Prince* may *Tyrannize* under *This Colour* ; but 'tis as certain, that a *People* cannot *Scruple This Inconvenience*, without incurring a *Greater* : for 'tis an *Opinion Destructive of Government it self* ; all *Subjects* being equally expos'd to the same *Hazard*, under all *Governments* ; and it is inevitable, that either the *King must have it in his Power to Oppress his People*, or the *People have it in theirs to Destroy their Sovereign*. (and betwixt the *Ills of Tyranny and Rebellion*, all the world knows the *Disproportion*) Wherefore let *Subjects hope and believe the best of their Prince his Will, and Inclination* ; without meddling with his *Power* ; for it is not less his *Interest to be well Obey'd, and Belov'd* ; then it is *theirs, to be well Govern'd*.

Where a King has it not in his Power to Oppress his People, They have it in theirs to destroy their King.

Yet when a *Prince*, by *Exigencies of State*, finds himself forc'd to waive the *Ordinary Path, and Course of Law* ; the *Less he swerves, the Better* : and the more *unwilling* he appears to *Burthen his People*, the more *willing* shall he find them to *serve him*. Especially, he should be *Cautelous*, where men's *Estates, or Freedoms*, are the *Question* ; to make the *Necessity as Manifest as is possible*, and the *Pressure as Light*, and as *Equall*, as *Consists with his Honour, and Convenience* : Mixing however with *This General Indulgence*, such a *Particular Severity*, where his *Authority is Disputed*, that the *Obedient* may have *Reason to Love his Goodness*, and the *Refractory*, as much, to *Fear his Displeasure*.

A Mixture of Indulgence, and Severity, Obliges the Loyal, and Awa the Refractory.

By *These Means*, may a *Prince* preserve himself from the *Harred of his People*, without exposing himself to their *Contempt* ; and in Order to the avoiding of *That too*, we'll take up *This Observation* by the way : That *Subjects do Generally Love, or Hate, for their own Sakes* ; but when they *despise a Prince*, it is for *some Personall Weakness, or Indignity in himself*.

Nothing makes a *Monarch Cheaper* in the *Eyes of his People*, than *That which begets an ill opinion, either of his Prudence,*

The Influence
of Prudence
and Courage.

or *Courage*; and if they find once that he will either be *Over-reach'd*, or *Over-aw'd*, they have *his measure*. By *Courage* here, we do not intend a *Resolution* only against *Visible* and *Pressing Dangers*; but an *Assurance* likewise, and *Firmness* of mind against *Audacious* and *Threatning Counsels*.

The *Prudence* we intend, is of a more *extensive Notion*; and from the most *Mysterious Affairs* of *Royalty*, descends to the most *Private*, and *Particular Actions* of a *Princes Life*. It enters into his *Cabinet-Counsels*, and *Resolves*; his *Publick Acts* of *State*; his very *Forms of Language*, and *Behaviour*; his *Exercises*, and *Familiar Entertainments*. In fine; It is scarce less *Dangerous* for a *Sovereign* to separate the *Prince*, from the *Person*, even in his *daily Practises*, and *Conversations*; then to permit *Others* to *Divide Them* in their *Arguments*: And in a word; to secure himself from *Contempt*, it behoves a *Monarch* to Consider, as his most *Deadly Enemies*, such as *Brave his Authority*; and by *no means* to allow, even in his most *Acceptable Servants*, and most *Familiar Humours*, too great a *Freedom* toward his *Person*.

Not but that a *Sovereign* may in many *Cases Familiarize* with his *Subjects*, and, by so doing, win the *Reputation*, of a *Wise* and *Gracious Prince*: Provided that the *sweetness* of his *Nature*, cause him not to forget the *Severity* of his *Office*; and that his *Stooping* to his *People*, prove not an *Emboldening* of them to come up to him. This is a *Course* to *Prevent Sedition*, in the *First Cause*, and check it in the *Bud*.

But if it come once to shew it self and *spread*; there is first *Requisite*, (upon a *Clear* and *Open Proof*) a *Speedy Execution* of *Laws* to the *Utmost Rigour*. I say, [upon a *Clear* and *Open Proof*] for in such cases, 'tis of great *Advantage* to a *State*, to make the *Crime* as evident as the *Punishment*, that the *People* may at once *Detest the Fact* and *Approve the Justice*. I say Likewise [a *Speedy Execution*] for *Delay* brings many *Inconveniences*. It gives a *Faction Time* to *Contrive*, and *Unite*; and *Boldness* to *Attempt*: for it looks as if they that sit at the *Helm* were either *more sensible* of the *Danger*, or *less mindfull* of their *Duty* then becomes them. *Lastly*; whereas it is added, [to the *utmost Rigour*:] My meaning is not to extend the *Severity* to a *Multitude* of *Offenders*, but to *Deterre* the *Generality* by making some *few*, and *Dreadfull Examples*.

Nay my *Advice* should be, to *Pick these Few* too. They should

A Prince that
bears Affronts,
and Familiari-
ties from his
Subjects, Les-
sens himself.

How to hinder
the Spreading
of a Seditious
Humour.

should not be *Fools, Madmen, or Beggars*; but the *Boldest, the Wisest, the most Circumspect and Wealthy* of the Party: the *Leaders, and first Starters* of the *Quarrel*: to shew that neither *Confidence* should *Protect* them, nor their *Shifts and Politicks* avail them. But above All; let not their *Money save Them*, for *That's* no other then *Setting of a Price upon the Head of the Sovereign*.

Another *Expedient* to Stop a *spreading Mischief*, is for a Prince to keep a watchful Eye over *Great Assemblies*; which are either *Irregular and Lawless*; or *Regular and Constant*; or *Arbitrary and Occasional*. Let a Prince keep an Eye over Great Assemblies.

Concerning the *First*; It is seldom seen, where the *Manner* of a *Meeting* is *Tumultuary*, that the *Business* of it is not so too; and, where *Many Concur in One unlawful Act*, 'tis no hard matter to persuade them to agree in Another. So that to frustrate the *Ends*, and prevent the *Consequences* of such *Meetings*, the surest way is for the *Sovereign* to employ his *Authority, Timely*; and *strictly* to *Prohibit* them. If *That* does no Good; He has no more to do, but *Instantly* to *Scatter Them by force*, and *single out the Heads of the Riot*, for *Exemplary Punishment*. Let him be Quick,

Touching *Conventions* which are *Regular and Steady*; It concerns the *Chief Magistrate* not to be without his *Creatures, and Discoverers*, in *Those Assemblies*; and to see that they be well *Influenc'd* as to the *Government*. For Instance; when the *People Meet* to *Choose Officers*; when *Those Officers* meet to *Advise upon Business*, 'tis worth the while for a Prince to learn how the *Pulse Beats*; and Principally, to *Over-watch Churches, and Courts of Judicature*: Both in regard of the hazard of *Errours* in *Matters of Law, and Religion*; and of the *Multitude*, being ever in *readiness and humour* to *Entertain* them. and Watchful.

As to *Meetings Arbitrary and Occasional*, heed must be taken to the *Persons assembling*, the *Occasion* which brings them *Together*, and the *Matter* whereupon they *Treat*; which we shall handle in their proper Places, and so pass from *Generals* to *Particulars*, beginning with the *CHURCH*.

Sect. I.

By what Means Heresies and Schifms may be kept out of the CHURCH; Their Encrease hinder'd, and the Seditious Consequences of Them Prevented: With the Remedies of Other Mischiefs arising from Disorders in the CHURCH.

The most dangerous of all Sects.

Since so it is, that *Divisions* in the Church have no further Interest in This place, than as they Lead to Seditions in the State: the shortest Cutt I know, will be to Reduce all of that Tendency to Sir Francis Bacon's Notable Comprizal of them, under Two Properties: [*If a New Sect have not Two Properties, fear it not; for (says He) it will not spread. The one is, the Supplanting, or the Opposing of Authority established: For Nothing is more Popular than That. The Other is, the giving Licence to Pleasures, and a Voluptuous Life. For as for Speculative Heresies (such as were in Ancient Times the Arrians, and now the Arminians) though they work mightily upon Mens Wits, yet they do not produce any great Alterations in States; except it be by the Help of Civil Occasions.*] Now when a Prince meets with a Faction thus Markt, let him look to Himself: for there are against him, the best Counterfeit of a Friend, and the most Deadly Composition of an Enemy; the Strongest of all Allurements; the most Popular of all Designs; and the most Rational Means to Accomplish it.

But the Question will be, How to Prevent, what is not as yet Discover'd? To which we answer, That the Sect here spoken of, is New, either Absolutely, or Comparatively. If Absolutely; Observe what Carnal Interest they drive: If Comparatively; mark what Copy they follow; and Measure the Disciple by his Master.

A sure way to prevent Schism.

One Safe and Certain Remedy, (be the Novelty what it will,) is, not to suffer any Innovation whatsoever, without a warrantable Authority: No, not so much as a Publick Dispute against an Establish'd Order, from a Private Person. Nay, more; let the Dissent be Right or Wrong, 'tis the same thing as to the Reason of Government, though not so to the Conscience of the Dissenter. Suppose the Subject of an Idolatrous Prince,

Prince, within his *Masters Dominions*, and *Contrary* to his *Express Order*, Preaches against the Religion there *Establish'd*: He does well, to Discharge his *Conscience*, but let him have a Care of the *Consequence*; for if in Order to the making of *Good Christians*, he makes *Bad Subjects*, his Zeal will hardly acquit him of *Sedition*: God does not allow of Proposing *Good Ends*, by *Ill Means*; and of *Reforming Religion*, by *Rebellion*. Have a Care.

Let him have a Care likewise, if he comes to *suffer* for *well-doing*, how he behaves himself: for if he but *open his Mouth* against the *Civil Magistrate*, as a *Persecutor*, he betrays himself to be an *Hypocrite*.

There are *Two Sects*, whom I dare say, This *Doctrine* will not please; i. e. The *Pontifical Presbyterians*, and the *Rigid Jesuits*. The *Latter* of which, have, for *Convenience sake*, been *True to One King*: The *Former*, (*giving the Devil his Due*) since *Presbyterians* had a *Being*, were never *True to Any*: or if they ever were, let him that *Loves Them best*, or *knows* them better, shew me but *when, where, how*; and with a *Neverint universi*, I do here Declare, I'll make a *Publick Recantation*. Till Then, We'll take the *Prebyterian* for the *Cock-Schismarick*; and (if *Sir Francis Bacon's Note* holds Good) the *Dangerous New Sect*: against *Whom*, no *Caution* can be too *Early*, no *Importunity* too *Earnest*, no *Restriction* too *Severe*.

These are They, that (according to the *Lord St. Albans*) *Propagate Religion by Wars*; *Force Consciences*; *Non-rish Seditions*; *Authorise Conspiracies and Rebellions*. That put the *Sword into the Peoples hand*, and *Dash the First Table*, against the *Second*. In short; all Those *Popular*, and *Supplanting Politicks*, which we find only *here and there*; *Scatter'd*, and *Thin*, in *Other Sects*; are by These *People* drawn into a *Practical Method*, a *Set-form of Sedition*.

They *Govern Their Looks*, their *Words*, their *Actions*; The *Presbyterians Set-form*. They are *Instructed*, when to *Beseech*, and when to *Expostulate*; when to *Flatter*, and when to *Threaten*; when to *Offer*, and when to *Deny*; when to *Prefs Swearing*, and when to *Declaim against it*; when to *Save*, and when to *Kill*.

In the *first Scene*, ye have the *Schismarick* upon his *Knees*, And Method. begging his Prince into a *Dispensation*, for *Scrupulous Consciences*,

Their Modesty.

ences, that perhaps stick at such and such Ceremonies; the Cross, the Surplice, or the like.

Let but the Sovereign Comply *Thus far*, and *what's the Fruit of this Indulgence?* Within a Day or Two, they come for *More*, and by Degrees, *More still*; till at *Last*, they find the Government of the Church as *Troublesom*, as they did the *Rites* of it; and *Bishops* as great a *Grievance*, as *Ceremonies*. Where the *King Stops*, *They Cavil*; and now, from *Petitioners* for Freedom to *Themselves*, they are Grown to be most Insolent *Denyers* of it to *Others*.

Their Art is next, to *Tune the People*; which is best done by the *Pulpit*, where *One half* of their Business is *Investive* against *Prelacy*, and the *Other* is spent in *Well-Acted Supplications*, *That God would turn the King's Heart*; Accounting *His yielding* to all *They Ask*, as a *Divine Assurance* that their *Prayers* are heard. But if the *Monarch* still holds out; what *Pity 'tis* (they Cry) *so sweet a Prince should be Miss-led?* And then they fall upon his *Evil Counsellors*; still *Taking* all he *Gives*, and *Struggling* for the *Rest*; till having first *Disrob'd* Him of his *Rights*, *Depriv'd* Him of his *Friends*; Step. after Step, they *Attempt* His *Sacred Person*, and at last take away His *Life*.

Here's their *Glorious King!* the End of all their *Vows* and *Covenants*, their *Prayers* and *Fastings*; or, in a word, the *Summe of their Religion*.

It was great *Blasphemy* (says Sir F. B.) when the Devil said I will *Ascend* and be like the *Highest*; But it is greater *Blasphemy*, to *Personate God*, and bring Him in, saying, I will *Descend*, and be like the *Prince of Darkness*; and what is it better to make the *Cause of Religion*, to descend, to the *Cruel and Execrable Actions*, of *Murthering Princes*, *Butchery of People*, and *Subversion of States and Governments?*

He that stands firm against (not the *Wit*, or *Bravery*, but) the *Fawning*, and *Treacherous Insinuations* of This *Faction*, may make himself Sport with all *Other Practices* and *Combinations* whatever: and *That Prescription*, which helps This *Evil*, serves for all other *Publick* and *Intestine Maladies*.

I think we may be *Positive*, that there neither *Is*, nor ever *Was* in *Nature*, any *Society of Men*, without a *Vicious Mixture*, under what-Government, or *Governour-soever*. I think

think we may be as *Positive* likewise, that Those *Ambitious*, and *Unsatisfi'd Particulars*, with which all Constitutions are infested, are only *Deterr'd* from troubling all Governments, by the want of *Opportunities* to Plot, and *Contrive*; and by the *Hazards* they meet with, in putting Those *Plots* in *Execution*.

Wherefore it ought to be a Prince his *first Care*, to *Choke* The means of These *Seeds of Discord*: which may be Effected, by a *Provi-* Preventing sion of *Orthodox Ministers*; (to the utter *Exclusion* of the Schism. the *Contrary*) by *Prohibiting Private Meetings*, or *Conventicles*; and by *taking heed* to the *Press*. A *Watchfulness* in These Three Points Secures the *Church* from *Schisms*, and Consequently the *State* from *Conscientious Seditions*. (At least, if I am not Mistaken in my *Presumption*, that there is not any fourth way of *Dangerous Communication*.)

Touching the *Licentious abuse* of the *Press*, and the *Freedom* of *Riotous Assemblies*; the *Distemper* is not as yet grown *Bold enough*, to *avow* Those *Liberties*: But from the *Non-Conforming Ministers*, we must expect *hard Pleading*.

What? [*shall the Faithfull Guides be ejected, upon the account of Forms, or Ceremonies? because they dare not do that which they Judge to be so great a Sin against the Lord?*] May not a *Dissenting Brother* be an *Honest man*? Object.
Petition for
Peace, p. 4, 5.

Our *Reply* shall be *short*, and *Charitable*. If the *People* take them for *Guides*, they will be the apter to *follow* them; so that the *fairer* their *Credit* is, the *worse* is their *Argument*. Answ.
The Hazards
of Toleration.

Nor are they *laid aside*, as if the *Difference* it self were so *Criminal*, but for the *evill Consequences* of *Retaining* Them.

First, it advances the *Reputation* of the *Dissenting Party* to have the matter Look as if either the *Power*, or *Reason* were on *Their side*.

Next, it Subjects the Prince to be Thought *Diffident*, either of his *Authority* to *Command*, or of the *Justice* of the *Thing Commanded*.

Thirdly; a *Dissenting Minister* makes a *Dissenting Congregation*.

Fourthly; it makes *Conscience* a *Cloak* for *Sedition*, and under Colour of *Dividing* from the *Church*, it Ministers Occasion for *People* to *unite* against the *State*.

Fifthly; it not only leads to *Novel Opinions*, whereof the Vulgar

Vulgar are both Greedy, and Curious; but it Possesses the Multitude with These Two *Desperate*, and *Insociable Persuasions*. First, That the People are Judges of the *Law*; and Next, That because God alone has Power over their Souls, the *Sovereign* has none over their Bodies.

As to the Honesty of a *Dissenting Brother*; his Honesty is only to himself, but his Dissent is to the *Publick*: and the Better the *Man* is, the *Worse* is the *President*.

Upon these hazards, depends the *Royalty* of That *Sovereign*, that dispenses with the *Law*, to Indulge This *Faction*: and, which is the great Pitty of all, the better he deserves, the worse they use him. So that the only way for a Prince to deal Safely with These People, is first to lay aside That *Dangerous*, and *Fatal Goodness*, and Steer his *Resolutions* by the *Compass* of a *Severe*, and *Inexorable Reason*. Not that *Kings* are *Gods*, in any Respect, more then in their *Power*, and *Mercy*; but there are certain *Cases*, and *Instances*, wherein That *Power*, and *Mercy* may be Restrain'd; and wherein 'tis possible that what is Excellent in *Nature*, may be a slip in *Government*. 'Tis One Thing for a Party to ask *Pardon* for a *Fault* already Committed, and another thing to beg a *Dispensation* beforehand, to Commit it. And there's this Difference also in the Issue of the *Grants*. The Prince has the *Faction* at his *Mercy*, the One way; and the *Faction* has got the Prince at Theirs, the Other. But to the Point.

Will the *Monarch's* yielding to this, or that, content them? They'l say 'tis all they aime at; and truly I'd believe them: would they but shew me out of their whole Tribe, any one Instance of This Moderation to save the Credit of my *Charity*; Any *Presbyterian Interest* in *Nature* that is not Rais'd upon the Ruins of a Prince, and Cimented with Broken *Vows* and *Promises*.

If it be thus; Nothing less then a Miracle can secure that *Monarch* that makes this *Faction* Master of the *Pulpit*: and this, King *Charles*, the *Martyr*, prov'd by sad Experience: For not a Soul that by the *Instigation* of *Schismatical Lectures* deserted the Church, but became an *Enemy* to the *State*. So that Effectually a *Gracious Toleration* in some Cases, is by some People understood no otherwise, then as a *Tacit Commission* from the Person, of the King to Levy a *Warr* against his Office. And it is very rarely that such an Indulgence

The Founda-
tion of Pres-
bytery.

gence is better Employ'd. In which Opinion we are not a little Confirm'd by the Reflections of that Blessed Prince above mentioned.

[*I wish (sayes he) I had not suffered My own Judgment to have been over-borne in some Things, more by others Importunities, then their Arguments: My Confidence had less betrayed My self, and My Kingdoms, to Those Advantages, which some men sought for, who wanted nothing but Power, and Occasion, to do Mischief.*] And after the utmost Tryall of Bounty and Remissness to that Faction; *These* are his words to his Royall Successour, [*I cannot yet Learn That Lesson, nor I hope never will you, That it is safe for a King to gratifie any Faction, with the perturbation of the Laws, in which is wrapt up the Publick Interest, and the Good of the Community.*]

Eix. Baπλ.
pag. 3.

Eix. Baπλ.
P. 239.

Finally; Those Perfidious Creatures which at first Petition'd their Sovereign, afterwards fought against him, and Imprison'd him: Refusing him in his Distress the Comfort of his own Chaplains, in Requittall for having Granted them the Liberty of their Consciences. Who strook the Fatall Blow, it matters not: If he had not been Disarm'd, he had not been Kill'd. Subjects do not Hunt Kings for Sport; only to Catch Them, and let them go again. To Conclude; He was Persecuted with Propositions worse then Death; as by his Choice appear'd; for he Preferr'd rather to Die, then Sign Them. But to Signalize the Honor of his Memory, and the Glory of his Martyrdome, take his Last Resolution, and Profession.

Let Pagans
blush at These
Christians.

I look upon it with infinite more content and quiet of Soul, to have been worsted in my Enforced contestation for, and vindication of, the Laws of the Land, the Freedom and Honour of Parliaments, the Rights of my Crown, the Just Liberty of my Subjects, and the true Christian Religion in its Doctrine, Government, and due Encouragements, then if I had with the greatest Advantages of Success, over-born them all, as some men have now Evidently done, whatever Designs they at first pretended.

Eix. Baπλ.
P. 253.

From a Supposition of the first Inclination to Schism, proposing

posing also how to strangle it in the Birth : we are now to Consider it in some Degree of *Growth*, and *Progression* ; and to enquire after the best means to prevent such Mischieves, as may arise from the further Encrease, and spreading of it. That is ; the Mischieves of *Conspiracy*, which may be Promoted, either be *Speech*, or *Writing*.

The Growth
of Schism.

The first great Hazard is when *Popular Persons*, are put in *Popular Employments*, and in *Populous Places*. A *Cunning*, and a *Factionous Minister*, is a *Dangerous Instrument* in a *City* ; and the more *Dangerous*, if *Tollerated* ; for Then he stirs up Tumults by *Authority* : and who shall blame the Flock for Following the *Shepherd* ?

The Liberties of *Conventicles*, and *Pamphlets*, are likewise of Desperate *Influence* upon the People ; but These (as is already said) are easily Suppress'd by the Seasonable Execution of *Laws*. But There's no *Dallying* with the *Combination*.

If through the fault of *Negligent Officers*, the Distemper be gone too far, and the Confederacy grown Strong and Bold enough to struggle with the *Law*. Then, Other Arts must be found out, either to *Amuse*, *Ensnare*, or *Disunite* the Faction. The Last *Resort* is *violence*, which must be Timely too before the Reverence of Authority is quite Lost. And let the *King* himself appear ; not only to Ask, but Take the Heads of the *Sedition* ; before the Quarrel is Transferr'd from his *Ministers*, to his *Person* : if he but Stoops, he Falls. How horrible a Mutiny was That which *Cesar* Quieted at *Placentia* ? Single, Unarm'd and with One wretched word. (QUIRITES.)

————— *Nec dum deserviat Ira,*

Expectat ; Medios properat tentare Furores.

Nor Waite he till the Hot Fit should assuage,

But at the Maddest, Scorns, and Braves their Rage.

A Noble Re-
solve.

As the Resolve was Great, and the Success Good, so doubtless was the Reason of This Action ; For by the *Sodaineſs*, he Prevented their *Agreement* ; and by the Generous Contempt of *Danger*, he was almost Certain to Divide the *Revolt* ; making the Nobler Part of the *Mutiniere* to Adore him, and the *Baser*, to Fear him.

If the bare Presence of a *General*, could have This Power upon a *Disciplin'd*, *Incens'd*, and *Daring Army* ; what should a Lawfull *Monarch* apprehend, from an *Unpractic'd*, and *Loose Multitude* ?

But

But the Dispute is not yet Brought to This Extremity ; Our Purpose in this Place , being rather to Frustrate and Disappoint the *Malice* in the Contrivance , than *Crush* it in the Execution. To which end are Requisite, great *Diligence*, *Secrecy*, *Watchfulness* , *Moderation* ; and (at-what-rate soever) a Strict and General *Intelligence* : All which together, make up a Necessary and Becoming *Prudence*.

Sir *Francis Bacon's* Counsel is, to Begin with *Reforming Abuses* ; a Work seldom out of *Season*, but never more needful . then upon the very first Murmurings and Motions toward *Troubles*. Most especially, let *Great Towns* be Supplied with *Good Ministers*, and the Earlier, the Better, least the Multitude think it Extorted ; and the *Guilty* become too Strong for the *Innocent*.

It ought to be *Impartial* too ; for a *Toleration* on the One hand, will make *Justice* it self look like a *Persecution* on the Other. Beside, That it takes away the *Subject* of the *Clamour*, and exalts the *Reputation* of the *Monarch*, in making Him appear the *Common Father* of his People.

By these Means, may the *Church* be Purg'd of *Schism*, without much hazard of *Sedition*.

If the *Plot* be already *Modell'd*, and the *Multitude* Leaven'd, The *Sovereign* is to look for *Petitions*, on the Behalf of *Ejected Ministers* ; in the Names of *Thousands* ; and Accompanied with the Rudeness rather of a *Riot*, than a *Request*. The *Petitioners* may be Put Off, *Threatned*, or *Punished*, &c. according to the Merit of their Behaviour : but let a Watch be set upon the *Leaders* of Those *Troops* : their *Haunts* and *Correspondents*. Let it be mark'd who *Intercedes*, who *Mitigates* on Their behalf.

Let the Motions of the *Disaffected Clergy* be likewise Observ'd ; which of the *Nobility* they Frequent : And in fine, *Spyes* Employ'd upon all their Considerable *Privacies* : For, let the Cry be what it will , the Cause of these Disorders is *Ambition*. Of which in another Place, and with One Word more we'll Conclude this Point.

That may be *Conscience* in the *People* , which is *Sedition* in the *Minister* ; wherefore in all *Schismatical Ruptures*, I could wish all possible Favour to the *Common sort* of the *Lairty*, and as much *Severity* to the *Offending Clergy*.

Let the Prince Reform be-
time.

And Impar-
tially.

Ambition is
the Cause, no
matter what's
the Cry.

How to prevent SEDITIONS arising from the Disorders of the BENCH.

WE have Begun with the *Church*; and the *Bench* properly Follows: which is but to give Them the same Place in the Order of this Discourse, which they have in the Argument of it. Was there ever any *Considerable Rebellion* (I do not say *Revolt*) That was not Usher'd in by *Corrupt Divines*, or *Lawyers*, or Both of Them? And 'tis no Wonder; since upon *These Two Interests* depends the great Concern, both of our Souls and Bodies. One Reason of their Forwardness may be This; that they may do more Harm, upon *Safe and Easie Terms*, than other People: Bolt a *Rebellion* out of a *Text*; Dethrone a *King* with a *Moot-Point*, and Execute a *Bishop* at a *Reading*. All which is done with a *Wet Finger*; for when a People are *Discontented*, 'tis but Picking a *Scripture*, or a *Statute*, for the *Time* and *Purpose*; and Commit the *Rest* to *Application*.

These Two Interests hold so Good Intelligence, it is almost Pity to part Them: and Compar'd with the Rest, (supposing all in Disorder) They mind me of a *Combination* I have observ'd betwixt a *Beagle*, and a *Grey-hound*: the One Starts the *Hare*, and *Yelps*, the Other *Catches* it, but by *Consent*, they part the *Quarry*.

As I Reckon These Men of the *Robe* to be the very *Pests of Humane Nature*, when they Degenerate from the *Prime End* of their *Institution*: So take them (on the Other side) in the *Due Exercise* of their *Callings*, they are the *Blessings* and the *Pillars of Society*. A Word now to the *Lawyer*, apart.

The *Common Crime* of *Vicious Lawyers*, is *Avarice*; and Those *Inducements* to *Sedition*, which (in the Chapter next fore-going This) we have divided into *Corruption*, *Partialty*, *Oppression*, *Chargeable Delays*, &c. are but as several Branches from that Root of *Covetousness*.

Nay, take Their more *Pernicious* and *Vile Practices*; Their *Misconstruction* of *Laws*, *Misapplying* of *Presidents*, *Torturing* or *Embezzelling* of *Records*, &c. What is All This, but

Corrupt Divines and Lawyers are in the forlorn of all Rebellions.

But the Contrary, are the Pillars and Blessings of Society.

The Common Crime of Vicious Lawyers is, Avarice.

but *Corruption* in another *Dress*? A Project to Embroil the Government, that They may get *Money* by *Settling* it again? Or if they can procure a *Change*; They make the best Market they can of their *Country*; and *Betray* it to that *Faction* that will *Give Most* for't. Nay, when That's done, (and that Matters will come Right again, in spight of them) They shall *Betray* it back again to the Right Owner: at once *Lamenting*, and *Adoring* their *Past*, and *Profitable Transgressions*. These are the miserable Fruits of *Corruption*.

The Basest of Corruptions.

Others there are that *Err* through want of *Judgment*. And that's a sad Case too; for *Mistakes* coming from the Lips of a *Judge*, pass for *Oracles*.

An Ignorant Judge is a Dangerous Minister.

Others there are again, that *Understand* the *Right*, but in some Cases dare not *Own* it. And *These* deliver up the *People* to *Day*, for Fear of the *King*; and the *Prerogative* to *Mor-row*, for Fear of the *Subject*.

And so is a Timorous.

From hence it seems to me, That a *Prince* his *Chiefest* Care in this Particular of the *Law*, lies in a *Narrow compass*: That is, in *Securing*, and *Preserving* his *Courts* of *Judicature* from *Corruption*; and in *Supplying* them with Men of *Eminent Abilities* and *Courage*: *These* are the Instruments to make a *Prince* and *People* *Happy*; Nor does any Thing more *Conduce* to it, than the *Carrying* of an *Even* and *Impartial Hand* upon the *Ballance* of *Government*, and *Obedience*. We come now to the *Choice* of *Persons*, and There the *Difficulty* lies.

Some *Deceive* the *World*, by *Appearing* *Honest*er than they are. Others *Deceive* *Themselves*, and are *Honest* only for want of *Temptation*. Some there are, that are *Proof* against *Money*, but not against *Danger*. In short; *Where* it *so much Imports* a *Prince* not to *Repent* too late, it may be worth *his while* to *Consider* of his *Choice* in *Time*.

A hard matter to make a good Choice.

Concerning the *Abilities* of *Persons* for the *Offices* to which he *Designs* them; *Common Fame*, with a *Little Particular Enq. ry* will be sufficient: but their *Integrity* requires a *stricter Scrutiny*. What's such a Man's *Humour*? His *Behaviour*? His *Temper*? are not unnecessary Questions. And upon the *Whole*? If he has ever *Betrayed* any *Friend*, *Trust*, or *Interest*, either for *Fear* or *Profit*; Away with him. But if upon *Tryals* either *Private* or *Publick*; it appears, that rather than do *small Injuries*, he has *Refus'd* *great Benefits*: that he

A Rule to Chuse by.

has

has Preferr'd his *Faith* and *Honour*, before his *Life* and *Fortune*: This *Evidence* may serve for a *Moral Assurance* of an *Honest Man*. Whereas without this *Personal* and *Particular Examination*, not only the *Future Safety*, but the *present Quiet* of a Kingdom may come to be endanger'd by a *Mischoise of Ministers*.

To *Reason* upon this *Hazard*, does not at all *Impeach* the *Sovereign's Absolute Freedom* to *Elect* whom *He pleases*; nor does it one jot *justify* the *Subject*, that shall presume to *Scan* and *Judge* the *Actions* of his *Prince*. But in *Regard* that *Discontentments* breed *Seditions*; and that *Mistakings* of This *Quality* may beget *Discontentments*, we Offer This *Expedient* as to That *Consequence*. And in *Truth* it seems to be a kind of *Propharation* of the *Seat of Justice*, when *He Sits* upon the *Bench*, that deserves to hold up his *Hand at the Bar*. To *Conclude* then; When a *Monarch* comes to *Discover* the *Inconvenience* of such *Ministers*, *He may kill two Birds with one Stone*; and *Consider* who *Recommended* them: (But they may be better *Kept out*, than *Driven on*.)

Next to the *Choice of Good Persons*, Succeeds the *Care of Good Order*, when they are *Chosen*: Which may be *Provided* for; *First*, By maintaining an *Intelligence* concerning the *General Bias* and *Complexion* of their *Proceedings* as to the *Publick*; (i.e. Whether or no they do *equal Justice* betwixt *King* and *People*.) *Secondly*, By *Over-watching* them in *Cases* of more *Private* and *Particular Concern*.

Let not This *Strictness* appear either too much for a *Prince* his *Business*, or below his *Dignity*. Kingdoms are *Lost* for want of These *Early Providences*; these *Little Circumspctions*; but it costs more to *Recover* them. Nor (in effect) is the *Trouble* at all *Considerable*; for 'tis *here*, as 'twas with the *Tyrant*, that durst not *Sleep* for fear of having his *Throat cut*. A *Mathematician* comes to him, and tells him; That for so many *Talents* he'd secure him, and shew him such a *Secret*, that it should be impossible for any man so much as to design upon him without *Discovery*. The *Tyrant* was content; provided that he might be satisfied of the *Secret*, before he parted with his *Money*, and so takes the *Cunning-man* into his *Cabinet*. What was the *Secret*? But that he should give the fellow so much *Money*, & pretend that he had Taught it him. This *Sory* comes up to *Us*: The bare *O-*

pinion

He nuz & Seria
ducunt in mala.

pinion of a Prince his *Vigilance*, saves him the *Need* and *Trouble* of it: And Three or Four *Discoveries* in his whole *Raign*, shall gain him That *Opinion*.

Touching Those Abuses which Immediately relate to the *Publick*; (as concerning the *misconstruction* of *Lawyers*, &c.) they are usually couch'd under the *Salvo* of an *Ambiguity*. To prevent which Inconvenience, all Those *Distinctions* which in *Seditious* times have been made use of for the *Authorising*, or *Countenancing* of *Treason*, might be *summd up* and *Declar'd* *Treasonous* *Themselves*. Such I mean, as the **Co-ordinate Power of King, Lords, and Commons**, The **Litteral and Equitable Construction of Laws**. The **Person, and Authority of Princes**. *Singulis Major, Universis Minor, &c.* For sure it is not *Reascuable*, that the *Clear, and Sacred Rights of Kings*, should depend upon the *dubious, and Prophane Comments of the People*.

A way to prevent Treasonous Mistakes.

Concerning Grievances of a more Particular *Quality*; the Principal of them are *Injustice*, and *Delay*: the Former whereof, is purely the Fault of the *Judge*; the Other may, in some measure, and in some *Constitutions*, be imputed to a Defect in the *Law*. In This Case, the best way to prevent further *Mischief*, and satisfy for what is done *already*, is an *Impartial Severity* upon all Offenders as they are Detected: Especially, where Complaints are General, and the *Injustice* Notorious; for nothing less then a *Publick Example*, can amount to a *Publick Satisfaction*.

Sect. III.

How to Prevent, or Remedy Seditions arising from the Disorders of the COURT.

WE have in the Last Chapter, *Pag. 99.* (concerning *Seditions* which may possibly arise from a *Disorder'd Court*) stated what we intend by the *Court-Interest*. We have likewise Divided the *Evill-Instruments*, into such as either *Plot* *Mischief*, or *Occasion* it. We have again *Subdivided* the *Plotters* into *Three Parties*. The One whereof opposes the *Title of the Governour*; The Other, (as Directly) the *Form of the Government*: And there is a *Third Party*, that bring their

The Contrivers of Seditious are of Three Sorts.

their Ends about, by *Supplications, Vows, Fasting and Prayer*; by *Forms of Piety, and Reverence*: and finally; that with a *Hail Master* and a *Kiss, Betray* their *Soveraign*.

The Puritan. Concerning the *Two Formér*; More needs not be said, than that *Force* is to be *Repell'd* by *Force*: and That, the *Monarch* is suppos'd to have always in Readiness, for the Safety of the *Government*. The Other, is a *Serpentine*, and *Winding Party*; that *Steals*, and *Glides* into the very *Bosome* of a *Prince*, and Then it *Clipp*s and *Strangles* him. This is a *Faction* that Answers to our *Jesuited Puritan*.

Yet while I separate These Three, for *Perspiciuity of Method*; let me not be understood, as if they would not mingle in *Complication of Interest*: For nothing is more Notorious, than that in all *Commutations* upon pretext of *Conscience*, the *Religious Division* is still the *Receptacle* of all other *Disaffected Humours* whatsoever. He that's an *Artheist* to *Day*, becomes an *Enthusiast* to *Mcrow*; where a *Crown* is the *Prize*. Only I must confess, the *Presbyterian* playes the *Fast* and *Loose* of the *Device*, the best in the whole *World*. Let as many help him as will, 'tis *Liberty of Conscience* forsooth; but have a *Care* of the *Purity of the Gospell*, when they come to *share* with him. They may, if they please, (nay they shall be *Invited* to't) run the *hazards* of the *Course* with him; *Venture Neck, and Body*; over *Hedge and Ditch*; through *Thick and Thin*, but yet at last, the *Devill* a bit of the *Quarry*.

In fine; the *Plausible Contrivers* of *Sedition* (under what *Mask*-soever) are the *People* we aim at; and These are either In the *Counsell*, or Out of it. Sir *Francis Bacon* Divides the *Dangers* from Within the *Great Counsell*, into an *Over-greatness in One Counsellour*, or an *Over-strict Combination in Divers*. The Rest, we only look upon as *Their Dependencies*..

Pag. 71. We proceed from the *Direct Contrivance* of *Seditions*, to the more *Remote Occasions* of them. As *Corruption, Monopolizing; Non-payment of Debrs, &c.*—

This being the *Order*, into which we have dispos'd the *Causes of Seditions*; it will be suitable, that some *Degree* of *Method* be observ'd in the *Remedies*. But first, a word of *Introduction*.

We are to take for granted, that *Sedition* is a kind of *Clock-work*, and that the *Main Spring* of all *Rebellions* is *Ambition*.

bition. We may be again as *Confident*, that never any *One Monarchy* was destroy'd, but with design to set up *Another*. (The Talk of This or That *Form of Government*; or of This or That *Shape of Religion*, being no more then a Ball toss'd among the *People*, for the *Knaves* to keep the *Fools* in play with) It's Truth, that a *Sinking Monarchy* lapses into an *Aristocracy*; and That again into a *Popular State*. But what's the Reason of all This?

Does any man Imagine that the *Conspiratours* work for One another, or for Themselves? They Joyn in the Necessity of a *Common Assistance*; but they Divide in the Proposition of a *several Interest*. Who is he in the *Senate*, that had not rather Rule *Alone*, then in *Company*, if he could help it? To be short; where more then One *Govern*, 'tis because what *Every man Wishes*; no *Particular can effect*. (That is to Master the Rest. (Understand me only of Medlers to overthrow a *Government*.)

The next *Slide* from an *Aristocracy*, downward; comes a little clearer yet. Some of the *Craftiest* of Those that help'd the *Peers* to Cast off the *King*, are now as Busy with the *People* to throw off the *Nobility*: and Then, they are within one *Easie step*, of *Confusion*; from whence, the next *Change* brings him that can carry it from the Rest, to the *Sovereignty*. As arrant a *Mockery*, is *Religion*, in the Mouth of a *Conspiratour*.

Indeed it makes me smile sometime, to hear how Soberly Men will talk of the **Religion** of This or That *Faction*: as if a *Traytour*, or an *Hypocrite* were of *Any*. And then they cry, — This is against the **Principles** of the *Presbyterians*; and That against the **Principles** of the *Independents*: when (*Truly*, and *Shortly*) they are but Thus *Distinguished*; Those would subvert the *Government*, *One Way*; These, *Another*; And he that would rightly Understand them, must Read, for *Presbytery*, *ARISTOCRACY*; and *DEMOCRACY*, for *Independency*. I speak of the next *Consequence*, if they *Prevail*; not of the *Ultimate Design* of the *Chief Leaders*; for That's *Monarchy*) Wee'l drop ye a Little *Story* here.

' An Officer of the *Reformaton* advises with an Ingenious Surgeon of my Acquaintance, about a Grief, (as he pretended) caught with a *Streyn*. After divers Questions; how and how? The Surgeon tells his *Patient*, that (by his leave)

‘ the Trouble he complains of, can be no other, then (to
 ‘ Phrase it Modestly) a *Ladies Favour*. The good man
 ‘ blesses himself; and still it must be a *Strain*. *Why then a*
 ‘ *Stain let it be*: but This I’ll tell you Sir; *The Thing that*
 ‘ *Cures That Strain, will Cure the Pox*. In fine; the *Officer*
 ‘ *submits*, and the *Surgeon does his work*,

The Presbyte-
 rian has gotten
 a Strain.

This is the Case of the two *Factions*, They Cry out, of their
Consciences; but their Disease lyes somewhere else: and
Schism is cur’d, just as they cure Sedition.

A Ceremony
 may be as well
 impos’d as a
 Tax.

Nay; does it not behove a Prince, with the same strict-
 ness to require Submission to a Ceremony, as to a Tax? Or
 why may not a Justice as well refuse to Swear *Obedience*, to
 the *Civil Government*, as a Minister to the *Ecclesiastick*?
 What can be more reasonable, than for a *Master* either to
Punish, or *dismiss* an *undutifull Servant*? Briefly, *That Mo-*
narch that would be safe, must resolve to be Deaf to These Reli-
gious Clamours. Alas! let but the *Ministers Begin*; the *Peo-*
ple Bawle in Course: not that they are *Troubled*; but they’ll
 do’t in *Rudeness*, or *Imitation*. They are as arrantly *Taught*
 to do’t, as a *Friend of mine Taught his Beagles*. Let him
Gape first, and the whole *Kennell falls to howling*: Let him give
 off, they are quiet too: and just Thus stands the Case, betwixt
 the *Schismatical Clergy*, and the *Multitude*.

But (it will be said) *what’s all this to the Court? Or to Se-*
ditions, thence proceeding?

Oh very much. These *Out-cryes* of the *Vulgar*, are but
False Alarms: The *Dint* is nearer hand. They have their
Demagogues, and their *Patrons*; (as the late *Glorious King*,
 and *Martyr* calls them) and if a Prince look well about him,
 in such a juncture as is here mention’d; ’tis odds, he finds
 some of their Principals, even at his Ear, or Elbow. So
 that his first *Concern* is to *Inspect*, and *Purge* (where he sees
 Cause) his *Royall Palace*, Beginning with his *Counsell*. Where
 (as *Sir Francis Bacon*) the *Danger* is either, the *Over-great-*
ness of One; or the *Combination* of *Divers*: Which *Dangers*
 we shall *Obviate* with their *Remedies*, in *Order*.

Subsection. I.

The Remedies of certain Hazards arising from the Overgreatness of One COUNSELLOR.

ONE Over-great Counsellor may be *Dangerous*; First, In respect of *His Particular Temper and Inclination*: Secondly, In regard of *His Credit with his Master*: And lastly, In Consideration of the *Influence of that Power, and Inclination upon the People*.

The Over-great Counsellor we here Treat of, is as the *Malus Genius* of a Nation: And in Two Words, behold the Ground and Summe of the Whole Mischief. 'Tis either *Vice or Weakness*, apply'd to the *Dishonour or Damage* of a Prince and People.

Now to the Application of That *Vice*, or *Weakness*. And first, What *ill use* may be made of the One, and what *ill effects* may proceed from the Other, by vertue of his *Credit with his Master*.

If He be *Ambitious*, He's plac'd upon the very Point for *Popularity*. Whom can he not *Oblige*, by *Hopes, Rewards, Preferments*? Whose *Tongue* cannot he *Charm*, either to *Speech or Silence*? Whose *Reputation, Suit, Fortune*; nay in some Cases, whose very *Life* it self, and *Liberty*, are not dependent upon his *Favour*? If this *Aspiring Humour* be accompanied with a *Sharpness of Judging*; a *Felicity of Contriving*; and an *Impulse of Enterprizing*: The Master of such a *Servant* should do well to Look about him.

Ambition dangerous in a Favourite.

It may be Reply'd, That doubtless so he would, if he saw any Reason to apprehend his Abuse of that Power; But the Knowledge of the Person, does sufficiently warrant the Reason of the Dispensation. To which, we answer; That though *Sovereign Princes* are not Accountable to Others, yet They are to Themselves; both for the *Expedience and Equity* of their Actions: And entring into their own Souls, it is very possible, that they may discover some *Incongruities* betwixt their Affections, and their Convenience. Some *Incongruities* I say; and such, as may Induce the wisest Prince, and the most Indulgent Master; even toward the most Loyal and Meriting

Servant,

A Caution.

Servant, to limit the *Graces* of his *Inclination*, to the *Rules* and *Respects* of his *Office*; and to be wary, lest while He *Divide his Heart* with his *Friend*, he share also his *Authority* with his *Subject*: Therein, both *Endangering Himself*, and *Grieving his People*.

To Conclude; *It is great Prudence in Publike Affairs*, to commit little to *Hazard*; and it is no small *Hazard*, to *Expose a Favourite* to strong *Temptations*.

Where there are *Servants* that will employ their *Masters Bounty* against *Himself*; (and of such only we speak) If the *Design* be to *supplant the Sovereign*, many *Remedies* may be found out, to *frustrate That Ambition*. Nay (as I have already hinted) whether there be such a *Design*, or not; 'tis good to provide against the very *Possibility* of it. For, it is siter, that the *Publike* should be *Indebted* for its well-being, to the *Care of the Prince*, than to the *Honesty of the Favourite*.

Ambition does better in a Souldier, then in a Counsellor.

Ambitious Natures do better in the *Field*, than in the *Court*; and better yet *Abroad*, than at *Home*. If they *Advance*, they grow *Dangerous* for their *Power*; if they receive a *Check*, they become so for their *Malice*: Whence it comes to pass, that we see few *Seditions* without a *Malecontent* of *This Quality*, in the *Head* of them. These are a sort of *People*, of whom a *Prince* cannot be too wary. But we are here to provide against the *Ambition* of a *Person Rais'd by Favour*, not *Aspiring*; and from such a *One*, the *Peril* is greater, by reason of the *means* he has, both to *compass* his *Ends*, and to *Disguise* them.

Sir Francis Bacon proposes the *Mating of One Ambitious Person* with *Another*; and in *Extremities*, the *Puzzling* of him, with an *Enterchange of Favours*, and *Disgraces*, that he may not know what to *Expect*. Courses, no doubt, *advisable*, to put an *Insolent Favourite* to a stand; if it may be as *Safe* to *Disoblige* him, without *Disarming* him: but that depends much upon the *Complexion* of the *Person*, according as he is *Bold* or *Fearful*.

It is the Interest of a Prince to dispose of Offices by Particular Direction.

There is not any thing which more *Fertifies* and *Establishest* a *Monarch*, than the *Disposal* of all *Offices*, and *Charges* of *Trust*, by his *particular Choice* and *Direction*, without the *Interpose* of any *Publike Recommendation*: Nor can he *Transfer That Care* to his *Great Counsellor*, without a great share of his

his Power. And here's the *Difference*; the *One* way they are the *Honourable Dependencies* of the *Prince*; and the *Other* way, they are the *suspected Creatures* of the *Favourite*; who by *This Indulgence*, makes *One Party* at *Present*, and *Another* in *Expectation*.

A Wariness in *This Particular*, breaks the *Neck* of his *Design*.

It is good also for a *Prince Fairly*, and *Publikely* to *Refuse* him *some Requests*, and where the *Suit* is too bold, to *Check* Him for *Others*: That the *World* may see, that there are *Some things* which he cannot obtain; and *Others*, which he must not *Dare* to *Ask*. Whereas, if He carries all without *Reserve*, the *Majesty* of the *Sovereign* is lost in the *Power* of the *Favourite*. The *Advice* of *King Charles*, the *Martyr*, to His *Sacred Majesty* now in *Being*, shall put an *End* to *This Point*.

Never repose so much upon any man's single Counsel, Fidelity, and Discretion, in managing Affairs of the First Magnitude (that is, Matters of Religion, and Justice) as to Create in your self or others, a Diffidence of your own Judgment, which is likely to be always more Constant, and Impartiall to the Interests of the Crown and Kingdom, than any mans.

Eliz Bask.
Pag. 240.

This may suffice to Prevent a dangerous Over-greatness: How to crush it; (as in case of a bold, and manifest Transgression of Duty, and Violation of Law) Something like an *English Parliament* does it best; and much better to be promoted by the *People*, than by the *Sovereign*.

A *Second Danger* is, when a *Prime Minister* employs his *Credit* to uphold a *Faction*: and it is the more Dangerous, by the hardness to know what it is. As whether it be *Ambition*, *Corruption*, *Popularity*: Or in fine, some other *Secret Interest*. It may be, they have need of One-another.

The Danger of
a Favourite
that upholds
Faction.

Nothing can be more perillous then *This Correspondence*, when a proper Instrument has the manage of it. Oh how he Detects the *Faction*! But yet Truly, in such and such Cases; and for such and such Persons; and upon This or That Nick
of

And manage
of his Design.

of Time, if Matters were Order'd So and So. And Then, the Insolence of a Schism is Palliated with the Simplicity of a Scruple : And for such Cases as will bear no other Plea, is found out the Colour of an Indisputable Necessity. Not to prosecute the several Artifices, by which some Truths are Disguised, others Suppress'd : Those Suits Promoted ; These Complaints Smother'd : And finally ; by which, both Men and Things are quite misrepresented.

Sir F. Bacon.

Kings cannot possibly see all Things with their own Eyes, nor hear all Things with their own Ears ; so that they must commit many great Trusts to their Ministers.] The Hazard then is Great, when the Confident of the Monarch is the Advocate for the Enemies of the State. But above all, if he be Surly and Imperious to the Try'd Servants of the Crown : That looks like a Design, to Introduce one Party to Betray the Prince, and to Discourage or disable Another from serving him.

We are here upon a Supposition, That a Master may be mistaken in a Servant ; and that a Servant may abuse his Credit with his Master. In case This be ; What Remedy ?

Supposing the Favourite still in Credit, we must Imagine the Sovereign still in the Mistake ; and therefore not expect a Remedy as to the Person, but rather fetch Relief from some General Rules of Government : which shall neither disoblige the Favourite, if he be Honest ; nor expose the Prince, if He be Other : But this is better done at the Beginning of a Kings Reign, than in the Middle of it ; better upon Judgment of State, than Urgency of Occasion.

The certain Help is a fit Choice of Officers and Servants. Especially in such Places as have Numerous Dependencies ; for otherwise, Three or Four Persons Leaven the Court ; half a Dozen more the Souldiery ; and in Conclusion, a great Favourite, with a few select Instruments of his own making, may, at his Pleasure, seize the Government. This was the Rise of the Second Race of Kings in France.

Yet God forbid, that Princes should make Themselves, and their Privadoes, miserable, by Eternal, Causeless, and Unquenchable Jealousies : That Kings should be Debarr'd That Blessing and Relief, without which, Life's a Plague, and Royalty a Burthen. That is, the Use and Comfort of a Friend ; [to whom (as the Oraculous St. Albans) He may Impart his Griefs, Joys, Fears, Hopes, Suspicions, Counsels, and whatsoever

How to disappoint an Ambitious Design.

Favourites necessary to the Prince.

ever lies upon his Heart, to oppress it ; in a kind of Civill Shrift, or Confession :] and from whence, (with the same Author) he may reap, [Peace of affections, and support of Judgment.]

Nay, take the *Subjeſt's* Interest in too ; what can be more And desirable
Desirable, then for a *Prince* to have a *Watchfull, Wiſe, Faith-* to the People.
full Counſellour ; and the *People*, a *Firm Prudent Patriote* , in
the same *Noble Perſon* ? Accurſed be the man that envies ei-
ther. Yet Here's a *Line* ſtill drawn betwixt *Majeſty* and
Kindneſs ; which the *One* cannot paſs, without *Diminution*,
nor the *Other* tranſgreſs without *Preſumption*. In fine ; the
Right of Placing, or *Diſplacing Officers*, lies on the *Kings ſide*
of the *Chalk*, and falls under the *Head of Reward* or *Puniſh-*
ment.

King *James* in the ſecond Book of his βαπλικὸν Δῶρον, de-
livers Excellent *Adviſes* to Prince *Henry*, concerning the
Choice of Servants.

First, See that they be of a *Good Fame*, and without Concerning
Blemiſh. the Choice of
Servants.

Next, See that they be *Indued with ſuch honeſt Qua-*
lities, as are meet for ſuch *Offices* as ye ordain them to Let them be
ſerve in ; that your *Judgment* may be known in *Employ-* Honeſt and
ing every man according to his *Guiſts*. Fit.

Thirdly, I Charge you, according to my *Fatherly Au-*
thority, to preſerr Specially to your *Service*, ſo many as Of approved
have truly ſerved Me, and are able for it. — For if the Loyalty to the
Haters of your *Parents* cannot Love you, it follows of Ne- Father.
ceſſity, that their *Lovers* muſt Love you.

Chuſe your *Servants* for your own *Uſes*, and not for the Nor upon Re-
Uſe of Others : and hearken not to *Recommendati-* commendati-
ons, more for ſerving in effect, their *Friends* that put tion.
them in, then their *Maſters* that admit them.

Eſpecially take good heed to the choice of your *Ser-* Publick Na-
vants, that you preſerr to the *Offices* of the *Crown* and tures for Pub-
Eſtate : for in other *Offices*, ye have only to take heed to lick Places.
your own *Weal*, but theſe concern likewise the *Weal* of
your *People* ; for the which, ye muſt be *Answerable* to
God. Be carefull to Prefer none, as ye will be answerable
to God, but for their *worthineſs*.

Not *One* to all
Purposes.

Employ every man as ye think him Qualifi'd; but Use not one in all Things, lest he wax Proud, and be Envy'd by his Fellows.

These were the Directions of a Prince, than whom no Man spake more upon Experience: and very hardly shall a Sovereign that takes This Course, even upon any Account, Mis-
carry.

Let a Prince
set his Confi-
dent his
Bounds afore-
hand.

Another Profitable Course might be for a Prince to set his Favourite his Bounds, afore-hand. As for the Purpose; that in such and such Particulars, concerning Law, and Religion, or wherein his Peculiar Interest is concern'd; he never presume to move him above Once; and that in certain Other Cases, he presume not to move him at all. By these means, the Favourite is minded of his Duty, the Prince of his Dignity: and both secur'd; the One from the Hazard of Granting too much; the Other from the Temptation of Asking it. So far from being Impracticable, is This Proposition; that on the contrary, 'tis Obvious and Easie. As for Instance.

In Points of
Conscience,
Honour, and
Convenience,
let not a Fa-
vourite press
the Sovereign.

There are some things which a King cannot Grant as a Christian; Others, which he cannot Grant as a King: and some again, which he cannot Grant as a Wise man. So that Reserving to himself, a Freedom (even from Sollicitation) in These Niceties of Conscience, Honour, and Convenience; the Favourite may make his Best of the Rest. The Relation betwixt a Governour, and his People, is like That of Man, and Wife: A man may take his Friend into his Arms, but not into his Bed. To make an end of This; That Favourite that presses his Master to any thing which evidently exposes him, to Contempt or Hatred, does probably Design his Ruin.

To run through the whole Body of Humane Frailties, would be too Tedious; Let it suffice, that Those Vices (whether Devillish, or Bruiish) which in a Private man, are Mischievous, or Shamefull, are much more so in a Person armed with Power to Execute the Malice, and qualified with an Eminence, to Recommend a lewd Example.

Where a Great Trust is committed to a Weak Person; It matters not much to the Publick, whether he be True, or False: for Futility, in him, has the Effect of Treachery in another: The One Blabs his Masters Secrets, and the Other Betrayes them. The

The *Third Hazard* from the *Over-greatness* of One *Counselour*, arises from the Influence of his *Power*, and *Inclination* upon the *People* : And *That*, either as to their *Love*, or *Hatred*. The *Popular Part* we have already done with : (that is, so far as it concerns the making of a *Party* to *Himself* ; and the *Remedies* of *That Danger*) That which remains, shall be divided into *Pride*, *Coveteousness*, and *Misadvise*.

The Danger of
Over-greatness
as to the
People.

It is seldom seen, that a *Proud* man in *Power*, is not withall *Insolent*, *Vain*, and *Cruell*. The first to his *Superiours*, where they will suffer it. The next to his *Equalls*, till they are sick of it. and the Third, to his *Inferiours*, till he is *Hated* for it.

A Proud man
in Power.

A Favourite of this Temper, makes it his *Glory* to be thought the *Dictatour* to his Master : *Disputing*, *Excusing*, *Cavilling*, upon *Mandates* and *Directions*, (as Sir Francis Bacon) His style, is *Ego & Rex Mens* ; and the Consequence of this boldness is to lessen the *Sovereign* in the Eyes of his *Subjects*.

It is harder for a Prince to *Discover* this *Audacious Humour*, then to *Crush* it ; let but the King withdraw his Favour for one Moment, and of himself, he falls below the Scorn of those he lately Trampled on.

Easily crush'd.

If he be *Covetous* ; The *Person* of the Prince, and the *Honour* of the Nation are expos'd to *Sale* : and the People squeezed to fill his *Coffers*, till they have not Bread left for their own Bellies.

A Covetous
Great man.

We here suppose the *Worst* ; add yet even these *Extremities*, are not quite *Deploable*, and *Helpless*. *Sponges* will *Spue*, as well as *Suck* ; and 'tis but the *Monarch's* sending of the *Popular Assembly* in quest of the *Publick Treasure*, to fetch it up again.

Now whence proceeds this *Mischief*, but from *Misadvise* ? not want of *Prudence*, but of *Enformation* : or which is worse, from *Tales* fram'd to the *Passion*, and *Advantage* of the Teller. He's made an Enemy to the State, that's not a Friend to this or that Design. *Dangers* are Pretended, where there are none ; and *Security*, where there are : And (which is the Curse of these *Ill-Offices*) the *Wise*st, and the *Brave*st of Princes, are subjected to *Delusion*, and *Surprize*, in Common with their *Contraries*. Could *Solomon's Wisdom* tell him which of the *Two Harlots* was the *Mother* of the *Child*,

The Mischief
of False In-
telligence.

Good Advice
ca Coun-
sellor.

without a further means of *Decision*? Or Could *Cæsar's* Courage oppose the Fate of the *Senate*? In Matters of Fact, *Princes*, as well as *Others*, are to be Instructed by *Report*; and if from a Person whom they have Reason to believe, they receive notice of a Matter whereupon they have not Time to *Deliberate*; their Proceedings are to be directed by the fairest appearance of that *Relation*. In fine, if a *Servant* will betray his *Master*, there's no avoiding it, for he must trust somebody. [Remember well saies Sir Francis Bacon in a Letter of Advice to the late Duke of *Buckingham*) the great trust you have undertaken; you are as a Continual Centinell, alwaies to stand upon your Watch, to give him (the King) True Intelligence. If you Flatter him, you betray him; If you Conceal the Truth of those things from him which concern his Justice, or his Honour, (although not the safety of his Person) you are as dangerous a Traytor to his State, as he that rises in Arms against him.]

If such as only withdraw their *Allegiance* from their Prince, are so Criminal; how much are they to blame then, that, where his *Conscience*, *Life*, and *Dignity*, lie all at stake, abuse, and mispossess him! That cry; Not that way Sir, for the Lord's sake, go this way rather! and so betray him, from his Guards into an Ambush.

Prudence pro-
vides for the
worst.

But *Centaur's* are scarce more *Monstrous* in Nature, then these men are, in *Manners*; and I may seem perhaps very hard driven for want of work, to employ my time in searching out of Remedies, for *Mischiefs* so *Improbable*. Truly his Concept, that imputes the Omission of a Law against *Paricides*, to a Presumption that the Crime would never be committed, does not at all divert me from believing, that *Prudence* is to provide for the Worst: and nothing left to Chance, that may be secur'd by Counsell. Wherefore, I proceed to my *Prevention*.

Since the only Certainty of what is *Done*, or *Said*, comes from the *Eye*, or *Ear*; and that the *Sovereign* cannot be every where; so that he must either give Credit to *Relation*; or know nothing of Affairs at a *Distance*; let us Consider, by what means a Prince may most probably escape the Snares of a *Mis-enformer*.

To advise upon the Choice of the *Instrument*; is but to say, Chuse an *Honest man*, and he'll not betray you: And not
to

to let any man deceive you twice, is but the *After-game* of *Wisdom*; for the *First Error* may be *Fatall*. We must look out some other Course then, and a better I know none, then a *Strict Justice*, and *Severity*, of *Reward*, and *Punishment*. A *False Intelligencer* is as bad as a *Spy*. Wherefore, let a Prince suppress *Calumnies*, and encourage *Accusations*, that he may not take his *Friends* for his *Enemies*, and his *Enemies* for his *Friends*. What can be a greater Injury to the *Sovereign's Honour*, then by a false Story, to cause him *Love* where he should almost *Hate*, and *Hate* where he should *Love*? Punish where he should *Reward*, and *Reward* where he should *Punish*? It breaks the Heart of *Loyalty*, this sad Mistake, and strengthens the Hands of *Treason*. Who would dare to put these Affronts upon *Majesty*, and *Innocence*, if upon *Detection*, the *Scandall* were made as dangerous to the *Reporter*, as the *Consequence* to the *Sufferer*? And This we take for a sufficient Mean, to keep *Malitious Buzes* from the *Ears* of *Princes*.

Reward and
Punishment
keep People
in Order.

But This is but the work *half-done*; for there are certain *Truths* as Necessary to be Told, as are these *Calumnies* to be Conceal'd; and where the Undertaker of the *Office*, runs a far greater *Risque* to serve his Prince, then the Other does to Ruin him. These *Offices* are discharg'd, by *Mercenary Persons*, for *Reward*; and by the *Worthier Sort*, for *Reverence-Sake*, and *Duty*. So that betwixt the *Fear* of *Punishment*, the *Hope* of *Benefit*, and the rare *Integrity* of Those that stand firm without considering *Either*; a Prince may easily secure himself of *Good Advise*, and *Right Intelligence*; and That, (at least within himself) amply suffices to his *Establishment*.

Honest Truths
are Dangerous

That *Kings* are *Men*; who Doubts? And 'tis as much *Their Duty* to Remember it, as 'tis *Their Subjects*, not to be too Prying into the *Slips* of their *Humanity*. Their *Clergy* are to *Prescribe* to their *Souls*; Their *Physicians*, to their *Bodies*; and their *Counsellours* are to *Advise* in Point of *Government*: But 'tis within the Pale of every *Private Man's Commission*, to offer his *Intelligence*. As for Example; Suppose a *Counsellour of State* denies the *Kings Supremacy*. Shall it be counted *Sawciness* in a *Particular Person* to acquaint the *Monarch* with it? We'll make an end with this. That *State* is in an ill Condition, where he that would save his Prince, must ruin himself: and where One Party is bolder to do the *King Mischief*,
then

A Case put.

then the Other is to do him Good. It is now high time to take another Step ; and we'll stay but a Moment upon it.

Subsection II.

How to frustrate a Combination of Divers Counsellors.

THE Danger of a *Combination in Divers Counsellors*, are, in Respect of their *Power and Priviledges* ; their *Credit*, their *Dependencies*, (either by *Office or Expectation*) Their *Opportunities of Concealing or Protecting their Friends*. And finally, in Respect of their *Intelligence* betwixt the *State*, and the *Faction*.

This *Confederacy* is so liable to be *Discover'd*, so dangerous to be *Suffer'd*, and so easie to be *disorder'd*, that it is scarce worth the while, to speak to so *Manifest* an *Inconvenience*. In little ; if they are not *Removed* as they are found *Faulty* ; *Disgrac'd*, as they appear *Bold* ; or *Secluded* from such *Consultations* as probably concern the *Difference in Question* : It will be a hard matter for a *Prince* to struggle with a *Faction* that is assisted by so many *Advantages*. If it were nothing else but the meer point of *Intelligence* ; it were enough to *Endanger* the *Crown* ; to have a *Faction* privy to all the *Counsells*, *Resolves*, *Deliberations*, and *Necessities* of the *Monarch*.

The Lower
Region of the
Court.

In the *Lower Region* of the *Court*, we have supposed *Three* sorts of People, that may Occasion *Great Inconveniences* : to wit ; *Insatiate Beggars* ; *Corrupt Officers* ; and *Ill Paymasters*, I might have added *two more* ; that is, Men of *Ill Lives*, and of *Ill Principles*. The *First* of these *Five* ; I thought to have plac'd in the *Upper Division* ; but it Commonly belongs to *Both* ; only *These Beg oftner* ; the *Other more* : and to speak the truth of the business, where this trade is in *Fashion*, it may be observ'd, that there are not above *Four or Five Beggars in Chief*, and the *Rest Beg under them* ; as it falls out sometime in *Popular Representatives* ; *A few Get up*, and the *Rest Truckle*.

Four or Five
Beggars in
Chief.

Where *This Humour* is much *Indulg'd*, the *Consequence* of it, is not only *Faction*, within the *Walls*, but a *General Discontentment*, and *Necessity* throughout the *Nation* : For when the *Ordinary ways* of *Profit* are dispos'd of, *Recourse* is had

to *Project*, and *Invention* ; which, if not very tenderly managed, leaves the *King a sad Loser at the Foot of the Accompt.* Beside, that it *Anticipates* the Prince his *Generosity*, and by *Exacting*, rather than *Obtaining*, takes away the *Freedom* of his *Choice*, and *Bounty*.

The way for a Prince to *Help This*, is either to put a *Stint* upon the *Suitour*, or a *Restraint* upon his *Proper Goodness* ; and even where he is *Resolved to Give*, not to do it *so dainly* ; lest he appear to *Give* for the *Asking*, without *considering the Merit*, (*Harry the Great*, of *France*, prohibited *Begging beyond such a Limit*).

Let him farther have a *Particular care* of Persons that grow *Proud* upon his *Favours* : The same *weakness of mind* that makes them *Proud*, will quickly make them *Sawcy* too : and the reason is, *they think they have got the better of him*.

Corrupt Officers are Another *Pest* of a *Court*, and *Bane* of a *State* : unless *timely* look'd after ; and *Then*, the *Publike* may be the *Better* for them. And 'tis no ill *Policy* in some *Cases*, to let *Them Squeeze for a while*, that they may be worth the *Squeezing Themselves* : for *no Supply is more acceptable to the Generality*, than *That which is Levy'd upon their Oppressors*. Corrupt Officers a General Pest.
An Excellent way of Raising Moneys.

The miserable *Consequence* of *Ill-Payment*, we have briefly touch'd upon, *Pag. 114.* The Reason of *Ill-Payment* is commonly *Ill-Pay* ; and *Many* must needs get *Nothing*, when a *Few* get *All* : from which *vast Inequality*, arise *Factions* and *Want*. The best *Remedy* for This *Evil*, is, *first to Enable Them to Pay*, and *then to leave them to the Law* if they *Refuse*. For *Protections* are only so far *Necessary* to the *Dignity* of a *Court*, as they *consist* with the *Peace* and *Justice* of a *Nation* : that the *Priviledge* appear not an *Affront* to the *Law*. Ill-pay the reason of Ill-payment.

When a *Court Pays Ill*, it had need *Live Well* ; for when *People are Poor*, they grow *Conscientious* ; and for want of *Money* apply themselves to hearken after *Religion* : The *Seriousness* of all *Reformers* being a *Necessitous Multitude*. Especially, let them abstain from *Costly Sins* ; for to *Expend much*, and *Pay Nothing*, is a most *distastful Incongruity*. Want of Money makes People Religious.

We come now to that *Canker* of the *Government*, under the *Shadow* of the *Governour* : the *Ill-Principled Courtier* : who not only *causes Sedition*, but is *Himself* the very *Tincture* of it. You must Expect to see all look *Pale* and *Wither'd*, where The Ill-principled Courtier.
This

This *Worm* lies sucking at the *Root*. Can a *Prince* be *safe*, that's *serv'd* by his *Enemies*? Or a *People* *Happy* when the *Soul* of the *Publike* is in *Danger*? Yet, in some *Cases*, there may be *Reason of State*; and *That* known only to the *Sovereign*, for which some *Persons*, in *Exception* to This *General Rule*, may be *admitted*. Saving Those very *Individuals*, it may behove the *Prince* not to let any one of the *Rest* escape, without a *Strict Enquiry*; both by *what Means*, and to *what likely End* they are There *Plac'd* and *Entertain'd*. Which if he does, and *Early* too; before the *whole Lump* has taken the *Leaven*; 'tis more than an *Even Lay*, that he'll find *Reason* to *Remove* Them. Now to the *Camp*.

SECT. IV.

How to Prevent Disorders arising from the CAMP.

Dangers from
the Camp.

THE Dangers from the *Camp*, are Principally these Three; *Mutiny*, *Revolt*, or *Popular Risings*, (provoked by the *Oppression* or *Insolence* of the *Souldiery*) Of These, in their *Order*.

How Mutinies
may be caused.

Mutinies may be Caus'd by *Want of Pay*; some defect of *Discipline*; by *New-Modelling*; *Disbanding*; *Disgrace*, &c. And all These *Disorders* may be procur'd by the *Artifice* of some particular *Persons* that aim at an *Advantage* by them.

That *Prince* that *Raises* an *Army* which he cannot *Pay Himself*, raises it (in effect) for some body else that *can*. In short, a very great *Hazard* it is, to have the *Souldiery* *Dependent* upon any *Other Interest* then That of the *Monarch*. Where it so falls out, that a *Prince* lies subjected to the *Double Inconvenience*, both of having an *Army*, and of *Wanting Money*; Let him be sure of a most *Exquisite Choice* of *Officers*, both for *Honesty*, and *Ability*: That the *Body* likewise may be *well Chosen*, and *well Govern'd*. For he has enough to do, that undertakes to keep his *Troops* in *Order*, without *Pay*; but if they want *Affection* too, the *Point* is *Desperate*. This is the *Nick of Danger*, and *Temptation*; for a *Necessitous Army*, of This *Mixture*, is any man's *Money* that will

will offer for it: Wherefore in such a Juncture, a *Monarch* cannot be too *wary*, of all *Popular* and *suspected Practices*. Let him be *sparing* also, even in his *Personall*, and *Private Expenses*, at such a time as This: For *Military Spirits* are apter to take fire then *Other People*; and so distrust the *Kindness* of their *Master*, if they observe that he has *Money* for his *Pleasures*, and *none* for his *Servants*. An *Observation*, possibly neither *Fit*, nor *True*: However, when men are *discontented*, they look upon *small kindneses* as *Nothing*, and they see *Injuries Double*.

The next hazard is, upon the Point of *Discipline*; which, in an *unpaid Army*, can very hardly be *Preserv'd*, but by the *Exceeding Worthiness*, and *Prudence* of the *Officers*. Nor by That neither, beyond their *Interest* and *Credit of Persuading*: for *Punishment* were *Tyranny* without *Wages*. Good Pay will bear good Discipline.

The *New-Modelling* of an *Army* is also a *tickle Undertaking*: and so is the *Disbanding*. The *Former* is the *sharper Disobligation*; but 'tis but *Personall*: The *Latter* is the more *Dangerous*, for it *Destroys* the *Trade*: And the *Perill* is either from the *Influence* of some *Chief Officers* in the *One*; or from a *Disposition* common to all *Military*, as well as *Naturall bodies*, in the *Other*: that is, an *Averseness* to *Dissolution*. Both the *One* and the *Other*, are a work to be *dispatch'd* with as *much Care*, and with as *little Noise*, as possible: very *Tenderly*, and by *Degrees*. Modelling and Disbanding are dangerous.

If any *Trouble* be *Apprehended* from the *Displacing* of some *Particulars*, (as he may possibly resent the *Loss* of *Power*; or the *Disgrace* of being *singled out* to lose it after such a *Manner*) 'tis but *Calting out* to him the *Lure* of a *Better Office*, or of a *Higher Preferment*: wherein he may be *more Serviceable* to himself, and *less Dangerous* to the *Publick*. Or if he be too *Crafty*; to stoop to *That*; the way is to begin with his *Dependencies*. This leaves him *Naked*; and the *Other Satisfied*: At least in *show*, since to the *World* he appears rather *Exalted*, then *Ejected*. How to New-model an Army.

Disbanding is a *Nicer piece of business*: The very *Word* is scarce to be *Mention'd*, till the *Thing* is *Done*. For 'though the *State* may be *Judge* when 'tis *Convenient* to *Raise an Army*; the *Souldiery* are commonly the *Judges* when 'tis time to How to Disband.

lay it down again. A Good Preparatory to This, is *Modelling*, and *Dispersing*, before they have the wind of the Design to prevent their uniting against it. And by *Degrees*; *One Regiment at a time*; to keep the Rest *Quiet*, in hope of *Continuing*. Let That be done by Lot too, for the *Losing Party* will sooner forgive a *Mischance*, then an *Unkindness*. Touching *Mutines* that proceed either from opinion of *Disgrace*; dispute concerning *Precedency*, *Command*, *Provision*, *Quarter*, &c. they may be referr'd to want of *Discipline*.

The Causes of Revolts.

The Causes of *Revolts*, may be as many as of *Discontents*. But the *Principal*, are either *Fear*, *Despair*, *Revenge*, or *Inconstancy* in the *Common-Souldiery*. And they may likewise be Procur'd, either by the *Ambition*, or *Corruption* of the *Chief Officers*.

A good Choice is the best Security against a Revolt.

The best *Security* against These *General Defections*, is in the *Original Election*, and *Constitution* of the *Army*. Wherefore let heed be taken (as near as may be) even to the *fitness* of the *meanest Private Souldiour*: which in a fair degree may be attain'd, by good choice of *Valiant*, *Prudent*, *Vigilant*, and *Faithfull Officers*. Why should a *Kingdom* be hazarded for a *Trifle*? How small a matter added to either side carries an *Equall Balance*! A *Word*, a *Thought*, an *Imagination*, a *Mistake* turns the *Fortune of the Day*, and *Decides the Battell*. Is any thing more ordinary then a *Panique Terrour*, in a *Croud of People*? which, as Mr. *Hobbs* hints in his *Leviathan*; is only an *Apprehension of Danger*, in the first man that *Runs*; the Rest, *Fearing*, and *Running* by example, every man supposing his Fellow to know why. At This Rate, *Ten Carrs may destroy Twenty Thousand Valiant men*.

Against *Despair*; Arguments are best upon the *Place*: *Revenge* may be *Prevented* by a *Generous*, and *Military Severity*. So that they shall neither have any *Provocation* to the *Attempt*, nor *Security* in the *Execution*: But against Their *Inconstancy* there is no *Remedy*.

The mischieves which may arrive upon the account of *Ambition*, or *Corruption*, are scarce to be *Prevented*, but by chusing Persons of an *Impregnable Fidelity*; or Otherwise the *Fairest Bidder* carries it. And against *Popular Risings*, nothing better then a *Strict Discipline*; and an *Impartial Justice* betwixt the *Souldiery* and the *Country*. It does well also, to Interest *Both Parties*, (*Civill*, and *Military*) as fairly as possible, in the

the Common Care of the *Publick*: For a *Pure Military Force* has the Face rather of an *Enemy*, then of a *Guard*: But where Persons of *Eminent Repute*, and *Integrity* in the Country are joyned in *Commission* with others as *Eminent for Martial Affaires*, *Both sides are satisfi'd*, and the *Common Good* better provided for.

Sect. V.

How to Prevent, or Remedy Seditions arising from the
C I T Y.

WHERE the *Metropolis* is not well *Season'd*, and in good Order, *Many*, and *Great* are the *Advantages* it has to Disturbe a Government. It has *Men*, *Mony*, and *Armes* always at hand. But yet let a *Prince*, in his *Greatest Distress*, have a Care how he *Abandons* it; for 'tis by much a more dangerous *Enemy* at a *Distance*, then at *Home*.

The Danger of an Ill-order'd City.

The Ordinary *Pretenses* of a *Troubled City*, are either concerning *Religion*, *Oppression*, *Privileges*, or *Poverty*, but still 'tis *Ambition* that sets the *Wheel* going; and it is the *Monarch's* yielding at first, that destroys him in the *End*. For while the *Party* is *Tender*, and *Wavering*; the *Humour* *Corrigible*, and the *Authority* of the *Prince*, not as yet either exposed by *Patience*, or *Prophan'd* by *Popular Contempt*, and the *Insolencies* of the *Rabble*; Then is the time, to cut off all Possibility of *Sedition*. *Murmurings* are but the *Smoke* of *Rebellion*; the *Fire's* already in the *Straw*, but easily smother'd: That is, if seasonably look'd after: for if it break forth into a *Blaze*, All the *Buckets* in the *Town* will hardly *Quench* it. The very first *Mutterings* against the *Government*, are but a pretty way of putting the *Question*; as who should say, *Sir, May we Rebel?* And the *Forbearance* of the *Prince*, seems to *Answer* them: *Yes; Ye may.* And *Then*, to work they go.

First, upon *Religion*: the most *Dangerous*, and the most wicked *Quarrell* in Nature. *Is there a God?* Or, *Is there none?* Let any *Reasonable* *Rebell*, whether *Artheistick*, or *Religious*, answer me. *If a God there be*; Upon what *Nation* will he power out the *fierceness* of his *Wrath*; Upon what *Heads* will he employ his *Thunder*? If not upon *That Nation*, where his *Divinity* is made a *Stale*; His *Majesty* *Affronted* in

Pretext of Religion is a dangerous and wicked Quarrel. Is there a God?

all his *Attributes*: And upon *Those Heads*, that entitle the *Basest of Corruptions* to his *Immaculate Purity*; and the *Dilates* of the *Devill*, to the *Inspirations* of the *Blessed Spirit*.

Or is there
None?

Now to *Those* that say in their Heart, *There is no God*: They'l yet allow the *Political Convenience* of persuading the *People* otherwise. So that where This *Freedom* in Matters of *Religion* is permitted to the *Multitude*: Either the *Abuse* draws down a *Vengeance* from *Heaven*, or the *Superstitious League* among the *People* unites a *Party* against the *Sovereign*.

All Seditions
proceed from
Misgovern-
ment.

To deal frankly; *All Seditions* are to be imputed to *Misgovernment*: To the want of *Early Care* in the *Magistrate*. *One Man* begins; *He Imparts* himself to *Others*; *They Conferr* with *Their Interests*, and so the *Mischief Branches* it self, till it comes to *Overspread* a *Nation*. How *easie* a matter is it, to *Smother* a *Spark* in the *Tinder-Box*? A little *Harder*, to *blow out* a *Candle*: *Harder* yet, to put out the *Fire*. In short, when the *Town* is in a *Flame*, thank *Him* that neglected the *first Spark*.

Begin with
the Clergy to
prevent
Schism.

The *Prince* that would prevent *Schismaticall Seditions*, in a *City*, must begin with the *Clergy*, and assure himself of the *Pulpit*. To say 'tis *Dangerous*; may in some Cases be a *Truth*. But *Dangerous* as it is; If it be more so, to let them *Alone*, *What signifies that Objection*? Suppose the *Hazard* almost desperate, on the *One* side: But there's a never failing *Certainty* on the *Other*: *Here 'tis Hard*; *There 'tis Impossible*. It is *Necessary* also to suppress *Conventicles*, *Pamphlets*, and all other *Irregularities*, which either *Draw People together*, or *Unite* them, in Order to a *Separation*.

Let the Magi-
stracy be well-
affected,

In a Particular manner, let heed be taken, that the *Magistracy* of the *City*, consist of Persons *Well-affected* to the *Government* of the *Church*: And if they *Struggle*, let them be timely *Taught*, that the *Liberty* of their *Charter*, does not discharge the *Bond* of their *Allegiance*. This *Strictness* ought to be *indispensible*; for it is not to be *Expected*, that *One Schismatick* should *Punish Another*.

The *Second Grievous Complaint* is *Oppression*; and whether it be *True* or *False*, let it be *strongly Urg'd* and *Credued*, 'tis the same thing.

Oppression
procur'd by
Ill-Instru-
ments.

Some Oppressions are *Procur'd* at the *Instance* of certain *Ill Instruments* about the *Sovereign*; on purpose to stir up the *People* against him. And this is done by shewing how *Other*

Princes,

Princes hamper Their Capital Cities : Never considering, that the same manner of Governing will no more fit all Varieties of Custom, Temper, and Scituation, than the same Doublet and Hose will fit all Bodies. And then they Cry, This Damn'd City must be Humbled and Taken down. 'Tis very Right; but This must be spoken softly, and done warily. For to Level the Menace at the City, in stead of the Delinquent, is a great mistake. In such a Heat as This, a Prince needs no more than Three or Four Churlish and Rash Officers; Two or Three spiteful and Illegal Actions, to bring his Royalty in danger. Briefly; a Mean there is, betwixt Fury and Slumber; and equally ruinous to Princes, are Those Counsels that lead to either of These Extreams.

May not That very Thing which these People pretend they aim at, be done by Gentle, Legal, and Familiar Means? Let them. Choose their own Officers; That pleases the City: But 'tis the Publick Care to see the Choice be Honest: and that secures the Prince. On the One side, no Clemency can be too great, that stands with the Rule of Government: On the Other side, no Severity too strict, in Case of a Contumacy that Crosses it.

Burthenfom Taxes are many times a Great Complaint, and sometimes a Just One. Lighter, or Heavier they are according to the various Humours of the Prince; and the different Exigencies of Times and Occasions; Nay, and according to the differing Disposition in the People at several times, to understand them. Publick Necessities must be Supply'd; and the Supream Magistrat is the Judge of Publick Necessities. Yet still where a more than Ordinary Levy is Necessary, the Ordinary way of Raising it may be Convenient: for the One way, they only stumble at the Present Burthen; but the Other, they are startled with an Apprehension of the Perpetuity of it. In which Case, it fares with Rulers, as it does with Racking Landlords, in Comparison with Those that Let better Penny-worths. The One has more in his Rental, but the Other has more in his Pocket: And the Reason is; the Tenants run away with the Rent.

Sir Francis Bacon is of Opinion, That [Taxes and Imposts upon Merchants, do seldom good to the King's Revenue; for that he wins in the Hundred, he loses in the Shire; the Particular Rates being Encreased, but the Total Bulk of Trading rather Decreased.]

Though the Levy be Extraordinary, let the Way be Ordinary.

Some

Some *Oppressions* again there are, that proceed only from the violence of *Extorting*, and *Corrupt Officers*. To Complaints against Abuses of this Quality, a Prince his Ear is to be ever Open; for it is in a *Peculiar manner*, his Duty, to Relieve the *Oppressed*.

Priviledges are Sacred.

A Prince that *Invades* the *Priviledges* of a City, *Breaks his Word*: If they are *Forfeited*, he may *Resume*, or *Remit* at Pleasure: *Otherwise*, let them stand *Sacred*. It can never be safe to Govern *ad Libitum*: for when People find no *Security in Obedience*, it puts them upon the *Experiment of Sedition*. If a Monarch has an *Over-grown Subject*, that he would be quit of; that he would *Sacrifice* to his *Proper Advantage*; let him but give him a *Temptation* to *Encroach* upon the *Rights* or *Customs* of his *Imperial City*: and if he take the *Bait*, let him *Discover* him, and bring him upon the *Stage* of a *Publick Oppressor*. Such an *Action* lays That City at his Feet. To Finish; That Prince that would have his Subjects firm to *Him*, in *Danger*, must be *Kind* to *Them*, in *Peace*.

Poverty is a terrible Enemy.

The Fourth and Last Motive to *Sedition*, is *Poverty*: A *Terrible Enemy* to a *Great and Populous City*; Nor is such a City, in *Extream Want*, a less *Formidable Enemy* to the Monarch: for *Hunger* is neither to be *Aw'd*, nor *Flatter'd*.

The Prince not to forsake his Metropolis.

The *Causes* of it are so many, and so uncertain, 'tis hard to assign particular *Remedies*. In some Cases, *Restraint of Building* is convenient; In others, *Sumptuary Laws*; the *Regulation* and *Emprovement of Trade*; The calling of *Corrupt Ministers* to *Account*, &c.—For fear of the worst, it is good, if the *Neccessitous Party* grow *Numerous*, for the Prince rather to make *War* with *Them* abroad, then to *stay*, till *They* make it upon *Him*, at *Home*; by That means, exchanging a *Civil War*, for a *Forreign*.

If the *Mischief* be too far gone, and that it breaks forth into a *Direct Sedition*; yet can it very hardly happen, that a Prince can warrant the *forsaking* of his *Metropolis*.

First, with *Five Hundred Men* he keeps a *Million* in *Awe*; That is, If *He Himself*, and his whole Party, be not *Comp'd up under the same Roof*, *They* can *Destroy Him*, by *Number*; and *He, Them*, by *Fire*; in case of being put to that last *Extremity*.

Next;

Next ; Let the Prince but carry the First Scuffle, and (the World to nothing) the Town is his own. Whereas, let Him withdraw ; so great is the Advantage he leaves to the Rebels, both as to the Readiness, and Proportion of Men, and Provisions for War ; that (at a Distance) he may get the Better of Five or Six Pitch'd Battels, and yet Lose all at Last. For They shall sooner Re-enforce a Broken Army, than He Recruit a Scatter'd Regiment.

A Third Reason may be, that it lessens the Reputation of his Power, to give Ground.

We shall conclude with the Fourth ; which is, That Citizens will stand better, far from Home, than under their own Walls : for what with the Importunities of their Relations : Their Interests in view ; and the Convenience of a Near Retreat ; They Fight in Distraction. We speak here of a Civil War, for against a Forreign Force ; These Reasons transport them into a more Determinate Obstinatation. From the City, now to the Country.

SECT. VI.

How to Prevent Seditions from the C O U N T R Y.

IT is very rarely seen that the Country begins a *Seditious Quarrel*, unless in case of some *Barbarous and Depopulating Tyranny*, or for pure want of *Bread*. In Truth, their *Business* is too *Innocent*, and They're so *Full* on't too, they have scarce *Leisure* from their *Sleep and Labour* to *Think of Wrangling* ; and when they do, they *dread* it. The hurt They do, is by *Siding*, and *Seconding*, and That *Unwillingly* too : So that to keep Them *Quiet*, no more is *Necessary*, than to have an *Eye* upon their *Patrons*, and to allow the *Common Sort* only to *Live* upon their *Labours*.

Sect. VII.

Certain CAUTIONS Directing how to Prevent and
Avoid Dangers arising from the BODY REPRESENTATIVE.

There are Three Grand Hazards which Occur in the Consideration of a *Body Representative*. The Choice of the Persons; The Manage of Affairs; And the Subject Matter of their Consultations.

Let the Choice
be Legal and
Prudent.

Touching the *Choice*; Regard must be first had to the *Legality*; and Then, to the *Prudence* of it. : That the *Candidate* may be of such *Age* and *Quality*; and *Chosen* in such *Manner*, as the *Law* of the Place requires: And moreover, that he be a Person of *Moral Integrity*; A *Lover* of his *Prince* and *Country*; and One that Understands his *Duty* and *Employment*. There is a *Duty* also Incumbent upon the *Electors*; That they be not *Corrupted* by *Money*, *Overborn* by *Importunity*, or *Transported* by *Fear*, or *Favour*, to an *Unworthy* and *Unsuitable Choice*. From the want of This *Care* and *Fidelity*, proceed many times the *Ruine* of *Princes*, and the *Subversion* of *Kingdoms*.

Before the *Sovereign* Summons This *Grand Convention*, he may consider how the *Last Ended*; the *Present Temper* of his *People*; and hold a *Strict Intelligence* concerning such *Persons*, and *Fellowships*, as are likely to *Cross* him.

If the *Last Assembly* Acted and Concluded to the *Satisfaction* of *Himself* and the *Kingdom*, he may *Hope* well of the *Next*: but if the *Contrary*, let him expect a *Faction*: Unless in the *Intervall*, he take off That *Animosity*: which may be attain'd by doing That *Himself*, as of his own *meer Grace*, and *Motion*, which may bear some *Proportion* with what they would have done by Their *Deputies*: but within the Bounds of *Honour* and *Prudence*, there's a great *Difference*; betwixt a *King's Reforming* of *Abuses* by *Himself*, and by his *Counsell*: In the *One Case*, it looks as if the *People* help'd *Themselves*: and makes them think better of their *Own Authority*, then they ought to do: In the *Other*, they find *Themselves* *Dependent* upon the *Grace* of the *Sovereign*, and ascribe the

Better the So-
vereign Re-
form, than the
Council.

Relief.

Relief to his Bounty ; In fine, it is no tamis for a Prince still to ulher in, the Call of his Great Assembly with some Particular Obligation upon his Subjects.

As to the Rest, if the Prince finds the *Temper* of the People *Peevish*, and *Factions Boyling* ; such as no *Clemency*, and *Goodness* can Engage ; the less Subject for *Clamour* he leaves them, 'tis the *Better* ; and if upon *Convening*, he finds the *Mixture Petulant*, and *Soure* ; he may with the less noise *Dismiss* them.

According to the *Choice of Persons*, will be the *Manage of Affairs* : The *Publick Good* ; *Particular Justice*, and the *Dignity of the Assembly*, will be the *Chief Care* of a *Good Choice* : but if the *Choice be Bad* ; These *Noble Offices*, and *Regards*, will be the *Least part of their Business*. They fall then into *Partialities*, and *Sidings* ; Help me to day, and I'll Help you to morrow. *Acts of State* will be *Bias'd by Particular Interests* : Matters *Concluded by Surprise*, rather than by any *formal Determination* ; and the *Reverence of Order*, and *Reason* will be dash'd out of *Countenance*, by the *Voicings of Faction*, and *Clamour*. The Effects of a good Choice and of a bad.

As *Politick Bodies* have no *Souls*, so *Publick Persons* should have no *Bodies* : but leave those *Impediments of Justice*, and *Distractions of Counsell* ; (*Project and Passion*) at the *Dore of the Senate*. In short ; where such a *Partiality* happens, as we here *Imagine*, the *Two main Mischiefs* are These : The *Iniquity of the end*, or the *Disorder of the Means*. The *Former* may in some *Measure* be *Prevented*, by an *Oath to deal Uprightly* : (but the *Grand Failing* was in the *Election*.) The *Latter* may be *Regulated* by such a *Clearness of Rule* and *Method* ; together with such a *Strictness* in the *Observation* of That *Rule*, that both *Every man* may *know his Duty*, and no man dare to *Transgress* it. The Mischiefs of Partiality.

But Concerning the *Subject Matter* now of their *Consultations* : There lies the *Peril*, when they come to reach at *Affairs Foreign* to their *Cognisance*. The *Hazard* is This ; step by step, They *Encroach* upon the *Sovereign* ; Claiming a *Right to One Encroachment*, from the *President of another*. So that Meeting with an unwary Prince, they *Steal away* his *Prerogative by Inches* ; and when perchance His *Successor* comes to *Resume his Right* ; That *Pilfery* is call'd the *Liberty of the Subject*, and There's a *Quarrel* started betwixt the

Better a Ty-
ranny, than
an Anarchy.

King and his Subjects. Then comes the Doctrine in Play, That *Kings are Chosen for the Good of the People, and that the Discharge of that Trust and Care is the Condition of his Royalty.* The very Truth is, *All Government may be Tyranny.* A *King* has not the *Means of Governing*, if he has not the *Power of Tyrannizing.* Here's the short of the Matter: We are certainly Destroy'd without a Government, and we may be Destroy'd with One: So that in *Prudence*, we are rather to choose the *Hazard of a Tyranny*, than the *Certainty of being worry'd by One-another.* Without more words, *The Vulgar End of Government is, to keep the Multitude from Cutting One-anothers Throats:* which they have ever found to be the *Consequence of Casting off their Governours.*

When *Popular Conventions* have once found This Trick of gaining Ground upon the *Sovereign*; they catch their *Princes*, commonly as they do their *Horses*, with a *Sieve*, and a *Bridle*: (a *Subsidy*, and a *Perpetual Parliament*) If They'll take the *Bit*, they shall have *Oats.* But These are the *Dictates of Ignorance and Malice*: for such is the *Mutual Tie* and *Interest of Correspondency* betwixt a *Monarch* and his *People*; that *Neither* of them can be *Safe or Happy*, without the *Safety and Felicity of the Other.*

The best way to prevent the *Ill Consequence* of the *Peoples Deputies* acting beyond their *Orb*, is *Clearly, and Particularly*, to State Those *Reserves of the Prerogative*, with which they are not to Meddle. And likewise to set forth the *Metes and Bounds of their own Priviledges*, which They themselves are not to *Transgress.*

E I N I S.



